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INTRODUCTION 
THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITION OF TERMS USED 
A. The Purpose of this Dissertation 
l 
The aim of this dissertation is to propose a new 
approach to the investigation of ethical theory. All works 
in moral philosophy in some sense allude to ethical sources, 
but none has attempted to deal with the foundations of 
morals in the manner pursued in this dissertation. 
An attempt is made to answer the question: In what 
does moral expression inhere? In code, or in nature, or in 
some relationship between the experient and God? This 
dissertation Will. attempt to advance the position that moral 
standards can be reduced to three basic sources: one external 
to the experient, or imposed ethics; one internal to the 
experient, or immanent ethics; and a designate combining 
both external and internal sources, or imparted ethics. 
B. Method Employed 
The method used in this dissertation is analytic, com-
parative, and critical. Isolation by analysis reduces the 
moral philosophies of Jacques Maritain, W. T. Stace, and Paul 
Ramsey to their simplest fundamental forms. Those forms, or 
tenets, are then related, and the results, or empirical values, 
are criticized, 
2 
c. Definition and Use of Te~s 
To engage the vital conside~ations of this dissertation, 
clear definition of te~s will be essential. It is a common-
place that definition is an aid to precise communication, but 
the need of lucid, definite meaning is an indispensable 
adjunct of the forthcoming discussion. 
"Language has two primary purposes, expression and 
communication."1 Definition opens o~ bars the way to 
unde~standing. A good definition sets aja~ the doo~ to 
insight, but, conversely, a poor definition obstructs the 
t~ansit to comp~ehension. Exp~ession then must be language 
or some pre-linguistic analogue. 
With the int~oduction of language the problem of 
semantics a~ises. Language in the beginning was pedestrian 
and practical, but elaboration has involved it in inc~easing 
technical complications until too often definition has become 
"a needle in a bottle of hay." To fix permanent and uniform 
meaning to te~s is the real difficulty. Although each word 
has its own lexical meaning, it still may have a limited 
~ange of applicabil1.ty, which is determined by the context. 
The lexical level of meaning is the stage in which "meaning 
1. Russell, BK, 58, 59. 
is determined exclusively by rules and procedures of 
definition."2 This level is supplemented however b,y a 
second, a "syntactical meaning," in which "meaning is fixed 
and determined by the rules of snytax; for not every 
3 
combination of words is meaningful." 
The symbolism encountered in the process of defining 
represents the most stubborn obstacle to understanding. As 
a consequence, fine lines of' distinction will be necessary 
in defining and using the three major terms of this disser-
tation. In order to attain clarity, special meaning may be 
given to a term in certain instances. This privilege will 
be taken at the expense of' time and space needed to compare 
the special sense of' the term with the standard meaning, so 
that understanding may not be hindered. 
The three terms used in this investigation will be 
treated much more fully in the body of' the dissertation. At 
this point, the meaning and use of terms will be set i'orth 
as briefly as possible. 
IMPOSED ETHICS. By Imposed Ethics is meant 
any conception of' morality enjoined upon the 
adherent by a revealed fiat of God or by any 
arbitrary command of' man, either verbal or written. 
IMMANENT ETHICS. By Immanent Ethics is meant 
a standard of morality as the expression of' man's 
conscious experience, lived out in his total 
behavior, Whether the moral condition be human or 
divine. 
2. Werkmeister, BSK, 32. 
3. Ibid. 
IMPARTED ETHICS. By Impa~ted Ethics is 
meant a standa~d of mo~ality based on the 
conditioning of man's spi~itual selfhood 
always consequent upon a vital ~elationship 
between God and man in which the mo~al incentive 
is impa~ted di~ectly to man in a t~ansfo~ng 
expe~ience occasioned by obedient love. 
OWing to the grave possibility that these definitions 
as formulated a~e not fully self-explanato~y, attention will 
be given to further elucidation. To achieve this pe~haps it 
would be well to select from the definitions wo~ds ove~ which 
some question might arise and attempt to p~ovide clea~er 
meaning for them. 
1. Imposed Etymologically Defined 
Even though the~e is a comparatively standa~d meaning 
for the te~ imposed, its use in this disse~tation may 
require further clarification. It is derived from the.F~ench 
imposer and the Latin impono,-posui,-~. The French usage 
implies to charge, to impute, or to lay on as a burden, tax, 
or duty. In Latin, the sense of appoint is implied. Its 
equivalent, injungo, means to enjoin. This latter meaning 
is also found in the French. Equivalent English words, 
therefore, are charge, impute, burden, and enjoin. 
The synonym generally accepted for impose is authority. 
The terms imposed ethics and authoritarian ethics are 
5 
consequently used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
Authority is defined as "the theory of knowledge which 
maintains that the truth of any proposition is determined 
by the fact of its having been asserted by a certain 
esteemed individual or group of individuals."4 "Asserted" 
is not specific enough and should be extended to include 
anything asserted verbally or by writing. 
The use of imposed in this dissertation is 
restricted to overt relationships existing between an authority 
and a subject. In this sense, its meaning is in contrast to 
immanence which connotes relationships within the subject. 
For instance, a code, legal or ethical, enjoined upon an 
individual, even with his consent, is imposed so long as the 
relationship between the legislator and subject is external. 
Examples of imposed ethics are the Decalogue, the Koran, and 
all sacred ancient Scriptures believed to be revealed. 
Imposed ethics is thus related to the letter, not the spirit, 
of the law. 
In the New Testament, the letter of the law of the Old 
Testament was transformed into the spirit of the law, 
expressed by st. Paul as follows: "Forasmuch as ye are 
manifestly declared to be the epistle of Christ, ministered 
by us, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the 
4. Runes, DP, 29. 
6 
living God; not in tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of 
the heart."5 In Paul's expression imposed ethics is implied 
in the phrase 11 in tables of stone" which refers to the law 
Moses delivered to the people of Israel on Mt. SinaL 
2. Immanent Etymologically Defined 
The term immanent is far more difficult to define than 
imposed. It has a number of meanings, and the significance 
varies r.rom context to context. It is derived r.rom the Latin 
immanere, which means to remain in. In ordinary usage it is 
the state of being immanent, present, or indwelling. 
According to Runes,6 11 in Medieval Scholasticism a cause is 
immanent whose effects are exclusively within the agent, as 
opposed to transient." For Kant 11 the immanent is experiential 
as opposed to non-experiential or transcendent, 11 7 In modern 
metaphysics and theology "immanence signifies presence (of 
essence, being, power, etc,), as opposed to absence, 11 8 
Pantheism holds that the essence of God, or the 
Absolute, is fUlly identical with the world, and thereby 
immanent in it. On the contrary, Deism proposes that God is 
essentially absent from the world, and is, therefore, 
transcendent, not immanent. Theism, in religion or philosophy, 
5. II Corinthians 3:3 (King James Version). 
6, Runes, DP, 141. 
7. Ibid, 
8. Ibid, 
7 
believes that God is both transcendent and immanent in the 
world: transcendent in essence, but immanent in presence 
and activity. If we turn to logic we get still another 
variant, for there immanent is used in relationship to 
transient activity. The activity of the mind in producing 
no effect upon the object of knowledge is termed immanent; 
whereas, that which is known is transient, or transitive. 
With the understanding that the notion of immanence 
has figured prominently in philosophy from the first, the 
only system of philosophy to take the title was that of 
Wilhelm Schuppe (1836-1913) in Germany.9 Schuppe blended 
friendly aspects of British empiricism, Kant, and Fichte 
into a system which was denoted "immanence philosophy. 11 
The Real was identified with consciousness "considered as an 
inseparable union of the 11 1 and its objects. 11 10 All non-
conscious existence, such as Kant's ding-an-sich, is 
rejected. 11The categories are restricted to identity-
difference and causality. To the extent that the content 
of finite consciousness is common to all or 1 trans-
subjective' it is posited as the object of a World Conscious-
ness or Bewusstsein Ueberhaupt. 11 ll. This conception of God, 
heavily influenced by Fichte, requires that the "World 
Consciousness11 be immanent in the individual finite 
9. Runes, DP, 141, 142. 
10. Ibid. 
ll. Ibid. 
consciousness in contrast to the usual theistic idea that 
God is also transcendent. 
8 
This definition of immanence would still hold for 
pantheism, either natural or absolute, so long as the subject 
embodies immanently the ethical condition. It is not 
friendly to Deism owing to the transcendence difficulty, but 
if Deism holds that morality is an issuance of life from an 
immanent natural state, which it does, then in this respect 
Deism would be admitted, for the scope of immanentism com-
prises even naturalistic humanism, with its atheistic 
tendency. In short, the concept of God is not essential to 
1mmanentism; all that is needed is that man, determined by 
nature or free as a conscious person, lives out his life as 
nature intended. That is how such diverse philosophies as 
personalism, religious liberalism, and naturalistic humanism, 
especially the first and third, can be associated under the 
heading immanentism. 
3. Impart Etymologically Defined 
The inquiry into imparted ethics, which will comprise 
Part IV of this work, has to make its way without the usual 
help of philosophical terminology and background, for it is 
identified historically with theology and has never, in the 
writer's knowledge, been objectively philosophized. Its fate 
as a philosophy must be left until the fUll consideration 
in Part IV, but its terms will be investigated here. 
9 
The term imparted is derived from the French, impartir, 
and the Latin, impartire. English equivalents are bestow, 
share, grant, allow, or communicate. A broader scope would 
include yield, convey, and confer. Whereas the French and 
Latin verbs impartir and impartire denote division, to part, 
the English usage involves both transitive and intransitive 
meanings. For instance, impart in the transitive means to 
bestow a share or portion of, to grant or communicate, or to 
allow another to partake in, while the intransitive form 
' 
connotes to give a part or share. The transitive form yields 
itself to such statements as "The sun imparts warmth," "the 
fUrniture imparted an air of elegance to the room," or "I 
will impart a secret to you." It is therefore the transitive 
fonn of the verb to impart that applies in the definition of 
imparted ethics in this dissertation. 
The term selfhood as used in the definition of imparted 
ethics connotes ego, person, being, or soul, the importance 
of the tenn being to supply the idea that the subject is an 
active, fUnctioning existent with the ability to cooperate, 
not merely a passive, impressionable entity. The final, the 
most diff1cult of all, is the tenn transform. There is no 
equivalent state which will illustrate it. The meaning involves 
10 
a sense in which the problem is activated and modified in a 
cooperative relationship or experience of' "contemporaneity 
with Christ" by which "the image of' God is reflected in man 
because of' his position before him" (God).l2 
Inasmuch as further exposition here would mean the 
exploring of' extensive implications, which belong to the 
main body of consideration to come later, we must let the 
explanation as it stands suffice. Imparted Ethics, then, 
refers to a standard of morality shared with, or communicated 
to, the adherent by God which, although pervading the actual, 
tangible existence of the subject, does not deprove the 
subject of personal freedom in function not related to 
morals. The assentee is, however, under constant moral 
suasion through absolute obedience so that every moral act 
is a willed act. 
This moral ideal is not derived solely from an external 
or an immanent state, but it involves both in a vital relation-
ship. The subject is changed and influenced through a relation-
ship to God, in which the subject reflects the imago Dei. In 
this transformation is born the strong motivation of' neighbor-
love, which becomes the social basis of the ethical quest. 
Man is but a reflector of the love of' God, a consequent con-
tingent upon the position of man before God in obedience. 
12. Ramsey, BCE, 255. 
ll 
Impart is distinguished from impose in that the process of 
impartation does not enjoin upon the adherent a code, but 
rather transmits to him the character of the ethical ideal, 
in the same sense that a masterpiece of art imparts elegance 
to a room. 
PART I 
THE PROBLEM OF AU'l'HORITY 
PART I 
CHAPTER I 
THE MORAL IDEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY 
12 
A survey of either the popular or profound thought 
of the day discloses that all men do not agree as to the 
basis of their ethical beliefs. Whereas one trusts tradition, 
another resorts to reason, and a third is content with 
sentiment. If one segment of society is asked the reason for 
its ethical stand, it replies smugly that the church, or 
some other source, provides satisfactory evidence; another 
group demands rational coherence for all beliefs; and still 
another is pleased with a harmonious integration in the 
generall7-accepted customs of the time. The sentimentalists 
wag or nod their heads in coy obeisance to the changing whims 
of social custom. 
A brief analysis will reveal that most of the present-
d~ ethical beliefs, unless supplemented by something more, 
are inadequate as sound grounds for determining what is right 
or wrong. It is said that "all wisdom consists in our 
recognizing clearly and courageously the actual situation in 
which we find ourselves, and in acting accordingly.nl 
"Situation8 in this sense signifies the whole of the specific 
and ever-changing conditions in which we live, including tha 
1. Frank, PURT, 9. 
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people and interests on which we depend.2 A wise, or rational, 
standard of morals must, therefore, be coherently derived from 
experience and its relations. But "modern man is characterized 
primarily by his belief in his own free personality and in his 
moral perfectibility," according to Erich Frank. 3 If this is 
true of a large part of society, and it no doubt is, we must not 
forget, however, that still a large number of human beings are 
depressed with personality inadequacy and the wearying drag of 
moral imperfection. For them the science of psychology is no 
refuge. In the midst of this rather confUsing disorder there 
are some who have the intellectual fidelity and courage to demand 
reasonable grounds for all beliefs, even those having to do w1 th 
morals. 
A. The Need for Authority 
The present-day castigation of authority is an attack on 
unsupported or irrelevant authority, that based on tradition 
or custom, and not an assault on authority itself. The 
criticism of authority in ethics is not occasioned by its 
claim to authority, but rather from its dependence on some 
arbitrary authority Which does not support its claim. There 
is grave need of authority as the ultimate standard for moral 
judgment. Truth, or consistent verification, is the best 
foundation for authority. Truth is the most coveted prize of 
2. Frank, PURT, 9. 
3. Ibid. 
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philosophers, called by McGreal "the noblest of the idea-
gods to the philosophers."4 
1. Insecurity Drives Man to Authority 
Limited by a framework of broken reference, the elements 
of experience, man senses security in an unshakeable reality, 
a safe foundation, on which he can predicate his faltering 
beliefs. He feels that somewhere there is an invulnerable 
anchor of hope that will stand the strain of the "winds of 
doctrine." His innate sense of insecurity drives him on to 
seek rest for his faith in something that will not 1e t him 
down. In this restless quest appears the need of authority. 
But this is not the only evidence that authority is needed: 
the diverse opinions regarding moral beliefs which disrupt 
the unity of thought and practice among all peoples portend 
the necessity of authority. Roberts declares that 11it is a 
psychological fact of which all serious students of human 
nature must take account."S 
The need of authority has not diminished even though 
the basis of authority has changed from the Jaw-giver to the 
law itself. The ancient lawmakers shrewdly anticipated the 
needs of their peoplell!l and supplied them through sovereign 
decree or institutional means. The monarch's word or the 
4. AMC, 122. 
5. PC, 126. 
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institution of customs built up were never questioned. Duties 
were clearly defined and obedience was the secret of getting 
alor~. Penalties were devised to make the way of the 
transgressor hard, and rewards were offered to evoke trust. 
The problem of authority was simplified: the sovereign of 
state was the authority. If it was a matter of religious 
authority, either the state head or the church head 
prescribed the rules of conduct, and the adherents obeyed 
without question. The exalted sovereign either spoke by 
his own power or claimed the sanction of divine rights. In 
any case, the dictatorship was absolute in all things including 
morals, and the source of authority was unimpeachable. 
2. Historically Authority not Dependent on Reason 
An extensive invest~ation into the sociological and 
religious modes of those ancient days would be out of place 
in this discussion; besides, the important facts are 
generally known. We must be content, therefore, with only a 
brief glimpse of conditions related to authority, for a more 
intensive study of the moral ideas of the era will coms later 
in this dissertation (Chapter IV). It will be enough to 
note that authority was vested in human sovereigns or 
institutions or both, or in divinely-revealed standards. 
Conduct was imposed by decree. The point to observe is that 
16 
authority rested in sources not dependent on reason. As a 
consequence, vagueness and irrationalities of all sorts 
crept into the moral systems; injustices and inequalities 
were rampant. 
The unreasonable, and sometimes base, inequalities 
troubled the minds of good men. In Socrates, even though 
Rader considers him autocratic, 6 we discover the birth of 
a true moral ideal: the rational good for all. This 
rational concept was forged in the trial of his own soul. 
Once born, the ideal needed strengthening and development. 
This depth of character and meaning was supplied in the 
insight and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. As Borden P. 
Bowne stated: "Historically, the most important force in 
raising the moral ideal of humanity was the appearance in 
history of Jesus of Nazareth, his influence depending especiallf 
upon what he was, and also upon his thought of man and man's 
destiny."7 
3. Authority Vested in System 
As it took Plato to systematize the thought of 
Socrates, it took later theologians, such as Augustine, to 
work out the details of Christian theology. In the teachings 
of Jesus the fundamentals of morals were latent but 
6. EAS, 245-255. 
7. PE, 133. 
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unphilosophized. With the development or Christian 
institutions there was a strong tendency to interpret those 
original meanings in a way conducive to the ecclesiastical, 
and even political, advantages of the church powers involved. 
Distortions, misinterpretations, and doctrinal twists of all 
kinds rinally constituted the dogma of the church, as 
exempliried veritably in the Medieval period. These 
doctrines of expediency were a wide departure rrom the 
original and simple meaning of the Master, who had laid down 
as the summation of His teaching: "Thou shalt love the Lord 
thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with 
all thy mind. This is the first and great cornms.ndment. And 
the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as 
8 thyself." No logic can exceed the moral worth or the true 
meaning of these simple phrases; in that Bowne was right. 
But the accretion of dogmas has fulled if not obscured the 
light of truth imprisoned within these utterances. Because 
of the over-growth of religious dogma, instead of the natural 
development of the moral ideal, the Christian church lost its 
place in the sun as a source or authority in ethics. This 
was an unavoidable eventuality in the advancing light of 
science and philosophy. 
8. St. Matthew 22: 37-39 (King James Version). 
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4. Authority Vested in Science 
When the authority of the church failed, man sought 
elseWhere, first in philosophy, and then in science, for the 
sorely-needed ground on which he could predicate his trust 
and base his knoWledge. Science proved immensely helpful, 
for it supplied the data of sensory experience as raw 
material for thought. In Francis Bacon, in the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries, the restlessness of intel~ ct 
flowered, and the first fruits of the enlightenment were 
available for plucking. The glimmer of light which marked 
the dawn of the Renaissance burst into full glory in the 
years following Bacon. Bacon committed one error against 
which all successive thinkers should guard: while destroying 
the idols of traditionalism, especially medievalism, he 
unwittingly created another idol equally as false--the 
almightiness of science. Fortunately, Bacon's understandable 
enthusiasm for science has been tempered, but the error still 
exists. He was followed in over-wrought excitement about 
science by others, notably Auguste Comte, who "laid at the 
feet of science the crown of autocratic authority, triumphantly 
and contemptuously relegating both philosophy and religion 
to the scrapheap of time."9 He, Comte, "invested science 
with a sceptor she was incapable of wielding."lO Sigmund 
9. Flewelling, TP, 193. 
10. Ibid. 
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Freud, who developed the theory and technique of psycho-
analysis, although not adverse to the value of science, 
criticlzed man's "craving for grandiosity," and incidentally 
science, thusr 
Human1 ty has in the course of time had to endure 
from the hands of science two great outrages upon 
its naive self-love. The first was when it realized 
that our earth was not the center of the universe, 
but only a tiny speck in the world-system. The 
second was when biological research robbed man of 
his peculiar privilege of having been specially 
created, and relegated him to a descent from the 
animal world, implying an irradicable animal nature 
in him; this transvaluation has been accomplished in 
our time upon the instigation of Charles Darwin, 
Wallace, and their predecessors ••• But man's craving 
for grandiosity is now suffering the third and most 
bitter blow from the present-day psychological 
research, which is endeavoring to prove to the "ego" 
of each one of us that he is not even master of his 
own house but that he must remain content with the 
veriest scraps of information ~bout what is going on 
unconsciously in his own mind.ll 
Perhaps it is only fair to remark that the advance of science 
has corrected both its earlier mistakes and also those of 
Freud. Yet the observations of the brilliant Austrian 
physician are noteworthy. 
5. Disagreement Frustrating 
The moat frustrating obstacle in an attempt to estab-
lish authority is the disagreement among the various groups 
concerned. The need of authority is readily admitted; in 
fact the existence of such apparent differences, and the fact 
11. ILP,240. 
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that there is a ceaseless quest for authority are indicative 
of the need of it. Authority in the usual sense of the 
word, judgment imposed without sufficient cause, is no test 
of truth12 to be sure, but authority as sufficient reason 
for judgment-claims is the ultimate refUge of every argument. 
It is in this light that authority is used in these writings; 
not authority handed down, but authority arrived at by proper 
methods of experience and reason. This end, this rationale, 
is found in coherence. Thus the greatest degree of coherence 
becomes the authority, or ground, of argument. With the 
systematic elimination of contradiction, a probable consistency 
appears. This consistency may need to be revised as new facts 
are discovered, but the revision will always be in the direc-
tion of truth; cOherent insight will insure that. In short 
"the source of the authority is the test of the authority.•13 
6. Authority Versus Relativism 
This resort to a special definition of authority is 
effected to overcome the dangerous drift to relativism. 
There is a bearing in which all knowledge is relative, for 
all approaches to knowledge "have to be made through the 
experiences of human consciousness.•l4 Flewelling states 
12. Brightman, ITP, 51. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Flewelling, TP, 3. 
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further that, 11 in the realm of human thought we are never 
free from human implications and, when all is said and done, 
we can never be more sure of our universe than we are of 
ourselves, of our own existence, of the validity of our own 
experiences. 1115 He concludes, therefore, that "within the 
self is the ultimate uncontrovertible phenomenon. 1116 We 
cannot avoid the necessity of individual judgment of what is 
true. Added to this, which makes more difficult the road to 
objectivity in knowledge, is the fact that all knowledge 
begins with an assumption. "The very beginning of knowledge, 
the fundamental assumption on which alone it can proceed, 
must be some sort of dogma, even if it is no more than a 
belief in our intellectual capacity to understand 
Without this primary article of faith, learning is 
our world. 
17 impossible." 
Here is a clear indication that 11man is the measure." 
The vexatious problem is how to avoid a neutralizing relati-
vism which renders objective truth impossible. How to attain 
objective agreement on facts of experience, and thereby 
found a solid basis for future judgment, is the demand. This 
end cannot be accomplished by looking within as a final 
criterion, even though experience begins with personal self-
consciousness. Although there is truth in Professor 
15. Flewelling, TP, 3. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid., 4. 
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Flewelling's observation that all experience is first person 
awareness, there remains another element of experience which 
is not accounted for in Flewelling's limited definition, though 
believed by him. There is the element of objective reference, 
for nearly all consciousness is awareness of something external 
to the act of knowing. In this element of experience lies 
the ground for objective agreement: not person, but persons 
have experiences in common, and the object of their mutual 
experience is the rallying factor of objectivity in 
knowledge. Relativism that does not identify itself with 
skepticism is allowable, for relativism in the sense that all 
knowJe dge is related to personal experience does not prevent 
the fixing of objective standards of knowledge, especially 
the scientific. To this, no doubt, Professor Flewelling would 
assent. 
B. The Search for Authority 
A recourse to history is essential in the search for 
·authority, and history has been created by man. History is 
man working out his own salvation. Karl Marx and F. Engels 
proposed that "history is simply the activity of man pursuing 
his ends.n18 Sidney Hook corroborates their assertion when 
he writes: "tba t history is made by men and women is no 
longer denied except by same theologians and mystical 
18. The Holy Family. Gesamtausgabe, Berlin, 1932, p. 265. 
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metaphysicians.nl9 J. B. fury observes that "Historians have 
for the most part desisted from invoking the naive conception 
of a god in history to explain historical movements. 11 20 
George La Piana criticizes 11 The Theology of History," asserting 
that "To the historian these myths (which support the whole 
structure of the theology of history) are but human interpre-
tations of facts and experiences of life. 11 21 
The moral implications of history have been succinctly 
expressed by C. A. and M. R. Beard in their work, The 
American Spirit, published in New York in 1942. These authors 
believe that "this idea of civilization, in a composite 
formulation, embraces a conception of history as a struggle 
of human beings in the world for individual and social per-
fection--fort he good, the true, and the beautiful--against 
ignorance, disease, the harshness of physical nature, and the 
forces of barbarism in individuals and in society. 11 22 A. J. 
Toynbee in his Study of History23 analyzes the various 
principles which involve the genesis and growth of civilization 
and appears definitely to evoke a moral character al t..lJ.ough he. 
does not deal ~th history as a moral philosophy. P. A. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
The Hero in Histor~. Toronto: Longmans, 1943, p.ll. 
Selected Essays.ambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1930, p. 33. 
The Interpretgtion of History. Princeton: Princeton 
Press, 1943, pp. 154f. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942, p. 672. 
Vola. I-VI. London: Oxford University Press, 1933-39. 
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Sorokin in Social and Cultural Dynam1cs24 and other writings 
engages moral considerations, especially in his crusade for 
altruism. 
1. Philosophical Quest is for Authority 
The philosophical spirit is represented as "a quest for 
something on which everything else depends but which itself 
depends on nothing.n25 Essentially philosophy is a spirit, 
and methodologically it is a quest. Its objective is clear: 
it is truth. But science and religion seek the same objective. 
Is their difference a hopeless trifUrcation or is it academic! 
There is a genuine possibility that they may form a trilogy 
and are only different aspects of the same quest. Flewelling 
presumes that "the distinctions we make between science, 
philosophy, and religion are the different aspects under which 
we momentarily choose to consider the world of reality; 
difference which the mind sets up for its own convenience, 
somewhat as the engraver shuts out with the meniscus all but 
a narrow space of vision, for more effective work.n2S 
Professor Walter G. Gamertsfelder purposed that philosophy is 
24. New York: American Book Company, 1937-41. 
25. Class notes, course History of Ancient Philosophy, 
1946-47, under Professor P. A. Bertocci. 
26. TP, 5. 
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the "house-top" experience.27 Inasmuch as religion has its 
Window, chemistry its window, psychology its window, and so 
on, each of these insights is limited to the view from its 
particular vantage point; but philosophy ascends to the 
roof of the house of experience and looks all around, 
combining the truth of each window-view into a sublime 
totality of knowledge. 
Irrespective of the truth of these assertions, and 
the writer is convinced that there is merit in them, the 
conspicuous certitude remains that all thinking peop~ are 
on a quest for truth, and that an indispensable factor of 
the search is authority. The recurring inquiry is: by what 
shall we judge? Or better, by what authority shall we judge? 
2. Criteria of Knowledge 
To investigate the question further, the criteria of 
knowledge, the tests of truth, are brought under consideration. 
How would we know truth if we discovered itT Does truth 
imply that we must know everything about anything? If so, 
absolute knowledge is involved and truth then lies beyond 
the grasp of man. Does it suggest certainty, or unmodifiable 
judgment? With new facts arising constantly in experience, 
this position becomes untenable. Then what do we mean by 
27. Class notes, course Introduction to Philosophy, in 
Ohio University, 1941. 
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truth? Professor Brightman adopted the following meaning: 
"A true proposition is one that corresponds to a real state 
of affairs.n28 With this definition as a working guide, he 
then discussed cogently the various criteria.29 The search 
for truth moved through twelve criteria, as follows: custom, 
tradition, con sensus gentium, authority, instinct, feeling, 
sense perception, intuition, correspondence, practical 
consequences, consistency, and coherence. He found the most 
rationally satisfactory criterion in coherence, or systematic 
consistency. He drew a sharp line between systematic 
consistency and 11mere" or "rigorous" consistency.30 The 
search for consistency must be more than rigor and vigor as 
observed by William James. 
The search for authority, under the able and penetrat-
ing thinking of Professor Brightman, revealed the glaring 
inconsistencies of most criteria, but he was fair to note 
their strength also. In some he found a source of truth, 
but not a proper test of it, for instance intuition. He 
strove to ascribe proper credit to each, but each concealed 
a vital defect which was sufficient to discredit it. He 
gave to tradition a lagiti:.'ate fUnction, for without its 
traditions humanity would soon be reduced to barbarism. 
11Unappreciative hostility toward the pl. st is not merely in-
28. ITP, 47. 
29. Ibid., 47-73. 
30. Brightman, ITP, 68. 
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gratitude; it is cultural suicide."31 Yet tradition falls 
far short of qualifying as the best criterion of truth, for 
tradition itself must be judged by a more ultimate standard 
to heal its wounds. Tradition itself is rent with tragic 
conflicts; it is torn by irreconcilable schisms. 
(a) Agreement of Nations 
Authority as the agreement of "nations" or of individuals 
is to some extent "necessary for human survival, but it is 
not a test of truth,"32 In its superficial status, as the 
word of an expert or the dogma of a religious group, its 
value is sharply restricted. Knowledge has a social character, 
and no individual is sufficient in himself. Someone 1 s word 
must prevail in many of life's circumstances or the wheels 
of integration would stop. When we wish to know some fact 
about something, we resort to an "authority." If we desire 
to know the facts of vulcanism, the habits of eruption, or 
the detailed knowledge of ejectementae, we turn to geology; 
if we want facts about cell structure or diffusion and 
osmosis in plants, we go to botany; or if we have need of 
information related to the genesis and fUnction of the human 
mind, we turn to psychology. Why? There is the sense 
31. Brightman, IrP, 49. 
32. Ibid., 51. 
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of authoritative support in these sources. This practice, a 
common one, leads us to believe in the omnipotence of these 
sources unless we have trained minds to understand differently. 
Trenchant thought will penetrate the quackish exterior, and 
reason will disclose that ultimate ground has not yet been 
reached. The thinker must give a reason, and reason under-
girds the authority. 
(b) Instinct, Feeling, Sense 
Instinct and feeling prove inadequate as criteria owing 
to their inherent contradictions. Should one, for instance, 
accept the instinct of sympathy or resentment, fear or curi-
osity?33 These are confusing opposites. Or should one 
settle for feeling as a criterion when feeling can be good or 
bad, true or fa~e, permanent or changing? Sense perception 
is no better off, as the sensationalists, especially the 
positivists, have demonstrated. Ancient skepticism drew 
attention to the untrustworthiness of the senses. 34 Sense 
theorists today are facing the same troublesome resistance in 
sense data. 
There is an undeniable factor in direct knowledge, but 
this type of insight must refer beyond itself for its 
33. ~ightman, ITP, 52, 53. 
34. See Weber and Perry, HOP, 153-156. 
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orientation. For instance, the intuition of color gives a 
quality that must be rationally fitted into the pattern of 
thought. If intuition makes anything knowable, it takes 
reason to make it intelligible. Hence intuition depends on 
reason for its integration, and reason is the court of final 
appeal. 
(c) Correspondence 
Correspondence has been defined as representation of 
reality. This is a usefUl definition, but some would take 
the definition as a criterion.35 Even though correspondence 
may serve as a definition of truth, it is futile as a criter-
ion, especially when we try to compare our ideas with reality 
itself. The only possible comparison is between ideas, never 
between the idea and reality. One may have an idea of a 
typewriter, but the only way he can compare his idea with 
the typewriter is to get another idea of the type'llt'iter ani 
compare it with the first idea. No other medium is available. 
(d) Practical Consequences 
The use of practical consequences as a criterion of 
truth leads to disunion and cross purposes: a thief's 
ability to crack a safe may prove practically useful to him, 
35. Bl'ightman, ITP, 60. 
but to his victim it means entirely something ela e. The 
sale of a plot of ground in Florida may mean a livelihood 
to a crooked land-dealer, but if it is situated in the 
middle of a lagoon the purpose of the transaction is lost 
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to the buyer. How can practical consequences supply the 
factor of value necessary to its use as a criterion? It may 
be true that some proposition works, but it is not true 
because it works. At least the facts experimentally disclosed 
are only a part of the Whole application. 
36 As Professor Brightman has pointed out because all 
true propositions are consistent, it does not follow that all 
consistent propositions are true. In the syllogism All M is 
P, All S is M, then All S is P yieli1s truth only 1f it is 
determined before hand that All M is P. That the conclusion 
All S is P follows from All M is P is deductively exact, 
but actually, apart from the to~, All M may not be P, then it 
would not follow accurately that All S is P. For instance 
if the major premise claims that all politicians are honest, 
which is inductively wrong, then it would not follow that 
John Doe, who is a politician in the minor premise, is 
honest. He may be a scalawag and a thief. All true proposi-
tions are consistent. If we should begin with "All fish are 
36. Brightman, ITP, 67. 
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vertebrates," "a Northern pike is a fish," "a Northern 
pike is a vertebrate." This is both true, by inductive 
test, and consistent. But if we would say All fiSh are 
vertebrate, a scallop is a fish, a scallop is a vertebrate, 
an illicit minor premise destroys the truth of an otherwise 
consistent syllogism. Mere consistency in propositional 
thinking is not, therefore, adequate. 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the criteria 
examined to this point have one common lack: incompleteness. 
Each oan, and does, serve a worthy purpose within its limits, 
but each is fragmentary and inconclusive. This fundamental 
want must be satisfied; there must be wholeness, as much as 
possible, given to knowledge. Fractional detachment, or 
knowledge by morsel and crumb, cannot satisfy the rational 
mind. There is the plea for the whole loaf in awakened 
thought. We must pass, there fore, from the particuJa r to 
the universal, or from fact to its integration in the whole. 
The criterion which meets, as far as possible, this demand 
for synoptic completeness and integrity should receive 
superior accreditation. 
(e) Coherence 
So far as the disciplines of phtlosophy are concerned, 
there is one criterion which can lay the most valid claim to 
proof. That criterion is coherence, or systematic consis-
tency.37 Coherence literally means "sticking together," and 
it goes beyond the mere self-consistency of propositions to 
a comprehensive, synoptic view of all experience.38 No 
method which leaves out any area of possible experience could 
serve as a criterion. As Professor Brightman defined the 
coherence theory, it follows that "any proposition is true, 
if it is both self-consistent and coherently connected with 
our system of propositions as a whole.39 
As science is not almighty, neither is philosophy. But 
philosophy provides the honest seeker of truth with the most 
competent instrument, reason, and with the most universal 
field, all experience. Coherence as a criterion in its syn-
optic grasp gives to the searcher the needed analytic and 
synthetic approach to the problem of knowledge, This method 
of investigation inculcates the necessary analysis of science; 
it is as particular and discreet as the most enthusiastic 
nee-realist about the examination of the part. Yet experience 
itself teaches us that we cannot rest at the extreme point 
of reductiona the part is a part of the whole or its status 
as a part is meaningless. The truth about the part is in 
37 • Brightman, ITP, 68. 
38. Ibid. 
39, Ibid. 
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its relationship to the whole, or the parts composing the 
whole. This synthesis provides the basis for constructive 
knowledge. An isola ted part can never be explained. Explan-
ation is mostly concerned with the relations of the parts, 
and not with the parts themselves. This does not mean that 
analysis is useless; on the contrary it is of vital impor-
tance, but it is the beginning and not the end of knowledge. 
Imagine a neo-realist constructing a system of philosophy 
without the function of coherence! Any attempt at systema-
tization involves irrevocably the process of coherence. 
To deny coherence is to affirm it.40 To destroy the 
theory of coherence one would begin by eliminating any 
possible contradictions. He could accomplish this task by 
one method, by establishing the consistency of the proposition 
involved. To validate all the propositions he would have to 
move from mere, or partial consistency, to total or 
universal consistency. When he reached this point, he would 
have functionally confirmed the theory he set out to overthrow. 
3. Coherence not Absolute 
Perhaps this is the time to admit frankly that coherence 
is never absolute on the human level. Only an Absolute Mind 
could comprehend all the facts of any given situation and 
40. Brightman, ITP, 72. 
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thus arrive at truth as the whole. It may be questioned from 
this viewpoint whether there be such a thing as truth as the 
whole since each experience, even of the Absolute, invokes 
the necessity of revision. Viewed in this light truth as 
the whole would be only a momentary fact, for that whole 
would pass away and a new ome replace it at each instant of 
time. The whole then would be a aeries of completions each 
giving away almost instantly to incompletion. The problem 
would be settled by definition; the particular conception 
of the Absolute being the determining factor. If one should 
conceive of the Absolute in the Hegelian sense, completion 
yields to development; but Brand manshard would think of 
the Absolute as complete, composing all revisions within 
the One. 
But this criticism of coherence by-passes its 
essential worth. Because we cannot know everything about 
everything does not prevent us from thinking coherently about 
what we do know. If we think at all we ought to think as 
systematically and consistently as we can, and to follow this 
simple and direct formula is to practice coherence. Coherent 
thinking does not imply, nor require, absolute thought. It 
means at most a practical application of the laws of logic 
to the habit of thinking. "Logic is a science whose subject 
35 
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matter is thinking or reasoning." Logic and coherence are 
synonyms so far as process is concerned, Logic studies the 
operations of reasoning by which facts are observed and 
classified, evidence is secured and weighed, and sound 
general conclusions are drawn.42 "We do not really know 
any fact until we think it; that is, until we have succeeded 
in bringing it into relation with the rest of our experience, 
and have thus came to understand it,n43 This is a fair 
description of the theory of coherence, which does not 
explicitly denote each law of logic as it progresses, but 
which does include each of those laws. Broadly speaking 
both logic and coherence are disciplines which treat of the 
operations of the human mind in its search for truth, 
Logical thought is coherent thought; and coherent thought is 
logical. The word logic, in fact, is derived from the 
adjective corresponding to the Greek noun~6yoJ, which signifies 
either a complete thought, or a word as the expression of 
that thought.44 How could one better define coherence; it 
too is a search for the complete thought. 
Should it be necessary to explain that coherence on the 
human level is 11mitedT There is no advocate of the theory 
41. Gamertsfelder and Evans, LOG, 3, 
42, Ibid. 
43, Creighton, AIL, 3, 
44. Ibid,, 5. 
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who lays claim to omniscience. Coherence is not an end, a 
rational terminus; it is rather only a means. It may rail, 
or falter, and have to try again. The conclusions it 
reaches are not necessarily final; they may prove to be 
conditional. But at each level, or stage, or thought the 
mind is striving ror the most reasonable and conclusive 
insight possible to that point. If this is not perfection, 
and it is not, it is at least the fairest and best intellectual 
attitude available to human minds. If truth can be located, 
it certainly must lie in this direction; otherwise logic 
surrenders to tradition, and truth lies beyond the reach 
of human apprehension. 
C. Authority versus Authoritarianism: Conclusion 
The foregoing has been an attempt to fix the bounds of 
authority as well as to interpret it. We have discovered at 
least two meanings for authority. It can denote an edict 
handed down, as in the case of Moses imposing the will of God 
through the laws written on the tab~s of stone at Mr. Sinai, 
or it can indicate an empirical coherence derived from the 
facts of experience. In any event imposed ethics depends 
heavily on authority, but the type of authority which has 
characterized the theory is restricted to the "ready-made" 
rather than the rationally-validated order. The great weakness 
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of the theory of imposed ethics bas been that it ended at 
the beginning. There has been no development of its original 
tenets. Because of this evident stalemate the correction 
and enrichment of experience in succeeding years were lost. 
The bastions of ancient edict gave way under the impact of 
discovery and invention as truth advanced with the years. 
1. Progress in Harmony of Facts 
We make progress in any area of human knowledge by 
excluding those ideas which are either self-contradictory 
or out of harmony with known facts. The authorities of the 
past could not lend themselves in many instances to the 
facts laid bare by science, nor could they adjust to the 
scientific method. Nevertheless they retained their 
"authority" or jurisdiction and power over the minds and 
lives of the people. Sometimes the control was absolute, as 
in Calvin's theocracy at Geneva and the Roman Catholic total-
itarianism at Rome, and then again it was somewhat more 
democratic as exemplified in Protestant denominations which 
allowed freedom except in relation to God's revealed will as 
recorded in certain ancient writings. This is the author-
itarianism rejected by scientists and philosophers who turned 
from the ready-made edict to the test of experience as a 
criterion of truth. The quarrel was not so much with the 
ancient teachings as with the slanted interpretations and 
jurisdictional sway. Even Nietzsche could countenance the 
teachings of Jesus in pal't, but he could not beal' the 
"kingdom came• of Rome. No sincere theist discredits the 
purity and power of the ethics taught by Jesus, but many 
find adequate reason to dismiss as groundless the system 
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of beliefs which has marked the influence and development of 
the church through the centuries, and especially during the 
Dark Ages when all investigation was subjugated to the 
patronage of the church. 
All that honest intelJe ctuals demand in any age is 
that principles laid down, by whomsoever held, must accord 
with facts as verified in experience. Validity is determined 
by the testimony of experience which is open to all men, not 
by the fiat, or injunction, imposed by an "authority" whose 
claim to authol'ity rests in sources not open to fUrther in-
vestigation. 
2. Revision Mark of Progress 
The misuse of the prerogative of unhindered experiment, 
or the shortcomings revealed in its history, is insufficient 
cause to desert it and return to closed authority. Enthusiasm 
and immaturity have marked conspicuously the development of 
the empirical test. Frequent revisions have been necessary 
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to co~rect the pe~spective as it has unfolded. The fo~ 
~d1ments of Darwinian evolution, a case in point, have 
unde~gone ~evision, and one o~ more have been rejected by 
some thinke~s. 45 P. K~opotkin, a contempo~uy of Darwin and 
Spence~, while Darwin and Huxley were emphasizing st~ggle, 
took account of the evidence of coope~ation in natu~e.46 He 
gave cooperation equal emphasis with struggle, whereas Huxley 
stressed the notion of struggle in Darwin and applied it to 
all nature, including man. Spence~, in contrast to Huxley, 
sought to b~ing out the sociological aspects of evolution, a 
study which developed into "social Darwinism," a boon to 
early social sciences. 
In the train of Spencer and Kropotkin have followed 
many others. A Russian biologist, L. S. Berg, emphasized 
cooperation as a factor in the process of evolution.4? In 
1914 F. Von Bernhard! wrote a best-seller in which he frankly 
stated the warlike intentions of the German militarists and 
~ested his case on a nation's fitness to ~ule. In this book48 
Darwin figures prominently as the authority, giving scientific 
validation to such notions as st~ggle. EUt L. EUchner, also 
45. D. w. Puker in a class in the University of Michigan 
decla~ed that variation and nat~al selection as taught 
by Darwin were incredible. 
46. Mutual Aid. London: Penguin Books, 1939. 
4?. Nomegenesis, o~ Evolution Determined by Law. London: 
Constable, 1926. 
48. Ge~manz and the Next War. New York: Longmans, 1914. 
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a German, had published much earlie~ two fine works in which 
49 he had emphasized cooperation. A ~ema~kable work on the 
social life of animals by an eminent entomologist, A. v. 
50 Espinas, stressed cooperation. An incisive article by a 
distinguished psychologist, H. Cant~il, gives contemporary 
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emphasis to cooperation. Othe~ works in this field, an 
area unde~ intensive investigation, are by well-known authors 
such as Ashley Montagu, 52 C. Sherrington,53 W. M. Wheeler,54 
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and especially P. A. Sorokin. 
3. Advance Involves Time and Test 
Eminent empirical authorities have not always agreed, 
as is obvious in the foregoing review of the brief history of 
the theory of evolution, "The layman is not to be blamed 
for holding ideas that were largely conveyed to him, either 
directly o~ indirectly, by scientists who we~e themselves 
addicted to these erroneous ideas," Montagu states. 56 He 
continues, "the biologists of the nineteenth century, and 
many of their leading interpreters were largely responsible 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
Aus dem Geistesleben der Thiere and Liebe und Liebesleben 
in de~ Theirwelt. Berlin: the first, 1877, the second, 1879. 
Des Societas anima1es. Paris: Librairie Bailliere, 1878. 
11Toward a Scientific Morality.• Jour. Psy., vol. 27, 
pp. 363-376, 1949. 
Darwin: Competition and Cooperation. New York: Henry 
Schuman, 1952. 
Man on His Nature. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 
Essays in Philosophical Biology, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1939. 
Altruistic Love. Boston: Beacon Press, 1950. 
DDC, 11. 
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for the spread of these erroneous notions." The empirical 
advance has been over a path of trial and error; there have 
been frequent contradictions and wrong ideas in its system 
of knowledge at each stage of development, The adjustment 
of these faults has in each instance, notably in the theory 
of evolution, resulted in minor or major revisions of the 
original thesis, But it should be remembered that the 
changes are revisions and do not necessitate the repudiation 
of the theory, The use of freedom as a basis of research 
tends to produce a variety of ideas. If these ideas are at 
odds in the beginning, industrious tests will resolve them 
into a harmonious unit, Yet underneath all the time the 
theme of truth runs through them like the red thread of 
Ariadne, A similar case can be cited in religion, regarding 
the fate of th~ idea of love which Jesus pronounced as a 
basis of Christian sociology, In the history of the church, 
hate, power, prejudice, and malice have often obscured it 
from view, but love still "expressed the dominant ideal of 
the universe,"57 Time and test have proved that, 
These imperfections disclosed in the scientific method 
are chargeable to persons and not to the method, The weak-
nesses of technicians exposed in the conflicts of doctrinal 
interpretation do not at all weaken the method itself. Its 
57. Bertocc1, IPR, 545, 
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value is enhanced by its survival through error, the mistakes 
of its adherents. Yet in the process the possibility of 
eliminating error is presented, whereas in authority as a 
closed-case, error can be perpetuated with the grave danger 
that it may never be corrected. This fact marks the super-
iority of the scientific method over ready-made authority. 
4. Imposed Rests on Arbitrary Authority 
But in imposed ethics authority of the historical pre-
disposed sort is indispensable. Synonyms for imposed in this 
setting are command, order, decree, ordain, dictate, direct, 
or bid. There is implied, therefore, in the term imposed a 
sense of lordship or sovereignty. As already defined, imposed 
ethics refers to moral rules or codes forced upon the adherents 
at the behest of a superior. The superior may claim that the 
code is divinely revealed by writings, converse, or intuition, 
or that the code is his own creation as a representative of 
the Divine Head. The first type of superior is seen in Moses 
and the decalogue; the second the Philosopher King of Plato's 
Republic, the Pope of Rome, or Joseph Smith of the Mormons. 
In any of these, common morality is disposed by the regula-
tive power of the superior. His word is final in all things 
regarding right and wrong, good and evil, and the rational 
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capacity of the adherent is never explored; only his consent 
to believe is required. 
The superiority of the scientific method over authority 
is seen in the preponderance of evidence which it can bring 
to bear, the achievement of thousands of scholars, whereas 
authority is limited to the genius of one individual. Should 
ethics be the product of the great enterprize of the human 
mind, or should it represent the enlightenment of only one 
insight? The history of ethics marks a passage from force 
to persuasion, from the individual dictum to democratic 
cooperation. Authoritarianism may simplify ethics by placing 
control under one head, but it complicates process in that 
adaptation is never uniform. Truth to be impressive to the 
mind of the intellectual must have stood the test of time: 
veritas temporis rilia.58 Man's sovereignty is limited by 
time, both in thought and action. "Everywhere the supposed 
sovereignty or man's will and reason collides with the 
exigencies of history.• 59 
5. Authority and Tradition 
Arriving at this point in our discussion, the reader 
should not presume that we have abandoned the value of tradition 
58. "Truth is the daughter or time" (Francis Bacon). 
59. Frank, PURT, 13. 
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or the ancient religious truths. I~ one is intelrectually 
honest, he will be willing to face all ~acts. The 
appraisal of known facts does not at this place in history 
require the rejection of bona fide past data irrespective of 
where they have appeared, or under what circumstances. Un-
feigned reality will not be downed by argument or the 
pressure of years. Progress belongs to evolution not to 
revolution. It is against the background of historical truth 
that the actual situation of modern man stands out and becomes 
discernible for him. The past may interpret the present in 
as real a sense as the fact that the present interprets the 
past. The documents of the past, religious or philosophical, 
reflect the intellectual background of the time and socio-
logical conditions under which they were written. Eut, 
according to Erich Frank: 
Such connotations are of no consequence for the under-
standing of the quintessence of their truth. It is 
not the aim of religion to prove scientific propo-
sitions, but only to reveal religious truths. These 
revelations, therefore, for the modern philosopher 
become truly understandable only if he shows regard 
for their essence rather than for their accidental 
connotations. Interpreted in this way, they will 
divulge to him their full philosophical meaning, 
which remains valid even for the modern intellect. 
And this, in my opinion, is t~ task which religion 
imposes upon the philosopher. 
That Greek philosophy was born on the coast of Asia 
60. PURT, 17. 
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Minor, or that Hebrew tradition arose from an area identified 
with a small backWard agricultural strip of earth called 
Palestine, is not the point of importance. That the advocates 
of the two traditions, philosophy and religion, were intel-
lectual wizards for their time is still not the striking 
aspect for consideration, How the truths they spoke or wrote 
have endured is by far the most significant qualification of 
their integrity. Such truth is not the sole possession of 
any one source, whether it be religious, philosophic, or 
scientific, "However much we trichotomize our world for 
purpose of observation, the division is only academic, and 
none of us can be exclusively religious. We are looking at 
one reality under three aspects, the better to appreciate it, 
but the three cannot be absolutely dissociated, 1161 
6. Conclusion! Historical Authority Inadequate 
We conclude that authority in the usual historical sense 
is not worthless, but inadequate. ~ach man must, in the 
final analysis, see and interpret the world through his own 
experience, 862 A sincere application of the scientific 
method does not, for it cannot, destroy a vestige of truth. 
Even the scientist has not been free always from prejudice, 
61, Flewelling, TP, ll, 12. 
62. Ibid., 12. 
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and his ill-conceived hypotheses have missed the bull 1 s eye, 
for truth in time has a way of eliminating the radicals in 
science as well as in religion and philosophy. As Professor 
Flewelling insists, "Here he will see and understand the most 
who keeps open and clean the windows of his own soul, with a 
minimum of arrogance regarding his own understanding, not 
denying the understanding of others but anxious for that 
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truth which sets men free." 
63. Flewelling, TP, 12. 
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IMPOSITIONISM IN ETHICS: JACQUES MARITAIN 
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Imposed ethics rests on arbitrary authority, or that 
authority invoked without respect to rational justification. 
In philosophy it is designated as authoritarianism in ethics. 
Professor Titus represents fairly what is meant by the 
term Imposed Ethics in this dissertation when he observes that 
one group "would base morality upon some external religious 
1 
authority which is comparatively fixed and definite." As he 
states further, "the authority may be in the Bible, ••••• the Ten 
Commandments, some oburch or ecclesiastical institution, or 
certain moral codes or principles delivered at some time in 
the past. 02 
This conception of ethics is opposite ethical relativism, 
which asserts that morals are a matter of personal choice or 
private opinion. Authoritative ethics, used interchangeably 
with imposed ethics in this writing, involves arbitrary 
standards which the individual must keep regardless of his 
personal opinion. As Titus observes, ethics by authority 
submerges the individual in society, the standards of which 
he accepts without reflection on his part. 3 
1. ET, 118. 
2. ET, 118. 
3. ET, 118. 
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To accept the standards of an authority in morals 
destroys the basis of personal responsibility as far as 
rational criticism is concerned. The individual who submits 
to moral customs, if devout, generally considers the authority 
in which he invests his trust as infallible and final. In 
group morality this power of determination rests in the 
accumulated customs of the group. The authority may be that 
of a divine being, or its representatives. With the ancient 
Hebrews the law, given on tables of stone, was regarded as 
the specific revelation of a personal deity. 
Authority may rest in "divinely ordained rulers, as in 
the medieval period where the rulers, as God's representatives, 
were entit~d to the obedience of all men."4 Other author-
ities esteemed by men are the absolute command of the church, 
the ordinances of the state, "what they term 'natural law,' 
and their own private consciences."5 
A. Imposed Ethics Examined 
Imposed Ethics has its merits and demerits. The real 
advantage of such an approach to morals is found in its 
simplicity, especially to one who does not raise the critical 
questions for himself. The man in the street finds this type 
of morality convenient. If he does not have time to enter 
4. Titus, ET, 121. 
5. Titus, ET, 121. 
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into intense investigation, he can accept a ready-made system 
by simple faith in the source or authority. When the plain 
man submits thus to moral dictates, he can devote himself to 
other occupations than that of exploring the ethical issues 
of his day. He has not the time, opportunity, or temperament 
to question with any degree of thoroughness the validity of 
his belief; hence he leaves to others the question, "What 
are the rational grounds for this alleged absolute authority?" 
1. Perils of Impositionism 
This unquestioned acceptance of authority, however, 
presents several real dangers. As Montague observes, these 
dangers are, negativity in morals, delay of social progress, 
and destruction of the moral perspective. 6 Authoritarian, 
or imposed, ethics is essentially negative in character. 
The prohibitions involved tend to tell the adherent what he 
ought not to do, rather than what to do. This negation is 
summed up in the command, "thou shalt not." 
2. Retards Progress 
Impositionism in ethics is opposed by many because they 
believe that it retards the progress of social morality. 
With changing conditions, a moral code that is adapted to one 
6. WOK, 50 ff. 
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age may not be adequate for the next. New situations arise 
which require modification and enlargement of the code. 
Whereas basic moral values remain essentially stable, tran-
sient values need to be rethought and reinterpreted, The 
moral code dealing with the proper treatment of slaves, for 
instance, is obsolete, for slavery itself by many is con-
sidered immoral. If the society morality is to be advanced, 
old, useless, and outmoded rules of conduct must be aban-
doned, and new, adequate laws written, Morality must not 
consist merely of inhibitions, but it should include right 
incentives. The Golden Rule is an example of a positive 
moral standard: "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would 
that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this 
7 is the law and the prophets." By this dictum man is 
responsible to do right; the emphasis falls on doing. 
3, Destructive of Moral Perspective 
Montague asserts that authoritarianism in morals is 
destructive of the moral perspective because it considers 
acts wrong if they violate the moral code, regardless of 
whether or not they relate to life's fUndamentals. Minor 
details, Which might be non-essential to the moral per-
spective, if placed on the same level with recognized 
7. St. Matthew 7: 12 (King James Version). 
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universal acts of immorality and condemned by some authority, 
tend to discredit the authority by casting doubt on his 
wisdom and insight. The breakdown which follows tends 
further to cast suspicion on all rules of conduct. To equate 
a lack of consistent church attendance with adultery or 
murder is a point in question. 
To conclude the analysis of imposed ethics, it should 
be noted that the simplest definition which could be given 
to this type of moral philosophy is: Morality enjoined upon 
the adherent by an external authority, in the form of a code, 
duty, or revelation. 
B. Imposed Ethics Centers in Catholic Church 
The tradition of imposed ethics finds its center of 
gravity in the Roman Catholic church, with its hierarchy of 
bishops and complicated doctrines of redemption. 
St. Thomas Aquinas, who formulated the philosophical 
system behind Catholic theology, held that the Christian 
virtues have their origin in an infusion of character by God's 
grace.s Ostensibly the source of Catholic ethics then would be 
of the nature of infusion, or impartation of the divine grace. 
A casual estimate of Catholic philosophy would place the locus 
8. Ramsey, BCE, 213. 
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of morality Within the subject. This however, would repre-
sent a radical miscarriage of truth between theory and practice, 
for the moral ideal of the Roman Catholic church is not 
actually founded on an operation of infused grace, but on an 
ecclesiastical conception of the value of the sacraments as 
ordained and administered by the priests of the church. 
1. Authority of Church Ultimate 
Thus the authority of the church is more ultimate and 
becomes, thereby, the true source of the moral ideal. The 
sacraments are the occasion of the infusion of grace, pro-
vided the church's authority prevails. The true source of 
ethical strength, therefore, is not in the expressing 
subject fortified by infused grace but in the truth-claim 
of the church which gave the idea birth. 
Leaving behind the conception of infusion by the 
Angelic Doctor,9 Roman Catholicism erected a structure of 
moral judgments based on the church's infallibility. These 
judgments, in turn, are imposed on adherents of the Catholic 
faith, imposed here meaning enjoined with or without rational 
justification. Hence the moral ideal of the Roman Catholic 
church is designated as imposed, owing to the authoritarian 
9. Pegis, EWSA, Vol. II, 1022-37. 
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administration on which it rests. 
The purpose of this investigation is not to challenge 
the religious or social status of the church involved, but 
merely to examine its claim to authority in morals as a 
representative example of imposed ethics. Admittedly, the 
Catholic church is not the only instance of imposed ethics, 
for any moral code, the Decalogue for one, might be cited as 
a clear case of impositionism. The Catholic church is 
singled out to represent the idea of authoritarian ethics 
because of its broad influence in the general consideration 
of ethical ideals, and especially its claim to universal 
jurisdiction in all things related to morals. 
Whereas the Roman Catholic church lays claim to 
exclusive power and right in the conception and administration 
of morals which it holds are derived from Christian reve-
lation, its ethical code is a development of standards in 
morals derived from the history and experience of the church, 
with no Scriptural basis indicated or claimed for some of 
its prohibitions; for instance, abstaining from eating meat 
on Friday. 
2. Impositionism Also in Protestant Church 
Impositionism in ethics exists also in the Protestant 
branch of Christianity, but in a much milder form. Rigid 
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examples of imposed ethics in Protestantism are seen in 
Calvin's Geneva theocracy, some early forms of Lutheranism, 
and in American Puritanism. In fact, wherever objective 
standards of morals are observed a form of impositionism 
obtains. The alternate is relativism. But the indirect, 
incidental form of imposed ethics in Protestantism generally 
is so greatly tempered by individual liberty as to render it 
non-exemplary as a thorough-going form of morality by 
authority. If a protestant differs with his source of denom-
inational authority, he may change to another demonination, 
or even to another religion, and his name is crossed off the 
membership roll. His salvation is not dependent upon his 
vital relationship to any particular church, but in Roman 
Catholicism excommunication is fatal to the soul. Although 
the Catholic church claims to base its doctrines on revela-
tion, as an authority the church rises above revelation 
pertaining to the Scriptures. It is judge also of the Scrip-
tures. Thus the revelation on which it bases its claim to 
supremacy is actually the insights of its own leaders, a 
self-revelation which it imposes as the will of God. 
To understand the vast, sprawling ecclesiasticism of 
Romanism would require a life-study of its highly-detailed, 
but complicated, theological system. This interesting 
venture cannot be taken here. Since a brief resume of the 
church's history would be helpful in grasping its ethical 
notions which are so vitally related to its theological 
tenets, we shall proceed to it. 
3. Catholic Church Defined 
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By the Roman Catholic Church is meant "the visible 
body or organization which Christ Himself set up to perpet-
uate for all time the authoritative teaching of the truths 
Which He came on earth to reveal to mankind. 010 In this sense 
there can be only one church, divinely constituted, protected, 
and ordained to accomplish the heavenly m1ssion. 11 A more 
technical definition would be: 
The Church instituted by Jesus Christ is the 
visible society of men who, having received 
baptism, are united in the profession of the 
same faith and in one communion, are seeking the 
same spiritual end, under the authority of the 
Roman Pontiff, the successor of St. Pef~r, and of 
the bishops who are in union with him. 
To this earthly body, the church, Christ, as Founder 
and first Head, has given the sole right and duty to teach, 
guard, and maintain the doctrines which He taught. This 
divine mission is to the whole world, not just to any parti-
cular religious group, and is without 0 let or hindrance on 
the part of any human power."13 It is obvious from the nature 
10. Enc. Brit. vol. 19, 405. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid. 
of the church that all men come under its jurisdiction, and 
it is clear that "men are bound to submit to its authority 
as soon as they become clearly aware of its existence and 
14 
of its divine claims to their allegiance." There may be 
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some leeway in technical interpretation, but from the plain 
implications of the authority vested in it, submission to the 
church is essential for salvation,l5 
The Roman Catholic church is believed by its leaders to 
be an organism, not merely an organization of believers, In 
16 fact the church has body and soul. What is known as the 
visible church is the body, a union of the faithful with 
their organization and government, The soul denotes all those 
invisible elements which give life to the body,l7 The soul 
"renders the body capable of attaining the supernatural end 
for which alone it exists, namely sanctifYing grace, and in-
fused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the like,n18 
As to whether a soul can be saved outside the fold of the 
church is settled by the complicated device of spiritual re-
lationship in which "sanctifYing grace is essential for 
salvation, so no one can be saved who does not belong to the 
soul of the Church, and who does not, at least desire and 
14, Eno. Brit, vol, 19, 405, 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid, 
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intend to belong to its body."19 Without this sincere re-
lationship no one cen have evidence or love ror God nor 
20 perrect sorrow ror sin. "The Church has the right and 
duty or teaching all without exception." 21 
Central in the theology and dogma or the church is the 
ractor of unquestioned obedience. No professed follower can 
for long flout the dogma of the church. Any disregard or 
disrespect is counted as irreverence and places the subject 
in danger of excommunication. The unity of the church is 
founded upon "the Apostolic See of Rome; and all men are 
strictly bound by divine law to enter into the unity of this 
Church so soon as they become really aware of its existence 
22 
and fully conscious of its divine claim upon them." 
The purpose of this investigation does not require that 
we question the accuracy of the claims of the church of Rome, 
either as to historical facts or purity of doctrine. The 
point is to show that the Roman Catholic church is an 
authoritarian power, and that its moral philosophy is based 
on its authority over the moral-religious lives of its 
subjects. No other logical conclusion could be derived from 
its historical background. By its own admission it holds 
19. Enc. Brit. vol. 19, 405. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
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primacy over the temporal, spiritual, and eternal welfare of 
all men. This claim to allegiance cannot be shared with 
any other authority; it belongs to the Roman Catholic church 
alone, 
C. Maritaina Cammon Good Ground for Authority 
Jacques Maritain attempts deftly to set the church's 
moral house in order by arguing that authority rests on the 
foundation of the common good or moral law. "The common good 
is the foundation of authority," he states, in an effort to 
show that "the aim of society is its own common good, the 
good of the social body, 823 
From the context it appears that Maritain tries to 
make a strong case for the social aspect of man so as to 
avoid the threat of individualism, especially material individ-
24 
ualism, which he defines as 8 the animal man." One would 
think in the beginning that he is making a bold case for 
humanitarianism. 25 In fact, in one of his writings he takes 
humanism as his subject, His real purpose seems to be to 
propose the Roman Catholic church as the true society of 
mankind, 
The worth of human personality is discovered in the 
23. Maritain, RMNL, 8. 
24. Maritain, TR, 26, 
25, True Humanism. Also "Christian Humanism," April, 1942, 
Fortune, 25: 106-107. 
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church, the grace of which enhances all with which it comes 
in contact. Outside the church persons are deficient selves, 
for "a person possesses absolute dignity because he is in 
direct relationship with the absolute, in which alone he can 
26 find his complete fulfillment.• Man is a part of a whole, 
he is not a whole, unless described as an "open whole.•27 
Certainly he is not "a little god without doors or windows, 
like Leibniz's monad, or an idol which sees not, hears not, 
speaks not.•28 Man tends by his very nature to social life 
and to communion. "His spiritual fatherhood consists of the 
entire order of things which have absolute value, and which 
reflect, in some way, an Absolute superior to the world and 
which draw our life towards this Absolute.•29 
Since society is also a whole (man being an open whole), 
then society is a whole composed of wholes, properly defined. 
Society is an organism "composed of liberties, not just of 
vegetative cells."3° For while man is a whole he is not an 
independent whole, at least not in the sense which is proper 
only to God. Man as an "open whole" functions as a cell in 
an organism, openness being a way of indicating his indispen-
sable attachment to other human persons in the functioning 
26. Maritain, RMNL, 5. 
27. Ibid., 6. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid., 5. 
30. Ibid., 7. 
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whole. He cannot be closed off in an atomistic individualism; 
therefore he is said not to be a "closed whole."31 His 
interests and fate are irrevocably tied to the destiny of the 
whole as a society. There is no individual good or aggregate 
32 goods, but "the common good." 
1. Common Good Inclusive 
Maritain explains the common good thus: 
The common good of society is neither a mere 
collection of private goods, nor the good proper to 
a whole, which (as in the case of the species with 
regard to its individual members, or the hive with 
regard to the bees) draws the parts to itself alone, 
and sacrifices these parts to itself. It is the 
human good life of the multitude, of a multitude 
of persons, the good life of totalities at once 
carnal and spiritual, and principally spiritual, 
although they more often happen to 11 ve by the 
flesh than by the spirit. The common good of 
society is their communion in the good life; it is 
therefore common to the whole and to the parts, 
Which are in themselves wholes, since the very 
notion of person means totality; it is common 
to the whole and to the parts, over which it flows 
back and which must all benefit from it.33 
The common good involves as its chief value the highest 
possible attainment (that is, the highest compatible with 
the good of the whole) of persons to their lives as persons. 34 
In this we discern the first essential characteristic of the 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
Maritain, RMNL, 5. 
Ibid., 7. See also "Catholic Church and Social Progress." 
Foreign Affairs, July, 1939, pp. 670-685. 
Mir1tain, RMNL, a, 9. 
Ibid., 9. 
common good: "it implies a redistribution, it must be re-
distributed among the persons, and it must aid their 
development."35 But there is a second characteristic which 
is related to authority in society. This characteristic is 
of greater importance to this investigation, for it is in 
this sense that Maritain declares that 11 the common good is 
36 the foundation of authority." 
2. Common Good Basis of Authority 
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In leading a society of persons toward their common 
good it is required that certain individuals37 be charged 
with guidance and those who follow must obey. This authority 
applies to those Maritain calls free men, in contrast to the 
power held over human beings for the particular good of the 
master himself. The extent of subjugation required for 
obedience is not clearly marH8d by Maritain. He specifies 
that personality must be preserved through individuality, 
38 for when "you kill the individual you also kill the person." 
35. Maritain, RMNL, 8, 9. 
36, Ibid, 
37. A footnote explains that 11 in certain cases authority 
may be exercised directly by the people themselves, 
but in such instances we are dealing with very small 
communi ties leading a very simple life, or with 
particular decisions to be made by referendum," 
38, Maritain, EC, 35. 
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This places a high value on the person as individual, yet at 
the other extreme he holds that man "finds himself' by sub-
ordinating himself' to the group,w39 
Throughout Maritain 1 s writings there is a strong f':Bvor 
of' true democracy, denoted by the sacredness ascribed to 
personality, and one would easily be ~d to believe that this 
philosopher is a ranking champion of' human freedom. Compli-
cations arise, however, when he attempts to orient the notion 
of' human f'reedom into a religious totalitarianism such as 
Roman Catholicism. Maritain senses no real conf'lict, but 
rather believes that in return f'or man's subordination 
society pays of'f' in rich dividends. The relationships in-
volved between the individual and society are not easily 
ascertainable; they are complex and dif'f'icult to perceive, 
and especially to describe in their f'ullness. Following 
Aristotle, he states that "the whole is greater than its 
40 parts. 11 fut ref'erring to Christianity he adds that the 
human person is more than a part. The clash between these 
two principles produces the crux criticorum that Maritain 
must engage and conquer. 
Man and the group are therefore intermingled 
one with the other, and they mutually surpass each 
other in dif'ferent frames of ref'erence. Man f'inds 
39. Maritain, RMNL, 18, 
40. Ibid. 1 11. 
himself by subordinating himself to the group, 
and the group attains its goal only by serving 
man and by realizing that man has secrets which 
escape the group ani1a vocation which the group does not encompass. 
To grasp these points clearly is 
to understand the compromise between totalitarianism and 
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personalism. Because on one hand life in society is natural 
to the human person, and on the other, since man has a root 
of independence in him, there is also opposition; there 
exists a certain tension between the person and his society. 
The solution is "dynamic; it provokes movement and is 
42 
accomplished by movement." The person moves "from the 
family group (more basic because it has to do with the per-
petuation of the species) on to the civil or political 
society (more exalted because it has to do with rational life 
itself), and in the midst of civil society it feels the need 
for more limited groups or fellowships which will contribute 
43 to its intellectual and moral life." In his vertical rise, 
above the plane of civil society, "the person crosses the 
threshold of a kingdom which is not of this world and enters 
a supra-national, supra-racial, supra-temporal society which 
is called the Church, and which has to do with the things 
that are not Caesar 1s."44 
41, Maritain, RMNL, 11. 
42, Ibid., 18, 
43. Ibid., 19. 
44, Ibid, 
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3. Maritain1 s Concept of Society 
The conception of society as outlined by Maritain is 
characterized by four featuresa (1) Personalist, a root of 
independence aspiring to ever greater independence until the 
perfect spiritual liberty is achieved; (2) communal, in 
which the common good is superior to that of the individual; 
(3) (a) pluralist, a group of societies, or a state, and 
(b) "above all is the Church in the mind of Christians;" 
(4) and Theist or Christian, a feature which does not require 
that every member of society believe in God and be Christian, 
but in a sense that it recognizes that in the reality of 
things "God, principle, and end of the human person and 
prime source of natural law, is by the same token the prime 
source of political society and authority among men.n45 This 
escalator movement begins with the person, a strong position 
of democratic and human freedom, and ends in ecclesiastical 
totalitarianism, a final and complete subordination of self-
hood to the "prime source of political society and authority 
among men"--the church. So long as the individual cooperates 
in the movement he contributes to the common good whether he 
is Christian or not. Professor Maritain then confirms that 
45. Maritain, RMNL, 21. Cf. "Foundations of Democracy". 
Nation, April, 1945, pp. 440-442, where Maritain proposes 
that Democracy is founded on the doctrines of Aristotle 
and Aquinas, Who provided "the rational foundation of 
democratic philosophy." Maritain adds to this the Gospel. 
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this conception of society and man ties civil society to 
religion When he says: "In this conception civil society is 
organically linked to religion and turns consciously towards 
the source of its being by invoking divine assistance and 
the divine name as its members know it."46 Each must recognize 
the supreme authority of the church "by respecting and 
facilitating, on the basis of the rights and liberties of each 
of us, the spiritual activity of the church and the diverse 
religious families which are grouped within the temporal 
community."47 
The Catholic church "insists upon the principle that 
truth must have precedence over error, and that the true 
religion, when it is known, should be aided in its spiritual 
mission in preference to religions whose message is more or 
less faltering and in which error is mingled with truth.n48 
It is to be taken for granted here that the Roman Catholic 
church is the repository of truth and is, by that designation, 
to receive the preference. Because of its spiritual super-
iority the church must reach temporal and political transcen-
dence, although this aspect of the sociological relationship 
of the church is merely implied. 
46. Maritain, RMNL, 22. 
47. Ibid. Also, "Faith To Live By." u. N. fulletin, May, 
1947, pp. 568-570. 
48. Ibid., 26. 
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4. Man's Social Success Depends on Church 
Maritain does not hesitate, however, to serve notice 
that the success o~ man's social venture depends on the ~nal 
union o~ his interests, and destiny, with those o~ the church; 
and that the ~oundation o~ temporal good is securely grounded 
in the church, so that to reject the authority o~ the Kingdom 
49 o~ God on earth gravely endangers the temporal good. France 
is cited as 11E.xhibit A11 in respect to the value o~ religion 
in a nation, where the Catholic church derives special 
strength of spir1 tual radiance, owing 11 to the preponderance 
of her moral authority and her religious dynam1sm. 1150 It 
strikes the writer as odd that France, a nation with a century 
o~ atheism and general decadence behind her, should be chosen 
in pre~erence to Spain or Portugal, or better still Italy. 
Portugal adopts the moral princip~ s of the Catholic church 
and maintains a closer alliance with it, at least in recent 
years. 11The Portuguese State, which permits all cults and 
does not support an o~ficial church, is not neutral as 
regards doctrine and morals ••• the State adopts the principles 
o~ Catholic Christian doctrines and morals."51 
49. Maritain, RMNL, 27. 
50. Ibid. 
51. The Co~nweal. New York: February 5, 1943. (Underlin-
ing lriina. F'or comparison note "Rights o~ Man." U. N. 
Bulletin, Nov. 18, 1947.~ pp.672-674. In the u. N. address 
Maritain called ~or a "world Declaration o~ the Rights 
o~ Man," a moral charter of the civilized world. He 
declared that the rights of man "are founded upon natural 
law ••• the source of duties and rights." 
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From the foregoing there is sufficient reason to believe 
that the Roman Catholic church, philosophically, bases her 
authority on the common good, but there is the intrinsic im-
plication that the common good depends on the authority of 
the church. As Maritain works the problem out he supports a 
reciprocal relationship as philosophically and socially 
sound, even though the shadow of Catholic totalitarianism 
looms in the background. 
5. Maritain 1s Conception of Person 
A simple interpretation of the Maritain philosophy puts 
the whole matter thus: Man is a person with individual 
rights which must be respected, but he has social inclinations 
and finds his fUll development in social intercourse. In 
order to forestall the tendency of the "root of independence" 
to eventuate in anarchy, social restraint must be imposed 
and accepted, if the common good is to be served. The impo-
sition of restraint functions best through the highest 
authority, the church, whose control is absolute, but not so 
conclusive as to destroy the autonomy of the individual. It 
is the writer's opinion that Professor Maritain did not show 
enough of the workable compromise which is prerequisite to 
the theoretical and practical conclusion of his original 
premise. It may be true that the common good is more 
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effectively aided by the inclusion of religion, and specifi-
cally the Roman Catholic religion, but there is not enough 
evidence revealed to warrant the conclusion. There is lurk-
ing always the surmise that the Catholic religion is the 
only true religion and is therefore the religion whic'.-:~ can 
bestow the greatest benefits upon society. This may be true, 
but it is not proved; nor are the arguments brought to bear 
upon the problem exhaustive. If one notes carefully the line 
of argument from beginning to end in Maritain, the church is 
brought in as an assumption, or belief, and not as an empiri-
cal and logical necessity. This is the true weakness of a 
philosophical system that is to be commended for its strong 
emphasis on the value of personality. 
"Thomistic personalism stresses the metaphysical dis-
52 tinction between individuality and personality." The first 
to show the fecundity of this position in relation to con-
53 temporary moral and social problems were Schwalm and 
Garrigou-Lagrange. 54 Maritain has followed these and Welty55 
52. Maritain, PCG, 3. 
53. R. P. Schwalm, O.P., Lecons de Philosophie Socialet 
reedited in part under the title, La Societe et 1 Etat. 
Paris: Flammarion, 1937. 
54. R. P. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., La Philosophie de 1 1Etre 
et le Sens Commun. 1st edition, Paris; Beauchesne, 1904; 
4th edition, Paris: Desclee de ~ouwer, 1936. 
55. Eberhard Welty, O.P., Gemeinschaft and Einzelmensch. 
Salzburg-Leipzig: Pustet, 1935. 
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in the attempt to make explicit the meaning of the distinction 
and to develop its consequences in political and social 
philosophy. 
Maritain 1 s definition of the pe~son is p~ecisely 
Thomistic. 
"The human being is caught between two 
poles; a mate~ial pole, which in reality, does 
not concern the t~e pe~son but rathe~ the 
shadow of personality or what, in the st~ict 
sense, is called individuality, and a spirS~ual 
pole, which does concern true pe~sonality. 
Personality is defined as "the substance of the spiritual 
soul communicated to the human camposite ••• the secret depths 
of our ontological st~uctu~e, a so~ce of dynamic unity, of 
unification from within."57 The pe~son is directly related 
to the absolute, in which alone he· can enjoy his full 
sufficiency. 58 Individuality, o~ self, is good as it is 
~elated to pe~sonality. To give p~eponderance to the indi-
vidual aspect of being is the occasion fo~ evil to arise.59 
D. The E~ro~ of Immanence 
In cont~apositive cont~ast to the imposed morality of 
Roman Catholicism stands the principle of immanence, basic 
56. PCG, 23. 
57. PCG, 31. 
58. PCG, 32. 
59. PCG, 33. An inte~pretation of the self as c~eative can 
be found in "Things and the Creative Self." Magazine of 
A~t, 1953, pp. 51-58. 
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in Lutheranism. Many would question this assertion, saying 
that Luther merely shifted the center of authority from the 
church to the Bible. That is only part of the truth, for 
he also believed in some type of immanence as implied in the 
expression, "the just shall live by faith." The immanence 
denoted by Maritain is the internal aspect of man as against 
the external, or spirit as opposed to authority. The use of 
immanence here is Maritain 1 s, but it resemb~s closely the 
use of immanence in Part III of this dissertation. The two 
uses are the same 1n that they refer to inwardness, but 
different in that Mari tain rai sea the problem of individual 
and person, God and self, a division of man into the material 
and metaphysical, whereas this writer's use of immanence 
connotes the whole, undivided self as an expressing being. 
Maritain uses a large vocabulary of vindictive 
utterances in a vehement verbal assau:Jt on the position of 
Protestantism in general, and Lutheranism in particular. His 
biggest rifle is leveled on Luther's notion of spiritual 
immanence as opposed to authority, but he engages freely in 
argumentum ad hominem, to the point that it tends greatly to 
weaken his philosophical position owing to the obvious 
personal hate and prejudice which replace reason and phil-
osophical humility. 60 One cannot help wondering how much of 
60. Maritain, TR, 5-8. 
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the argument presented is reason, and how muCh is mere 
rationalization. Certainly a root of bitterness lies as the 
base of the abusive denunciation of Martin Luther as a man, 
a harsh, insulting attack that over-shadows the consideration 
of doctrine. 
1. The Doctrine of Immanence 
Over-looking the personal angle of Maritain's attack, 
we proceed to his examination of the doctrine of immanence. 
He cites the essence of the Reformation as the exaltation 
Wof Spirit over Authority, the interior energy of man the 
master of his judgment against dead ideas and lying con-
ventions imposed from w1thout.n61 This he denotes as •anglo-
~ 
modern stupidity.w He accuses Luther of turning the great 
ideas of liberty, inwardness, and spirit into error63 which 
is the heart of the immanentist illusion. There is rational 
ground for his questioning of Luther's polarity between in-
wardness and outwardness, as though they were inherently 
opposed somehow. This Maritain designates as the heart of 
~ the immanentist error. It is the inversion of self against 
what is not self. nconsequently truth and life must be 
sought only within the human subject; everything in us that 
61. Maritain, TR, 44, 45. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Ibid. 
~. Ibid. 
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comes from what is not ourselves (let us say, from what is 
1other 1 ,) is a crime against the spirit and against sin-
65 
cerity." If this follows in order then "everything 
extrinsic to us is the destruction and death of our in-
terior.n66 
2. Luther Charged with Liberalism 
According to Maritain, Luther was an advocate of 
authority rather than the liberal he professed to be. "He 
had personally an excessively dogmatic and authoritative con-
ception of life and had nothing liberal about him." 67 Luther 
is credited by Maritain with introducing the principle of 
modern thought which sets faith against works and Gospel 
against law. Immanence is denoted as a myth based on "a 
radical misunderstanding of the true nature of spirit." 68 
Maritain explains the immanent activity: 
If the law of the object, the law of being, 
imposes itself on the intelligence, it is in order 
that the intelligence may itself find vital comple-
tion in an action which is a pure immaterial quality, 
and in which the very thing which constitutes what 
is "other" becomes its own perfection. And if the 
law of the Last End, the law of the good, imposes 
itself on the will, it is that love may make us one 
with the Author of all good, and that we--by follow-
ing His law, which has become ours,--may still 
follow our deepest and most intimate attraction. 
65. Maritain, TR, 45. 
66. Ibid. 
67. Ibid., 46. 
68. Ibid. 
That is the mystery belonging to immanent acti-
vity, perfect interiorization by knowledge and 
love of what is "8ther," or of what comes from 
another than we.6 
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The immanent activity is an imposition of the knowledge 
of the good by the "Last End", the law of the good, upon the 
intelligence of the subject--a perfect interiorization by 
knowledge and love of what is "other." To follow the Lutheran 
theory of immanence is to violate the relationship between 
ourselves and our "other8 , an inseparable bond which makes 
"man's good works at the same time God's good works, since He 
produces them in us by His grace.•70 Luther's faux pas is 
made when he makes righteousness a "veneer" to cover his sin, 
for regardless of man's religion he continues to produce bad 
works, bad because •men's works, even though they always 
seem beautiful and probably good, are mortal sins, whilst 
God's works, were they always ugly and apparently bad, are 
of eternal merit."71 This occasions a hopeless bifUrcation 
between man and his "other" and represents a revival of 
"unbridled naturalism which in a little more than tvo centuries 
ruined everything in Western thought before blossoming into 
contemporary immanentism.n72 
69. Maritain, TR, 47. 
70. Ibid., 48. 
71. Ibid. 
72. Ibid. 
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3. Non-Catholic World in Darkness 
In Maritain's opinion Lutherans, and the whole modern 
world, lie in darkness regarding spiritual truths. They do 
not discern or comprehend the counterparts of the divine-
human encounter. Protestants have no cognition nor apprecia-
tion of the mystery of divine operation and the capacity of 
spirits. It is this Jack of true spiritual insight that 
turns the Protestant theology and worship into error. 
''Intellectual magisterium, human or divine, church and re-
vealed dogma, even more radically, authority of objective 
being and the moral law, are finally no longer conceivable 
except as external and mechanical restraint forced on a 
nature which suffers them under compulsion."73 
Thus God's continuity with the human soul is disrupted 
and the soul is pushed back into solitude, "impenetrable to 
everything but self.•74 The grace of God is thwarted, man 
is cut off and becomes subject to the •accidental and 
accessory, conditioned by the material and human."75 Maritain, 
as here noted, objects to a severance of the relationship 
between the inner and outer man. He indicates that the inner 
man is to be developed, and can fUlfill himself only, through 
the complementation of an act of faith in objective love (see 
73. Maritain, TR, 48. 
74. Ibid. 
75. Ibid. 
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footnote 69). Natural law is fUlfilled in the supernatural, 
hence the natural and supernatural are not unrelated spheres. 
One must, therefore, credit Roman Catholic philosophy with a 
degree of rooting in man's members, a doctrine which is basic 
in Roman Catholic thought. The flow of Divine grace is 
broken in the spiritual dismemberment forced by the Lutheran 
concept of immanentism. Here in the bailiwick of man's inner 
experience lies the mystery of immanent activity; the bethel 
of his spiritual function, the holy place of communion with 
God. To force a breach in this sanctum sanctorum relation 
between God and man is a fUndamental and destructive error; 
no greater sin against God could be committed. It is here 
that the transfiguring sacraments of life are invoked at the 
will of God. Thence man's truest and surest bonds to the 
Divine are forged, or broken, at this sacred point. When 
this idea is understood, the enormity of Luther's crime 
against the church appears. 
Not only was Luther himself guilty of high crime against 
the church, but he put in motion influences which affected 
thousands and resulted in a vigorous reaction against 
authority in Protestant Germany. The movement he inspired, 
the Reformation, was characterized by a show of authority 
and literalism which Maritain brands as more oppressive and 
mechanical than the church which he opposed. Maritain asks 
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the question: "What literalism is more oppressive than that 
of a dead theology and a 'supernaturalism' based not on 
Primal Truth, but on the human reason of preachers paid by 
the State to interpret Scripture.•76 Even though reason is 
grafted into the Catholic theology, its trustworthiness is 
readily questioned if employed by those outside the church. 
The reader of Maritain is shut up to the conclusion that God 
does not reveal His truth to heretics outside the fold of 
the church, nor are the rational assertions of those without 
the church to be trusted. It is the church which retains 
the power and privilege of spiritual patronage, holding, 
thereby, the temporal and eternal destiny of men and nations 
in its hand. 
4. Threat of Immanence to Catholicism 
The strength of Maritain1 s argument is turned against 
the Lutheran idea of immanence, fbr it is in this area of 
revealed truth that the security of the church rests. To 
deny successfully the church's claim to tenure in the inner 
realm of mystery forestalls its further claim to authority 
in any realm, including both temporal and eternal. Thi a 
forfeiture of rights stills the church's voice and renders 
it powerless in world affairs. Because it can lay claim 
76. Maritain, TR, 49. An interesting account of reason occurs 
in "Reason or Nonsense.• Catholic World, November, 1948, 
pp. 134-138 (by H. N. Hart). 
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to sovereignty over men's souls, it can use this leverage 
to spiritual and temporal advantage and impose its authority 
under an ecclesiastical dynasty, It is well understood that 
unless an authoritative control involves man's eternal 
welfare, it will not bear much weight in his temporal affairs. 
The atheist pretends unconcern as regards his eternal 
well-being. He charts his course "one world at a time," The 
lure of other-worldliness fades at his touch, and eternal in-
terests are but the withered blooms of tradition in his 
garden of memories. It is not providence but luck that marks 
man's journey through this life, and this life, even for the 
lucky one who manages to squeeze some drops of pleasure's 
nectar from this world's perishing vines as he passes along, 
is the only life about which we can talk intelligently. If 
there is 11 pie in the sky," he is perfectly willing to await 
the time of cutting; why become disturbed by the vain hope 
of immortality, Thus he muses, 
But the majority, and the percentage is high, do not 
share the material view of the atheist; they believe in God, 
even though conceived in their own image, and turn eyes of 
hope to 8 future state free from pain, loss, and want. Not-
withstanding men's diverse views, most of them cling to some 
notion of a divine-human homology that for them holds 
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infinite relevancy. To invade this sacred precinct is to 
engage the life-line of hope with its extraordinary worth. 
Hidden from the eyes of others, here in the temple of spirit-
ual wonders the secrets of men's souls are kept. Here man 
meets God and what transpires remains under the seal of 
secrecy until man chooses to divulge it. To subdue this 
bastioned fortress by storm or stealth places the conquered 
subject under the cample te dominance of the conqueror, for 
it is in this area of spiritual immanence that the heart of 
his true existence beats. 
The shrewdness of the church of Rome in extending her 
authority over this vital area becomes obvious. From this 
point the pivotal control of her dogma can reach to the ex-
tremities of the human personality, encompassing reason and 
will in a grand sweep of jurisdictional sway. The church's 
philosophy begins where hope is frail, motive is uncert&n, 
and the will is weakest. Capture and control are easy when 
men are refused the privilege, and right, of rational con-
sideration. With bondage properly effected in the area of 
immanence obedience is complete. 
If therefore the Catholic church is to consummate its 
authority over man's life, and eventually all society, the 
battle of immanence must be won. Luther charged that the 
church had no right to capture man within, to dominate his 
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soul. His pronouncement that "the just shall live by 
faith, 11 77 not by ecclesiastical fiat, out directly across 
Catholic philosophy. It amounted to a forthright repudiation 
of the church's claim to control over the temporal and eter-
nal well-being of men. Little wonder that such a bold 
assertion drew a clamor of disapproval, hurt cries, and 
threats from the Catholic bishops; because some for less had 
lost their lives in bloody martyrdom. Martin Luther escaped 
certain punishment only by virtue of a rising tide of 
opposition to the church's absolute authority which finally 
snapped the Roman bonds which held the world in almost com-
plete spiritual captivity. The success of the Reformation 
ended the church's power to punish the heretics and infide~ 
who rejected her authority. 
5. The Glory of Medieval Church Exalted 
Maritain not only bewails the fate of the church at the 
hands of Martin Luther, who "inflamed everything, and healed 
nothing, 11 78 but he recalls the glorious past of the church 
when 11 Christ and His Doctors solved for redeemed humanity 
their problems so long as it was faithful, problems which, 
nearly fo~ centuries ago, once more began to rack the human 
77. Romans 1:17. 
78. Maritain, TR, 50. 
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heart like angelic instruments of torture.n79 The reference 
here, no doubt, is to the Medieval church with its all-but-
conclusive rule of the civilized earth. There seems to be 
in Maritain 1s writings a hidden meaning that if the church 
was in full control of world affairs, men's probJems would 
be solved to a maximum degree and society would experience 
and demonstrate the common good. 
As has been noted in the first part of this chapter, the 
common good rests on authority, and authority depends on the 
extent to which control can be exercised over the immanent 
activity of men. Thus the principle of immanence is the axis 
of jurisdiction, whiCh, when under the dominance of the 
church, becomes the mainspring of good. Everything relative 
depends on the unhindered authority of the church. As it 
imposes its will, which is God's will, on the lives of men, 
the natural result is the equitable distribution of the 
common good. The church always acts in God's stead, as His 
instrument or medium, so that the written dogma of the 
church is the reveaJe d will of God. This, the church be-
lieves, is sufficient grounds on which to base its claim to 
universal authority. 
E. The Church: Source of Moral Standards 
The extension of its control over the temporal and 
79. Maritain, TR, 50. 
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eternal interests of its adherents automatically makes the 
Roman Catholic church also custodian of all moral standards. 
It reserves the privilege to specify what is good or 
bad, right or wrong in the same sense that it claims authority 
to indicate what is true and what is false. This regulative 
power applies not only to theological matters, the province 
of the church, but also to social and political relations. 
Any personal fUnction which involves the conscience, which 
includes all personal activity,80 involves at the same time 
the will of the church. The Catholic Christian is especially 
responsible in political affairs, as Maritain notes, 11if we 
are considering the question of the political activity morally 
permitted for a Christian, it is the office of Christ's church 
to give such rules and precepts and to particularize them 
according to the situation.w81 
1. Church Authority Complete 
The word 0 partieularize" is a key word in the applica-
tion of Catholic standards, for actually it includes every 
act of the subject since political and religious activities 
in the Roman Catholic system are inextricably mingled. For, 
whereas the church seems to recognize a separation of church 
so. Anshen, MPA, 64. 
81. TH, 258. 
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and state,82 if there is a dispute as to jurisdiction, the 
church and the church alone has the right to decide who shall 
prevail. "In case of direct contradiction, making it im-
possib~for both jurisdictions to be exercised, the juris-
diction of the church prevails, and that of the State is 
excluded.n83 The church on the surface lays claim only to 
moral authority, but the snare lies in the deeper truth that 
everything a Catholic does involves his moral responsibility, 
so that there is no real discrimination between his religious 
and his social or political liability. Pope Pius XI says as 
much in his Reconstructing the Social Order, which states 11 it 
is our right and Our duty to deal authoritatively with social 
and economic prob1ems.n84 All social and economic interests 
lie Within the moral sphere of the church "for the deposit 
of truth entrusted to Us by God, and Our weighty office of 
propagating, interpreting and urging in season and out of 
season the entire moral law, demands that both social and 
economic questions be brought within Our supreme jurisdic-
tion, in so far as they refer to moral issues."85 
82. "The Almighty, therefore, has appointed the charge of 
the human race between two powers, the ecclesiastical 
and the civil." Leo XIII, Christian Constitution of 
States, Husslein, Vol. I, 71. 
83. Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. XIV, 251. 
84. "Pive Encyclicals, New York: The Paulist Press, 136. 
85. !bid. 
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St. Thomas Aquinas, the principal church theologian and 
philosopher, in the Summa Theologica (Ek. VIII, Fifth Arti-
cle), specifies that all things are subject to the divine 
government, which means the church since the church consti-
tutes God's kingdom on earth and is the executor of the 
Divine will. He says in part: 
Now God is the cause, not of some particular 
kind of being, but of the whole universal being. 
Therefore, as there can be nothing which is not 
created by God, so there can be nothing which 
is not subject to His government •••• It is im-
possible fo~ anything to escape from the divine 
government. 6 
Then, fUrther 
The rational 
creature governs itself by its intellect and 
will, both of Which require to be governed and 
perfected by the divine intellect and will. 
Therefore, above the government whereby the 
rational creature governs itself as master of 
its own act, it requires to be governed by God.87 
This governance is channeled through the church, which is the 
only worldly medium for the revelation of Divine Truth. Be-
cause the church is the medium of Divine light, its voice is 
the voice of God, and its statutes actually form the Divine 
constitution of God's government on earth. 
According to the Angelic Doctor those who excel in 
intellect are the natural rulers, which is the divinely-
ordained ~der among God's creatures. Those who excel in 
86. Pegis, EWTA, Vol. I, 956. 
87. Ibid.,959. 
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intellect, so it seems, are the beings most closely associated 
with a superior intellect, or God, from Which they acquire 
the power or understanding. In this vein, St. Thomas, in 
Summa Theologica (Ek. VI, Fourth Artie~), says: 
Now the human soul is called intel~ctual by 
reason or a participation in intel~ ctual power ••• 
Moreover it reaches to the understanding or truth 
by reasoning, with a certain discursiveness and 
movement. Even more it has an imperrect under-
standing, both because it does not understand 
everything, and because, in those things which it 
does not understand, it passes from potentiality 
to act. Thererore there must needs be some 
higher intelleg~. by which the soul is helped 
to understand. 
In the eighth article or the same 
book he declares ~it is clear that in man reason and intellect 
are the same power.tt Since the Pope, especially, and the 
Catholic bishops in general are intimately arfiliated with 
God, the strength or intellect by that token belongs to the 
church. It is the church hierarchy which receives the Divine 
light and thence rules men accordingly. Those who excel in 
intellect (the Angelic Doctor records in Summa Contra 
Gentiles, Ek. X, Chapter LXXXI) thererore should rule. Here 
he rollows Aristotle, the Philosopher, who said that the 
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strong in body should serve, and the intellectual rule. 
88. Pegis, BWTA, Vol. II, 152. 
89. Polit., I, 5 (1254b, 25). 
85 
2. Division of Interests but not Authority 
On the one hand the church clearly designates that the 
separation of church and state is permissible; but it holds 
in reserve the right to prevail in cases of conflict, with 
the further reservation that the ideal state is the church-
controlled state. Then, because a Catholic's conscience is 
involved in all of his social and political interests, the 
church, by exercising exclusive jurisdiction over his con-
science, expands its sway over every interest of his life, 
temporal as well as moral and eternal. 
With this much observed, it is clear why the Roman 
Catholic church is basically opposed to separation of church 
and state; such separation tends to thwart its absolute 
authority. Constant conflicts arise between the church and 
sta~e which implicate the subject; if he obeys the state he 
at the same time offends the church and places his spiritual 
relationship in jeopardy. He is torn between two loyalties: 
citizen and churchman. "Separation of church and state 1s 
that negative, ill-defined, basically un-American formula, 
with all its overtones of religious prejudice," according to 
Father John Courtenay Murray.90 
The Pope is a kind of special world monarch and is not, 
90. America, February 15, 1947. 
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therefore, subject to the laws of any nation. He is 
sovereign over a synthetic moral empire that permeates by its 
spiritual nature all world statehoods, penetrating the vital 
life functions of every government. The vaguely-defined moral 
right of his church reaches into every phase of world 
activity where Catholics are involved, and while certain 
state rights are permitted, the final verdict must be rendered 
by the church. For instance the church concedes the state 
supreme power in military matters, the punishment of crime 
(except that of priests), the collection of taxes, ani the 
preservation of_ civic order. Consequently priests will in-
struct their people to obey the state in these matters. In 
time of war Catholics can permissibly fight for their country, 
even when fighting Catholics and when the Vatican itself is 
committed to one side. If, however, the particuBr Catholic 
finds himself called upon to break any law of the church, he 
is duty bound to obey the church in preference to its oppos-
ing authority. 
Because in any country Catholics act like other citizens, 
it is generally believed that the church does not interfere 
with their lives, except in matters strictly religious. It 
is only as one understands the broad implications of the 
dogmas of the church that he begins to realize that the church 
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is actively present in every Catholic's daily affairs. Then 
the position of the Roman Catholic church is important, for 
it mixes moral responsibility with all of life's activities, 
a form of absolutism. This is expressed by Hilaire Belloc 
who stated: 
The Catholic Church is in its root principle 
at issue with the Civic definition both of freedom 
and authority. For the purpose of the State, 
religion is either a universally admitted system, 
or a matter of individual choice. But by the 
definition which is the very soul of Catholicism, 
religionmust be for the Catholic First, a supreme 
authority superior to any claims of the State; 
Secondly, a corporate thing, and not an individual 
thing; Thirdly, a thing dependent upon Authority, 
and not upon a personal mood; Fourthly, a guar-
antee of g~dividual freedom in all that is not 
of Faith. 
Belloc puts it. concisely when he says that religion 
for the Catholic must be "a thing dependent upon Authority." 
One could not escape the force of this statement as indi-
eating the imposed character of ethics in Roman Catholicism, 
and since we have shown that religion and other aspects of 
the Catholic's life are an inseparable unit, the force of 
the statement applies equally to every phase of a Catholic's 
life, social, political, and economic. 
3. Authority Encompasses Education 
This authority encompasses education. Pope Pius XI 
in his encyclical, Christian Education of Youth, in 1929, 
91. TC, 160. 
directedt 
And first of all education belongs pre-
eminently to the Church, by reason of a double 
title in the supernatural order, conferred 
exclusively upon her by God Himself; absolutely 
superior therefore to any other title in the 
natural order ••• the Church is independent of 
any sort of earthly power as well in the 
origin as in exercise of her mission as educa-
tor, not merely in regard to her proper end 
and object, but also in regard to the means 
necessary and suitable to attain that end ••• 
every form of instruction, no less than every 
human action, has a necessary connection with 
man's last end, and therefore cannot be with-
drawn from the dictates of the divine law, of 
which the Church is guardian, interpreter and 
infallible mistress ••• it is the duty of the 
State to protect in its :If gislation the prior 
rights, already described, of the family as 
regards the Christian education of its offspring, 
and consequently also to respect the super-
natural rights of the C~ch in this same realm 
of Christian education. 
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The total life of the Catholic is tied into his religi-
ous commitment by the word of the Pope when he decreed that 
"every form of instruction, no less than every human action, 
has a necessary connection with man's last end, and there-
fore cannot be withdrawn fram the dictates of the divine 
law, of which the Church is guardian, interpreter and in-
fallible mistress." By this dictum the church's control 
over Catholic life is supreme, or absolute. The decree 
applies directly to education, but indirectly to every facet 
92. Five Encyclicals, 40, 41, 48. In the face of this edict 
by the Pope how can Maritain say that totalitarianism must 
11be replaced by a personalistic and communal civilization 
grounded on human rights," "Education for Tomorrow"? Yale 
Review, January, 1943, pp. 670-680. -
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of human existence. 
When the afore-mentioned encyclical was made known in 
America, it set off religious and public debate. The New 
York Times commented: 
The Pope's encyclical sounds a note that will 
startle Americans, for it assails an institution 
dearest to them--the public school--without which 
it is hardly conceivable that democracy would long 
exist. If other churches were to make like claims--
that is that "the educative mission belongs pre-
eminently" to them for their chili ren, and were to 
lay like inhibitions, the ve9! foundations of this 
Republic would be disturbed. 
Among the fields affected by Catholic intervention is 
the fi.eld of medicine. Father Francis J. Connell admonishes 
"priests who have doctors among the faithfUl committed to 
their personal care should be mindful of their obligation in 
conscience to provide these men (or women) with adequate in-
struction on their professional duties."94 Marriage and the 
family belong to the church, and marriage outside the church 
is not recognized. John G. Erun1ni summarizes the church's 
position thus: "the Church regards Matrimony as a sacrament 
over which She alone has jurisdiction, and jurisdiction which 
she cannot transfer; she cannot permit any other agency to 
take over the administration of ~ose laws with which she has 
surrounded the sacrament.n95 
93. January 13, 1930. 
94. Connell, MPP, 116. 
95. Brun1n1, WS, 209. 
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The literature Catholics read is censored by the church. 
Pope Pius XI, in an Allocution, December 20, 1926, ordered 
"Catholics may not support, favor, or read papers which are 
edited by men whose writings are in notable opposition to 
96 Catholic doctrine in faith and morals." Science is not 
exempt from the church control as evidenced in Pope Pius 
XII 1 s encyclical on Christian Education of Youth in which he 
statess 
Nor does she, the Church, prevent sciences, 
each in its own sphere, from making use of 
principles and methods of their own. Only while 
acknowledging the freedom due to them, she takes 
every precaution to prevent them from falling 
into error by opposition to divine doctrine, or 
from overstepping their proper limits, and thus 
invading and disturbing the domain of :fl!.ith.97 
4. Maritain Bases Morals on Authority 
Thus, following the philosophy of the Roman Catholic 
church as the basis of speculation, Maritain constructs his 
system of thought. It has been necessary to resort to 
original and other secondary sources for direct expression of 
the Catholic dogma because Maritain in his many works gener-
ally only implies the authority of the church, even though 
his strong allegiance to the church is sensed throughout his 
writings. He unhesitatingly confesses his Christian allegiance, 
96. 
97. 
Quoted from Bouscaren, CLD, Vol. I, 
Five Great Encyclicals. New York: 
1947, p. 53. 
610. 
The Paulist Press, 
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which is tantamount to saying he is a Catholic,98 He, how-
ever, frequently reminds his readers of the teachings and 
authority of the church.99 
In line with the basic position of the Catholic church, 
Maritain denotes the church as the source of moral standards 
when he states unreservedly that in respect to morals "it is 
the office of Christ's Church (the Catholic church) to give 
such rules and precepts.nlOO In Catholic belief, without 
reservation, the church is the only source of moral standards. 
5. Christianity and Democracy 
Maritain maintains throughout his extensive writings 
that democracy and Christianity have much in common. A 
genuine democratic philosophy is the "fruit and achievement 
of our Judea-Christian civilization.nlOl Since Christian 
humanism discovers the "true image of man," it remains for a 
Christian civilization to "save the human values and achieve-
ments arrived at by our forefathers," which were endangered by 
98. TH, 264, 
99. TH, 258, RMNL, 28 etc. 
100. Previously quoted, page 72. To Mari tain, the Church 
"which by virtue of its mission spiritually to beget 
men for eternal life," possesses a full right to 
education, "for morality without religion tends to 
undermine morality." In ~ducation for the Good Life," 
Commonweal, April 26, 1945, pp. 36-40. 
101. "Christianity and Democracy." Commonweal, May 7, 1943, 
pp. 66-70. 
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false philosophy of life in the last century.l02 The secret 
of a harmonious social order in Western civilization will be 
found in "a common secular or humanistic task and religious 
inspiration" working together.l03 The American constitution 
"has its roots in an age-old heritage of Christian thought 
and civilization.nl04 
Faith is the indispensable element of Western civil-
ization, even though it is a "mystery," and a "gift ~om 
heaven." Here Maritain says St. Paul is speaking for him, 
and he elevates the principal New Testament writer above 
philosophers and theologians. With him St. Paul would say 
that "one who receives the Grace of Faith in his heart hears 
the voice of the Father, 
by the lumen fidei.nl05 
to the objective truths 
and is supernaturally enlightened 
"In one single impulse he adheres 
presented by the Church. 0106 Maritain 
commends Catholics for absolute loyalty to the church. 
In recounting his conversion to Catholicism, which he 
asserts brought an illumination of his whole philosophical 
perspective, Maritain denotes his quest as seeking "a new 
Christendom, a new temporal order inspired by Christianity.n107 
To accomplish this "Christian means11 are needed, or "a true 
102. 
103. 
104. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
"Christian Humanism." Fortune, April, 1942 pp. 106-107. 
"Western Civilization and Religious Faith.& Lib. Jour., 
April, 1951, pp. 1284-1289. 
Ibid. 
"The Ways of Faith." Commonweal, November 4, 1949, pp.87-93. 
i~~~it of Freedom." Nation, March 18, 1939, pp.319-
321. (tr. by F. Moran) 
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spirit of love.l08 
6. Maritain Chief Catholic Philosopher 
H. N. Hart designates Maritain as the chief Catholic 
philosopher, and sets forth the proposition: Shall we follow 
Jacques Maritain or John Dewey?109 Hart finds hope in 
Maritain, a hope that "the western world may survive.nllO 
This hope is in Maritain 1 s declaration that "an activity 
directly aiming at improving and recasting the structure of 
the temporal life, and specifically social action, is needed.nlll 
Heinrich A. Rommen believes that Maritain makes "Thomism 
a present philosophy. n112 Mar ita in holds, nonetheless, that 
"the body politic belongs by reason of its rationality to a 
superior order," and agrees with Pope Pius XII that "the Church 
is the life-giving principle of society. 11113 11The principle 
of the superiority of the Church, the spiritual, over the 
state, the temporal," finds sanction in Maritain 1 s philosophy. 114 
108. "Pursuit of Freedom.• Nation, March 18, 1939, pp. 319-
321. (tr. by F. Moran) 
109. "Reason or Nonsense." Catholic World, November, 1948, 
pp. 134-138. 
110. Ibid. 
111. ~ritain on Social Action." Commonweal, December 30, 
1949, p. 344. 
112. 11Maritain on Man and the State." Commonweal, April, 
1951, pp. 239-242. 
113. Quoted by Rommen in "Maritain on Man and the State." 
114, Ibid. 
PART TWO 
CHAPTER III 
THE GROUNDS FOR REJECTION OF IMPOSED ETHICS 
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The attempt to think honestly and profoundly about 
the values for which all men strive has absorbed much of ths 
philosophical effort of ethical theorists of every age. 
In Chapter I impositionism (as related to ethics) was 
defined and treated etymologically, and an attempt was made 
to show its dependence on authority. Man's search for 
authority was traced and the quest ended in two distinct 
concepts of authoritys that which is arbitrarily assumed 
by a deity or man, and that which is reached by patient, 
rational investigation, Imposed ethics was found to rest on 
the former. In Chapter II the Roman Catholic church, with 
Jacques Maritain as interpreter, was selected as a repre-
sentative example of imposed ethics. As stated, this did 
not imply that the Roman Catholic church is the only instance 
of authoritarian ethics, for other examples of imposed ethics 
are found in early Lutheranism, Puritanism, and in milder 
forms in most Protestant denominations. The Catholic church 
was chosen because of the availability and accessibility of 
material bearing on the problem. 
In this chapter the writer proposes to extend the 
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investigation of imposed ethics to other relevant areas of 
thought. For instance, how do the theorists of conscience, 
rational religion, science, universalism, relativism, 
evolution, and self-realization treat the problem of imposed 
morality. The results of the investigation, which seems 
helpful to the whole perspective of this dissertation, take 
the form of objections to authority in ethics. This chapter 
proposes to examine the grounds of these objections. Follow-
ing an introductory consideration of the difficulties facing 
systematic thought about morals, the objections will be 
analyzed. 
A. The Problem of Unity in Moral Theory 
What is good or bad? What is right or wrong? What do 
we mean by value? These are the questions which recur in 
each generation. What is the goal of the ethical quest? By 
what method shall it be ascertained? As the questions mul-
tiply, the problem becomes more complicated. The crux of the 
problem seems to center in the disparity encountered as to 
goals and methods. 
After over two millennia the hope for un1 ty and univer-
sality, or a single ethical code, is not strong. Complete 
agreement on all details is not necessary, nor even desirable. 
Perhaps we can attain a point in which "we can think of our-
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selves as members of a single world society on the basis of 
a single ethical system, while retaining cultural pluralism 
and individuality."1 Even though the cherished hope for full 
agreement seems unlikely of fulfilment, the desire for unity 
is intense and there is some assurance that we are moving 
toward a system of ethics which will be valid and relevant 
for all men spiritually and morally. A survey of present-
day ethicists, professional and business people, religionists, 
government experts, and other qualified thinkers has revealed 
that there is an affirmative answer to the basic query: Are 
there universally applicable ethical principles?2 This is 
heartening for it indicates that many today are thinking of 
good and evil as more than "hypotheses or attributes of mind 
alone but as relations within reality."3 
1. Lack of Doctrinal Unity Obstructed Ancient Thought 
Beginning in the ancient days we detect persistent frus-
tration met in the attempt to attain doctrinal unity on the 
meaning of good and evil. Aristotle, disturbed by the bad, 
clearly designated the good as "that at which all things aim."4 
Eudoxus thought "pleasure was the good because he saw all 
things, both rational and irrational, aiming at it."5 What is 
1. Anshan, MPA, XI. 
2. Ibid., X. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Nic. Eth. I, l094a, 3. 
5. Ibid., x, ll72b, 9. 
the good? According to Aristotle most men say that the 
good is happiness, but they differ in their meaning of 
happiness. 6 
97 
For Plato the idea of good "has a place of honour 
higher" than science and truth.7 The good equals the beauti-
ful,8 and confers happiness on the possessor.9 Good is the 
object of desire in love. Socrates defines the good thus: 
"If he who loves loves the good, what is it then that he 
loves? 1The possession of the good,' I said. 1And what 
does he gain who possesses the good?' Happiness, I replied ••• 
the happy are made happy by the acquisition of good things.nlO 
Good is not only the object of desire 1n love, but it is the 
end of all action.ll Evil is connected to ignorance, we 
learn in the Protagoras.12 And there is more evil than good 
in the world, Plato believed in his later years when he 
wrote the Laws. 13 No brighter is the tone of the Theaetetus 
in which it is said that evil will always exist.14 Plato's 
most encouraging views rest in his conclusions that the use 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Nic. Eth. I, 1095a, 
~. VI, 509 A. 
LYSis, 216. 
Symposium, 204, E. 
Ibid., 204, 205. 
Gorgias, 499. 
345b. 
10, 906 A. 
176 A. 
15. 
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of good depends on knowledge, which is the desire of a11, 15 
and that evil cannot injure the good. 16 This is equivalent 
to meliorism, for good cannot be destroyed, and it will, 
undoubtedly, increase as knowledge improves. 
2. Good and Evil Basic Problems 
The problem of good and evil apparently lies at the 
bottom of the vexing disunity of moral thought and endeavor. 
The wide, seemingly irreconcilable lacunae have pushed the 
systematic ethicists to the brink of despair, where their 
quest is almost lost in a maze of definitions, subdivisions, 
cross-methods, and blind prejudices. Was Aristotle right in 
suggesting that all knowledge and every pursuit aim at some 
good;l7 could life's direction have an evil goal? Was Plato 
right, 
of the 
does the 
18 good? 
soul ascend above all hypotheses to the Idea 
3. Problem of Morals Persistent 
With these moot-points obstructing all effort at unity, 
and the attainment of the single ethical system many seek, 
moral philosophy, vigorously debated in the pre-Christian 
15. Euthyd. 279, 287. 
16. Apol. 30 c, 41. 
17. Nic. Eth. I, 1095a 13. 
18. Rep. VI, 511 A. 
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era, remains very much alive in our day and troub~ s the 
thoughts of honest thinkers not only in academic circles, but 
in all walks of life. Dispersed groups seem satisfied with 
specialized notions about morals, accepting imposed codes, 
human or divinely accredited; but rational thought, in search 
for valid, objective moral standards, tends toward a synthesis 
of the questions and ideas defined by the diverse groups. It 
appears now that we are less concerned about conclusive 
agreement than we are objective unity, i. e., that which 
"though not identical with each other is never-
theless not independent of each other, the 
realization that the human conscience and the 
moral intelligence fructified by the mutual 
effort of the creative forces among the peoples 
of the world will be able to make technological 
knowledge a positive source of e~§rgy for the 
creative well-being of humanity. 
4. Question of Ground and Method 
The question of grounds for systematic thought is the 
first, and perhaps the most stubborn, obstacle. On what 
shall we base ethical judgment? On God, revelation, reason, 
nature, or man? Or is there something possible as a ground 
not yet discovered by thinkers? Because of this division of 
thought a uniform beginning seems impossible. In this con-
fusing scope of moral theory are the varied, unrelated, and 
19. Anshen, MPA, XI. 
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even discordant, notions of expediency, as in Thrasy.machus's 
20 brutal notion of justice against the integrity of Plato 
21 (with "a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character" ); 
the passive resistance of Gandhi and the Quakers, opposed by 
the cruel, ambitious world exploitation of the Communists; 
and the dreary Hobbesian concept of man against the personal 
dignity of the self-realizationist. 
With the grounds for moral unity in serious doubt, 
equally as ala~ing is the fact that the methods by which we 
hope to reach stability and certainty are as indecisive. 
What are we to do, and how? Is our problem theoretical or 
practical, or both? Should our approach to the problem be 
naturalistic, mystical, or rational? The ancient controversy 
rages unabated in the modern period, the only difference 
seeming to be that in the modern era there are further com-
plications occasioned by the intervening verbal combats, 
especially those of the Renaissance and Reformation times. 
The impact of Christianity upon the world has been 
prodigious; but again the question arises, for good or evil? 
That may sound like a grossly credulous query, but it has 
received a large share of consideration by such thinkers as 
N. VonHartmann, Francis Bacon, and W. T. Stace. There is 
small doubt but that the doctrines of Christianity, its con-
20. ~el. 338 D. 
21. b d., 400 E. 
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cepts of good and evil, have made a ve~y g~eat diffe~ence in 
the wo~ld 1 s ethical outlook; but the fo~ces of mate~ialism, 
which shook the world in the pe~iod of mass production 
during the last fifty yea~s, are still potentially dan-
gerous and widely influential. Too often the popular 
notion of value, as a consequence, is position and possess-
ion, rather than character and right attitudes. 
It is this unequal condition of theory and act which 
has precipitated the present crisis in morality. Ruth 
Nanda Anshan has planned and edited the sixth volume of 
the Science of Culture Series which is entit~d Moral 
Principles in Action. In this recent volume the minds 
of the brilliant thinkers of the day meet, and their agree-
ments and disagreements are faithfUlly recorded. The basic 
question of the extensive and usefUl discussion isr Are 
there universally applicable ethical principles? As we 
have al~eady noted, the answer is strongly 1n the affirmative. 
Because the range of the discussion p~operly includes the 
adroit facility of the top thinkers of our day, the value 
of the Anshan's work is incalculable in the interest of 
ethical ~mony in au~ dive~se cult~al pl~alism. 
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B. Theories of Conscience, Religion, and Science. 
To reduce the prevalent ethical notions to a few basic 
assumptions is a gloomy undertaking. It ms.y be thought 
feasible, and is done in textbooks in Ethics, but whether 
the broad denotations do justice to the many variations in 
doctrine is questionable. 
Those who approach the task from the standpoint of 
deduction begin with special premises self-evident, or 
believed to be valid at least, in their own lives. Those 
who would begin with experience, unable to encompass the 
whole of life and existence, attempt to derive valid princi-
ples from the empirical facts known to them. There is always 
the problem of first-person experience with its limited 
grasp, or at best the limits necessarily imposed on groups 
in their familiar contexts. Who can say that the Mohammedan 
worshipper kneeling before the Mihrab22 at the Mosque, a 
socialite sitting in meditational solitude in Trinity church 
in Copley Square, Boston, and John Wesley undergoing a 
strange warming of his heart in Aldersgate mission are all 
experiencing the same thing. Such an assumption may be help-
fUl, but if it is inductively faulty, in the end it will do 
far more harm than good. This precisely is the problem of 
22. Prayer niche. 
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those who dare to think: Can the seemingly imponderable 
compass of man's experience be reduced to manageable propo-
sitions? Vlhether the answer is affirmative or negative, the 
one co no lu si on i a inevitable : We must try ! 
1. The Objection of a Conscience Theorist 
Erich Fromm asserts that "there is no prouder statement 
man can make than to say: 'I shall act according to my 
conscience•.n23 The history of conscience is resplendent 
with achievement. As Fromm notes: 
Throughout history men have upheld the 
principles of justice, love, and truth against 
every kind of pressure brought to bear upon 
them in order to make them relinquish what 
they knew and believed. The prophets acted 
according to their conscience when they de-
nounced their country and predicted its down-
fall because of its corruption and injustice. 
Socrates preferred death to a course in which 
he would have betrayed his conscience by com-
promising with the truth. Without the exist-
ence of conscience, the human race would have24 bogged down long ago in its hazardous course. 
Conscience has not always been so consistent, however. 
For others perpetuating crimes against humanity, as in the 
Inquisition when for conscience' sake men of conscience were 
burned, claimed conscience as their guide. The same could 
be said of "warmakers claiming to act on behalf of their 
23. MH, 141. 
24. Ibid., and 142. 
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conscience when they put their lust for power above all 
25 
other considerations." Because conscience "in its various 
empirical manifestations is indeed confUsing," Fromm asks: 
"Are these various kinds of conscience the same, with only 
their contents differing? Are they different phenomena with 
. 26 
only the name conscience in commenT" 
It is this indisputable Jack of fUndamental harmony in 
conscience practice which weakens, if not destroys, the 
conscience theory. With Fromm, we ask: "Does the assumption 
of the existence of conscience turn out to be untenable when 
we investigate the phenomenon empirically as a problem of 
human motivation?1127 Mr. Fromm fUrther observes that the 
philosophical literature on conscience brings a wealth of 
clues. He says: 
Cicero and Seneca speak of conscience as the 
inner voice which accuses and defends our conduct 
with respect to its ethical qualities. Stoic 
philosophy relates it to self-preservation (taking 
care of oneself), and it is described by Chrysippus 
as the consciousness of harmony within oneself. In 
scholastic philosophy, conscience is considered to 
be the law of reason llex rationis) implanted in man 
by God ••• The emotional element in this awareness was 
stressed by English writers. Shaftsbury, for 
instance, assumed the existence of a 'moral sense' in 
man, a sense of right and wrong, an emotional reaction, 
based on the ract that the mind or man is itself in 
harmony with the cosmic order. Butler proposed that 
moral principles are intrinsic ••• Kant abstracted con-
science from all specii'ic contents and identii'ied it 
with the sense of duty as such. Nietzsche, a bitter 
25. MH, 142. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid. 
critic o~ the religious 1bad conscience,' saw 
genuine conscience rooted in sel~-a~~irmation, 
in the ability to 'say yes to one's sel~.' 
Ma.x Scheler believed conscience to be the ex-
pression o~ rational judgment,2gut a judgment by ~eeling and not by thought. 
(a) Two Types o~ Conscience 
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Fromm distinguishes two types o~ conscience, the author-
itarian and the humanistic. The authoritarian conscience is 
"the voice o~ an internalized external authority, 1129 such as 
church, state, or parents. What is believed to be guilt is 
really ~ea7. This authority is accepted as the ethical end 
moral legislator, so that one ~eels responsible to something 
inside, his conscience. The great de~ect is that one does 
not act by his own moral judgments, and he thus commits him-
sel~ to the truth or ~alsity o~ another's command. I~ the 
authority provides good norma, man's conscience will guide 
him in the direction o~ the good, but someone else's good. 
Should the norms be wrong man will be led into evil by the 
same conscience. 
The value o~ the authoritarian conscience to the indi-
vidual is in the security it provides. His ~eeling o~ 
certainty and identity depends on a symbiosis, in which ~ear 
and guilt vanish. This "belonging" sense assures the subject 
28. MH, 141, 143. 
29. Ibid., 143. 
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of' the authority's concern and he will bear punishment or 
sacrifice, anything rather than to be cast of'f and lose the 
symbiotic strength and security. At all hazard he must 
retain a good conscience, which is done by pleasing the 
external authority. 
What really matters seems to be that the authoritarian 
conscience is strengthened by the deterioration of' one's 
self, so that destructive strivings are allowed within the 
person under the false guise of virtue. This blocking of' 
the instincts tends to turn them backward against man him-
self in a cruel, destructive conscience, harassing the 
subject with guilty feelings which result from not pleasing 
the authority under Whom he is sublimated. Man's person and 
social judgment is yielded to the will of' the accepted authority. 
The fallacy of imposed ethics is readily evident: the 
individual's value judgment is impaired, if' not destroyed. 
To impose authority serves to cripple the valuable latent 
powers of personality, resulting in a greatly weakened social 
structure. 
The authoritarian attitude indicates the presence of 
habit and inertia in society, a state of complacency which 
is not conducive to growth of the moral ideal, This attitude 
may represent intellectual laziness, tm greatest single 
factor of' retardation in social progress. A virile society 
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is dependent upon individuals whose contributions to society 
are the results of the activity of free intelligence. 
For Fromm the humanistic conscience "is our own voice, 
present in every human being and independent of external 
sanctions and rewards,n30 Here conscience is not the simple 
reaction of our minds but the total function of the person-
ality. "Actions, thoughts, and feeling which are conducive 
to the proper functioning and unfolding of our total person-
ality produce a feeling of inner approval, or 'rightness,' 
characteristic of the humanistic 'good conscience.•"31 Con-
science is thus "a re-action of ourselves to ourselves.n32 
The principal difference between authoritarian and humanistic 
consciences is that whereas authoritarian conscience is con-
cerned with man's obedience, self-sacrifice, duty or social 
adjustment, the humanistic conscience is "the expression of 
man's self-interest and integrity ••• which represents not only 
the expression of our true selves; it contains also the 
essence of our moral experiences in life,n33 The imposition 
of authoritarian rule retards and diverts this normal 
function of human personality. 
2, Objections from Rational Theology 
Rational theology is a systematic rejection of the idea 
30. MH, 158, 
31. Ibid, , 159. 
32, Ibid, 
33, Ibid. 
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of imposed ethics. George La Piana objects to revealed ethics 
because •the Christian theological system of ethics stands 
on the presupposition that as the human intellect cannot dis-
cover the supreme truth without a divine revelation, human 
conscience likewise cannot reach the goal assigned to human 
life by God without a divine intervention.•34 Revealed 
religion is based on God's disclosing His plan through sacred 
Scriptures with the confusing complication that all major 
religions present the same claim. La Plana is disturbed by 
inherent contradictions in non-rational theology, for instance 
"the notion that 'duties toward God are not rational' when it 
is of the very essence of man as created by God to be 
rational."35 
Moral and social progress has been directly affected by 
the moral principles expounded by the Christian church. It 
has been the capacity of the church to adapt itself to the 
reality of life in different eras, it is its notions of 
immortality and final retribution that explain its influence 
over the masses and its power to modify the social structure 
throughout its history. •The authoritarian character of its 
moral system will always attract those, and they are many, 
whose intellectual training and habits of mind are such that 
they must rely primarily on authority for guidance in their 
34. Anshen, MPA, 380. La Piana, Art. {17) 380 in MPA. 
35. Ibid., 399. 
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moral life."36 
In taking the Roman Catholic church as the representa-
tive Christian church, which he seems to do, Professor La 
Piana fails to observe the fact that the Roman church's 
imposed morality was part of the total authority cast off in 
the Reformation, which modifies the premise that the Catholic 
church is essentially the Christian system. The Catholic 
system of imposed theology was rejected in the Reformation 
precisely because Martin Luther, and his followers, did not 
believe that the corrupt Medieval church was the true church. 
This writer holds that it is historically inaccurate end 
unfair to ascribe possession of Christian truth to the Roman 
Catholic church, for it appears rather to be a usurpation of 
power, authority, and position which do not rightly belong 
to it, It is a system of substitutionary dogmas imposed on 
the world, void of the spirit and true ethics of the Founder 
of the Christian religion. It may simplify the problem to 
summarize Christian teaching under one ecclesiastical head, 
but it fails of integrity and truth unless one is ready to 
show that Catholicism as represented in the papacy is equi-
valent to Christian universalism as founded in the teachings 
of the Holy Scriptures, 
3, Objections from Science 
George Sarton, professor emeritus of the history of 
36, Anshan, MPA, 409, 
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science in Harvard University, sets science over against 1m-
posed authority, asserting that "the history of science is 
the story of an endless struggle against superstition and 
error; it is not a vivacious and spectacular struggle, but 
37 
rather an obscure one--obscure, tenacious, and slow." "The 
resistance of science against every form of unreason or 1r-
rationality is so firm, and yet so quiet, that it is almost 
as gentle as non-resistance would be, yet unshakable,n38 
The very nature of science forbids the imposition of authority 
except where the empirical test validates it. Science by its 
inherent character is international and inter-racial. It is 
one of the highest forms of altruism with the good dispensed 
to all man, not to a se~ct group. "It aims at unanimity, 
not according to any preconceived idea, but concerning the 
very system which is being developed by the unconscious and 
continuous collaboration of all people in a task independent 
of themselves and infinitely superior to any one of their 
39 desires." 
Professor Sarton wisely observes that science must not 
be allowed to become a Frankenstein monster, but that it 
must be integrated with the rest of life and culture, Ita 
moralization and humanization will prevent it from going on 
37. Anahen, MPA, 445, 
38, Ibid, 
39, Ibid. 
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a rampage. To achieve this end, science must be considered 
historically in the same way that other cultures have been 
studied, This study will reveal that science has been, and 
is still, a human achievement, the history of mankind at its 
best. Such an evaluation of science, with its continuity of 
human endeavor, construes the notion of scientific humanism, 
a humanism pure and simple. 
The scientific approach is essentially one of humility, 
not boisterous but humble, gentle, and free. In addition to 
securing man from disease, death, and danger, science has as 
a second value the aim to make •the contemplation of truth 
40 
more easy and more complete." The chief characteristic of 
a true scientist is disinterestedness, selflessness; not so 
much generosity as the forgetfulness and abandonment of self. 
The bigotry, ill-founded zealotry, and irrationality of i~ 
posed authority cancel out the fine virtues of science. 
Thus, by an irrevoc,ble alienation, science and non-empirical 
authority are separated. 
C. Universalism, Relativism, and Evolution 
The progress of mankind is toward global, if not cosmic 
universalism. Water barriers have collapsed and continents 
have moved close together in the expanding World Age in 
40. Anshan, MPA, 450. 
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which we live. The world is a neighborhood; we must leave 
the isolation or rormer years ror global interests. Earth's 
neighborliness, already a reality, suggests the oneness or 
our globe with the cosmos. Preparations are under way to 
invade spaee, to extend man 1 s inrluence to the "neighborhood 
or planets." Beside the enthralling exploration or our 
globe, and space, scientifically we ask: May there not be 
moral implications in this expansion? 
1. Objection from Universalism 
Ernest Jackh, in the Anshan study, believes that 
"spatial consciousness has enlarged the moral principles of 
the world. 1141 Certainly more than geography and astronomy 
are involved in man's record-making progress. Not only does 
11 the cosmogony or Genesis meet the cosmology or science,1142 
but the morality or Exodus meets the universality of modern 
globalism. Social action and ethics have a common source--
in human progress. Human aspirations, geared by a dominant 
or benevolent science, can never outstrip the de!IIEil ds of the 
ethical ought. Wherever man extends his control, the moral 
implications or the "fatherhood or God11 and the "brotherhood 
or man 11 will be needed ir the venture is to survive as a 
community worth living in. 
41, Anshan, MPA, 483, 
42. Ibid., 489. 
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Universal ethical codes by which men can be neighbors, 
living in peace, prosperity, and happiness, are attainable 
only at the expense of isola ted authoritarian groups who re-
fuse to yield to the practical necessity of objective prin-
ciples. Foremost among the obstructionists is the advocate 
of imposed ethics whose independence thwarts the universal 
will. No temper could be more diametrically opposed to 
authority than the urge toward universalism. Writing in the 
Science of Culture Series, Ralph Linton, anthropologist in 
Yale University, specifies that "one of the first require-
ments of a scientific approach to the problem of universal 
ethical principles is a clear delimitation of the frame of 
reference within which the comparative studies are to be 
made,n43 Society must universalize, 
2, Objection from Relativism 
Relativism can be divided into social and individual 
phases, Relativism as used in this chapter means individual 
autonomy, expressed in Protagoras 1s homo mansura, Relativism 
is a double-bladed philosophical axe, At one edge hangs the 
frail thread of individual experience; at the other, the 
cord of objectivity. From Socrates on, philosophers have 
done an intellectual toe-dance on the menacing axe edge, 
43, Anshan, MPA, 648. 
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unable to deny relativity, but afraid to admit it because of 
its threat to universal validity. Most of them have managed 
to maintain a respectable balance despite the imposing 
casua11 ty list. 
(a) Socrates on Relativism 
Socrates, in a lively discussion with Theaetetus, asked 
a damaging question regarding Protagoras 1s homo mansura: "I 
wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a declar-
ation that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other yet 
stranger monster which has sensation, is the meapure of all 
things?"44 The beating heart of Truth is laid bare as 
Socrates probes more deeply. He continues: 
Then we might have shown a magnificent con-
tempt for our opinion of him by informing us at 
the outset that while we were reverencing him like 
a God for his wisdom he was no better than a tad-
pole, not to speak of his fellow-men--would not 
this have produced an overpowering effect? For 
if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern 
another's feelings better than he, or has any 
superior right to dete~ine whether his opinion 
is true or fal~e, but each, as we have several 
times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, 
and everything that he judges is true and right, 
why, my friend, should Protagoras be preferred 
to the place of wisdom and instruction, and 
deserve to be paid well, and we poor ignoramuses 
have to go to him, if each one is the measure of 
h1 s own wi sdom?45 
In the following argument Socrates shows that ~rota­
goras1s doctrine of knowledge as perception is suicidal and 
44. Theaet. 160. 
45. Ibid., 162. 
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cuts away his own and other claims to superior wisdom. He 
concludes the argument by showing that general ideas are 
perceived by the mind alone without the aid of the senses, 
and whereas sensations are given at birth, truth and being, 
which are essential to knowledge, are acquired by reflection.46 
This Socratic paradigm is still the virile center of the con-
troversy today; sensation provides the raw material for 
thought, but reason gives structure and meaning to experience. 
Kant's merging of the modern division of philosophy, ration-
alism and empiricism, has its seed-thought in Socrates. 
(b) Sextus Empiricus on Relativism 
Sextus Empiricus gives us further light on Protagoras 
and the advent of relativity. "By measure he means the cri-
terion, and by 'things' the objects and so he is virtually 
asserting that 'Man is the criterion of all objects, of those 
which exist that they exist, and of those which exist not 
that they exist not 1 ••• and thus he introduces relativity. 847 
Aristotle objected that man is the measure of all things, for 
"if this be so, it follows that the same thing both is and is 
not, and is bad and good, and that the contents of all other 
opposite statements are true.n48 
In our day, the theory of relativity has emerged through 
the thought of Einstein and remains a provident element of 
46. 
47. 
48. 
Theaet. 185, 186. 
~., PYfrh. h. I, 216 seq. (From Nahm, SEGP, 239.) 
~- 6, 062b 13. 
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our theoretical knowledge. Philosophers, and scientists, 
find it no longer necessary to 0 argue with" relativity; they 
seek instead to grasp its contingent and contextual signifi-
cance in the rapidly-expanding understanding of cosmic 
relations. Modern discovery has not refuted the theory of 
re~tivity, poorly begun in Protagoras, but it has affirmed 
it. Extreme relativism destroys the basis of knowledge, as 
Socrates argued, by making objective standards of truth im-
possible. But the dependent position of facts, none being 
purely independent, indicates an interdependence, which for 
all purposes means relativity. Thus we cannot escape the 
relative nature of things in existence, even though knowledge 
must by that admission become provisional, undergoing a 
constant modification as new facts appear. 
The crux of relativity is the autonomy of the individual, 
especially in morals. Reinhold Niebuhr held that man alone 
can be moral; society is hopelessly disposed to immorality 
because of "the inferiority of the morality of the group to 
that of the individuals ••• to establish a rational social 
force which is powerful enough to cope with the natural im-
pulses by which society achieves its cohesion. 049 If the 
individual is to enjoy relative freedom in morals, the 
ominous shadow of imposed ethics must be dispelled. Imposed 
49. MMIS, XII. 
ethics represents a definite infringement on free man's 
rights; thus either individual relativism or authoritarian 
ethics must yield. 
3. Objection from Evolution 
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The evolutionary hypothesis, if true, abrogates the 
possible validity of imposed ethics. The wide acceptance of 
the theory of evolution by bona fide intellectuals, philoso-
phers, scientists, educators, ascribes respectability and 
authority to the theory. Even though this does not amount 
to unquestioned proof, since Darwin no intelligent person 
can ignore the importance of this concept of existence. Leav-
ing its fete in the hands of the scientists who will ulti-
mately determine its truth or falsity, we accept for sake of 
discussion its de facto status. 
This study is not concerned with the arguments pro or 
con regarding evolution as a description of the genesis and 
history of the facts to which it is applied, for as Bowne 
rightly said "evolution in the scientific sense is neither a 
controlling law nor a producing cause, but simply a description 
of a phenomenal order.n50 We turn rather to its relationship 
to imposed morality, and for arguments for and against evolution, 
concisely arranged, one may read Types and Problems of Philosophy 
by Mead, 51 which seems to be a fair presentation of the 
50. MET, 272 •. 
51. 122-135 (rev. ed.). 
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question. 
The evolutionistic objection to imposed ethics runs 
like this: Life is a process of unfolding, therefore a pro-
cess of learning. The problem of evil cannot be solved by 
legislating but by development; man is not evil, he is 
ignorant. Morality is the customs of collective adjustment, 
derived from experience and as man extends his control over 
his environment, his relationships in society will improve---
meliorism being the clue to morality. Man not only has 
advanced from the lower forms, his moral insight also has 
undergone concomitant elevation. Time and experience are 
the real keys to moral achievement; the race is on its way 
to redemption. 
Imposed ethics does not consider the gradual emergence 
of moral standards; it relates to authority not culture. As 
a conception of moral sanctity or turpitude, imposed ethics 
jumps the gun on the human race, overlooking the need of 
advancement by enlightenment. It is inconsistent with the 
rational method of human betterment, and it is therefore 
falre. Evolution applies not only to the physical state of 
man, but also to his moral stature. Imposed ethics does 
not conform to the facts of experience. 
D. Self-Realization and Education 
Self-realization stands opposed to authoritarian ethics 
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because impositionism nulliries personal autonomy. Freedom 
ror selr-rulrilment raises at once the much-discussed problem 
or human liberty: Is a man rree to realize his native poten-
tial; does he possess inalienable rights? 
The history or mankind is a story or ceaseless struggle 
ror human rreedom: rreedom rrom want, rear, insecurity, and 
coercion. Misconceptions or rreedom have retarded man's 
progress, but rortunately they have not completely blocked 
his way. Man had to learn, especially rrom the time or 
Rousseau, that liberty was not license but rreedom with 
restraint. As Proressor Flewelling puts it, "the democratic 
way or life is a give-and-take proposition, and personal 
liberty means the liberty to behave one's salr in a decent 
society."52 
Plato, in The Republic, recognized rreedom as a charac-
teristic or democracy, 53 but it required the mature thought 
or old age to relate it properly to law as a necessity in 
the state.54 This reveals the progressive insight through 
reason in the lire span or one man; but it is indicative or 
similar progress in the history or the race. As individual-
ists, Cicero, Melanchthon, Machiavelli, Bacon, Kant, Locke, 
Rousseau, ani Je rrerson, to name a rew, are living landmarks 
or man's quest ror rreedom. Although man was not always sure 
52. TTMM, 492. 
53. a, 557 B. 
54. Laws 12, 962 E (Cp. also Menexenus 238 E). 
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what he meant by freedom, his persistent urge toward it has 
driven him on. 
Freedom, which is the indispensable ground of self-
realization, is "the autonomy or self-determination of rational 
beings,n55 It is likely that Kant's doctrine of freedom 
"became the foundation of idealistic metaphysics in Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel, but not without sacrifice of the strict 
critical method,•56 In Aristotle, Kant,and the modern 
advocates of democracy, freedom is essential for placing re-
sponsibility. Autonomy does not exist unless choice is free, 
Only as man freely chooses in life's decisions does the 
possibility of self-realization become real. Freedom cannot 
be shouted down because of its abuse by the unscrupulous, for 
there is "a widespread and profound feeling that freedom is 
the basis of law, politics, art, knowledge, religion, and 
life, Only because it holds so elemental a place could it 
have survived its numerous and time-honored perversions.•57 
Self-realization depends on freedom, and in free intelli-
gence are the attributes of spontaneity, development, and 
self-determination. Then education is the conquest of free 
thought, man's liberation through knowledge and wisdom. This 
conquest of being, this progressive attainment of new truths, 
55, Runes, Diet. of Phil,, 112. 
56. Ibid., 11Kant1an1sm, 11 159. 
57. Flewelling, TTMM, 501. 
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or the progressive realization of the ever-growing and ever-
renewed significance of truths already attained, opens and 
enlarges our mind and life, orienting them in freedom and 
autonomy. 
The course of self-realization and education, for they 
have definite relations, demands more than anything else the 
opportunity for man to realize his latent potential, to ex-
plore his creative genius, to bring out the hidden values 
of personality. Progressive education is an attempt to re-
lease the inner dynamism of nature and of mind into useful 
channels; to guide the latent power of intellect rather than 
to dictate to it, with the view that imposed knowledge re-
presses the mind. We will not argue the value of progress-
ive education, but the bases of self-realization and per-
sonality seem to be the same rational potential. Hence the 
most healthy condition of mind exists when reason is free 
to realize its unexerted powers. In the untrammeled exer-
cise of human reason is the true ground of self-realization, 
Education supplies the restraints and corrections required 
for fUll and useful self-development. 
At the point of freedom, self-realization runs counter 
to imposed authority in the areas of social integration es-
pecially related to morals. Whereas a degree of restraint 
is necessary for proper development, the subject must avoid 
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subjugation, Imposed ethics demands complete subjection; it 
cannot countenance or survive freedom of thought and action, 
When freedom revives, imposition dies. They have no common 
ground. It is this insuperable barrier which sets self-
realization in a position of opposition to imposed ethics. 
E. The Intuitionists 
John Wild has described intuition as 11a plant of 
confused and intricate growth which has wound its tendrils 
round many noble trees and mingled ita roots with those of 
the brightest flowers and most ineradicable weeds in the 
philosopher's garden, 1158 Hence, intuitionism is an inex-
tricable phase of philosophy as well as theology. 
Intuitionism in ethics bas generally been divided into 
four interpretations, each related in a different sense to 
the conscience, the ultimate referent in value judgment. Thus, 
conscience is (1) an 11 inner voice" which rules directly on 
right and wrong, {2) a "sense of duty," or a desire to do what 
is right, (3) a general law of reason, as in Kant's "categor-
ical imperative," and (4) a learned response-pattern, as in 
59 the Freudian analysis, 
These views involve the direct witness of one's own mind, 
58, INT., Preface. 
59, Garvin, MIE, 402. 
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or seeks the direction of an inner faculty. This sensitivity 
to moral values is a form of innate, primeval, intuitive 
approach to moral problems, its unreasoned immediacy often 
being arrived at without consideration of the ulterior effects 
of the act involved. There are exceptions to this last 
notion, notably W. D. Ross and A. C. Ewing. The intuition-
ists believe that the moral consciousness functions almost 
instantly in the moral context, in somewhat the same manner 
as the sense organs do in the act of perception. Moral 
judgments are provided ready-made without the reflective 
ordering of reason. The term "intuition" in philosophy is 
used "to denote those theories which hold that man has or 
can have direct noetic acquaintance with what is fundamentally 
real, and a direct noetic ability to distinguish between the 
basically true and the basically false."60 
Prominent among intuitionists are such great names as 
Shaftsbury, Wollaston, Butler, Sidgwick, Kant, Spinoza, 
Moore, Ross, and Bergson. A detailed study of the various 
doctrinal facets encountered in the theories of these thinkers 
is not necessary for the point to be made in this disser-
tation. This writer is interested primarily to discover what 
relationship obtains between intuition as a function of human 
personality and the standards of morality as considered in the 
dissertation. It will suffice, therefore, to lay bare the 
60. Wheelwright, CIE, 134. 
broadest fUndamental principle or principles underlying 
intuitionism and then to evaluate the results in the light 
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of the meanings given to the three standards of morality here-
in considered. 
Even though in Butler's thinking intuition was associated 
with theology, in Kant to a general law, in Bergson to the 
"deep and profound creativity of the vital impetus,"61 and in 
Ross to "prima-facie duties,n62 the basic principle which 
connects all of these diverse views is the immanent faculty 
which pronounces judgment on moral questions without the 
mediation of reason or any other accessory. Despite the ram-
ifications involved from thinker to thinker, one basic fact 
remains: Intuitionism in all of its various forms is essen-
tially related to the immanent expression of the subject, with 
the ultimate court of appeal being the conscience, or some 
designate Which passes direct judgment on the questions of 
the moral rightness or wrongness of a motive or an act. 
However, the object (value) known by moral consciousness 
is external to the knower, "out there," objectively real 
(moral realism), and is not dependent on the act of knowing. 
Hence the moral norm falls outside the subject and could be 
said to be imposed. An exact classification for this type of 
ethics is difficult to determine. 
61. Robinson, POC, 124. 
62. Rader, EAS, so. 
F. Review and Conclusion 
In Chapter I Imposed Ethics was defined as: "Any con-
ception of morality enjoined upon the adherent by a revealed 
fiat of God or an arbitrary command of man, either verbal 
or written." 
The disposition of Authority was examined and a clear 
distinction was made between (1) the authority imposed at 
the behest of a superior without respect to the dignity of 
free intellect, and (2) that authority arrived at after 
patient, rational investigation. Imposed ethics is, by the 
meaning given it in this dissertation, related to the first 
conception of authority. The Roman Catholic church was given 
as an outstanding example, although not the only one, of 
imposed ethics. This chapter has been devoted to an exam-
ination of various present-day theories of morality in their 
relation to imposed ethics in an effort to show that the 
preponderance of reasoned opinion is against the notion of 
authoritarian morality. 
PART THREE 
IMMANENT ETHICS 
PAR 'r THREE 
CHAPTER IV 
ORIGIH AND HISTORY 
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The theor7 of1mmsnentism in ethics prescribes that 
the natural man incorporates within himself adequate and 
valid ground for moral character and expression. The moral 
1tate is not, therefore, imposed 'b7 code, decree, or 'b7 an7 
external authorit,-, nor is it imparted to man in a divine 
act. 
In Part Two it was explained that impo1ed ethics is that 
form of moralit7 enjoined upon the individual b7 some exter-
nal authorit,-, and although it involves the immanent consent 
of the adherent's will, it is distinct from immanent ethics 
in that it is related to an external source of authority. 
Every act of man involves to some extent his immanent psy-
chological function, but there is a precise distinction 
between authoritarian ethics enjoined upon an individual from 
an external point of reference, and immanent ethics which 
issues from within the individual, the natural expression of 
his life as it is lived out. 
In imposed ethics the authority is without, and the 
only implication of immanence is the act of man's will to 
obey. In immanent ethics, however, the source of authority 
is within the individual; he acts at tbe behest of his own 
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reason or the call or his om desires. I! man accepts imposed 
morality, he must set aside his own reason and desires when-
ever they conflict w1 th the demands or the authority 
imposing the moral standards. He is passive in his obedience 
to the expressed will or another. The situation changes 
radically in immanent ethics, !or the individual becomes 
active in the disposition of authority. Reference is shifted 
from the external to an internal point, and rather than give 
resigned allegiance to an external authority, he gives place 
to his own reason and desires which become to him the 
criterion of ethical truth. 
When ethics is immanent the jurisdiction or ethical 
power rests within the individual. Instead of unquestioned 
reliance on the judg11111nt and paternalism of some external 
sovereignty, man consult• his own best judgment. He asks 
questions. He searches diligently for rational answers to 
these questions. He attempts to harmonize reason and desire, 
and any reference to external authority is purely incidental. 
Ethics to be immanent must be involved in the total behavior 
of the individual. A metaphorical equivalent is ascribed to 
Solomon: "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it 
are the issues of life.•l The "heart" indicates the cause or 
source of expression, and the "issues of life" imply the 
total respon1e of the human being. Plato put it this way, 
1. Proverbs 3:5 (King James Version). 
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"every one of us is made pretty much what he is by the bent 
of his desires and the nature of his sou1,n2 
The distinction drawn between imposed and immanent 
ethics, therefore, is seen to be that in the former the 
authority is external to the individual, whereas in the 
latter the point of authoritative reference is within the 
individual. In imposed morals the adherent trusts the 
dignity and judgment of an external sovereign and tries to 
adjust his behavior to a code of ethics set forth by that 
sovereign. His reason and desires assume a place of sub-
ordination in his consent to obey. Immanent ethics reverses 
the situation and places the source of authority within the 
individual, so that his own rational judgment, harmonized 
with his natural desires, becomes the basis of authority. 
In Part Four where the idea of imparted ethics will be 
considered, we shall find that the distinction between im-
posed and immanent ethics and imparted ethics is largely that 
in imparted ethics the point of authoritative reference 
shifts from the external position to an internal position in 
an actual transmission of the seat of authority from outside 
the individual to a place within him, lhen the authority is 
transferred thus from the external to the internal position, 
that imparted state is thence lived out immanently through 
the personality function of tl:.e. individual. This complicated 
2, Laws, 904. 
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procedure will be dealt with fully in the place alloted to 
it. To summarize one ean express it thus: In imposed ethics 
the authority is external and remains outside the individual; 
in immanent ethics the source of authority is w1 thin the 
individual, and remains there; but in imparted ethics whereas 
the authority is at first external to the individual, it 
does not remain there, but changes from the outward point 
to an inward position from whence it becomes a part of the 
individual's immanent expression. 
A. The Historical Basis of Immanence 
To pin-point the exact beginning of moral theory is 
difficult because the doctrines of the ancient thinkers 
were not always explicit. These doctrines were embroiled 
in a maze of counter-discussion, in which myth played a part. 
For example, it was impossible in some instances to ascertain 
whether the philosopher was seeking the foundations of know-
ledge in matter or in a being or existence apart from matter. 
Until the horizons of thought cleared somewhat and a con-
structive system of philosophy was conceived, perhaps as late 
as Plato, some facets of human knowledge, morals a point in 
case, w.re left obscure and undeveloped. 
The pains-taking discoveries of the earlier thinkers, 
however, provided the building blocks for the later systems. 
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Too much credit c&nnot be given to tbem for the secrets of 
existence they wrested from primitive darkness. Their 
measure of success in some respects exceeds the achievements 
of their successors; they brought light out of darkness and 
those who followed them walked in that light. 
The speculative picture painted by the 
first Greek philosophers is today fresh and 
memorable for its broad simplicity, but it 
is logically unstable, and lacking in con-
viction. This is because the early thinkers 
proceeded upon a minimum of reflective 
analysis and, to put tbe matter bluntly, 
hardly knew wha3 it was that they were 
talking about. 
Until Plato conceived of a psychology of ethies,4 moral 
grounds rested in nature, a nature of the character of matter. 
Even though Anaxagoras, in the fifth century B. c., brought 
out the notion of mind, an advance over the hylozoiam of the 
Mile si&n philosophers, his rationally-animated force-substance, 
or "thought Stuff,n was still only a finer grade of matter. 
The ~ of Anaxagoras was a stuff or substance of the con-
sistency of matter; corporeal, homogeneous, and imperishable 
which was proportionately diffused throughout the universe. 
It varied in degree from otber substance in that it was 
mobile, finer, and lighter. It varied in essence because it 
was self-directing and capable of moving other elements, by 
its own motion, in a purposive way. 
3. Stallknecht and Brumbaugh, SWP, 1. 
4. Windelband, HOP, 123. 
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In the doctrine of Anaxagoras are the firm, obvious 
traces of the rational cause of Heraclitus, by which existence 
is teleologically ordered to proper ends. Then it could be 
said that the hylozistic animation of the Milesians was 
rationalized in Heraclitus and raised to the status of mind 
in Anaxagoras. This evolutionary structuring of the mind, 
or soul, clearly suggests the notion that man's behavior is 
the expression of the illllll!ment function of his mind. This 
is a step forward in the search for the inception of 
immanence in ethics, for it reveals that at that early date 
the idea of a direct relationShip between man's inner and 
outer existence had begun to emerge. But the question re-
mains: Has the process exceeded the bounds of matter, 
regardless of how matter is conceived? 
1. Early Materie.lilllll and Ethics 
There appears no perceptible break in the homogeneous 
substance that is ground for ~sical and ethical assumptions. 
The early philosophers wre concerned primarily with the 
problem of matter; the extraordinary importance of ethics 
did not occur to them. The hint of ethical necessity could 
possibly be taken in the poetic fragments of Thales in which 
the perishing of all things is represented as an expiation 
for injustice, a kind of retribution for sin in the Hellenic 
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life.5 But the lack of explicitness clouds the quest so far 
as ethical considerations were involved. 
At this time the concepts of absolutism and individualism 
had not yet been clarified. The individual was apparently a 
part of the World-Soul, Seelenstorf, not a figment, but a 
real part of it.S The World-Soul, a moving force, permeated 
all animate things yet left the body at death, which suggests 
a kinaaip to the modern notion of psychic reality. Feeling 
and volition were scarcely recognizable in those early 
systems, out the individual as· a mobile particular was part 
and parcel of the force which moved the entire mechanism of 
existence, and the "knowing" of the individual was an in-
separable component of the knowing process of the world. The 
degree of knowledge possessed oy the individual was gauged 
by the portion of World-Reason, fire for Heraclitus, he con-
tained. 
The uniformity of the World-Reason, the law of motion 
and order, was the main pre-Sophistic basis for a scientific 
mthod and principle of ethics. Whether it is said to be 
the harmony concept of the Pythagoreans, the hylozoism of 
the Mile sians, the identity of being and thought of the 
Eleatics, or the substance-force in Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, 
the conclusion is the same: Ethical gromds rest in a 
World-Substance, a substance insufficiently differentiated 
5. Windeloand, HOP, 49. 
6. Ibid., 41. 
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or understood so as to specify the precise nature. "Moat of 
the early philosophers were content to seek a material first 
principle as tbe cause of all thinga.n7 
2. Sophists Forced Ethics into Focus 
When the problem of the authority of man's living was 
encountered in the era of the Sophists, moral value was 
forced into tbe focus. The cosmological significance began 
to yield to the impact of the individual on social conscious-
ness. The importunity of the philosopher, the popular 
question of the Greek Enlightenment, was: Is there any 
knowledge that is valid everywhere and always? Is there a 
law, or authority, which applies universally to all people, 
states, and times? Windelband observes that "Greek ethics 
began thus with a problem which was completely parallel to 
the initial problem of physics.n8 
The philosophers had designated the unchanging, the 
essence of things, as nature in contrast to the changing, or 
the laws prescribed by hWII8ll institutions. This dominant 
principle of the period not only served as the explmation 
of the genesis of all things, but also provided a norm or 
standard of value. The philosopher's vision was extended to 
include not only man's relationship to the universe, but also 
7 • Bakewell, SBAP, 1. 
8. Windelband, HOP, 73. 
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his social implications, and thus ths pressure of the ethical 
ought was felt: If there is no universal standard, there 
ought to be. 
The search for authority until ths time of the Sophists 
had extended to sense-perception, emotion, and reason.9 The 
answer had been unequivocally reason. Socrates, though 
designated as a Sophist (perhaps to his displeasure), 
championed reason. But his rational scrutiny did not blind 
his eyes to man 1 s practical needs. Cicero accredited 
Secrates with bringing philosophy down from heaven. In the 
Tusculsn Disputations he described Socrates as follows: 
"Socrates was tbe first to call down philosophy from heaven, 
and to place it in the cities, and to introduce it into the 
houses of men, compelling men to examine into life and morals, 
and good and evil.nlO Socrates insisted that the unexamined 
life was not worth living. His didactic method made men 
aware of their ignorance, and consequently uncomfortable be-
cause of it. He saw the need of a universal norm to unite 
the perceptionally-broken framework of Sophistic knowledge. 
Protagoras, the most important Sophist, took note of the 
rising demand for universal law, whether it was to be relation 
to cognition in physics or in morals. He concluded that the 
9. Bertocci, Class Syllabus, course History of Ancient 
Philosophy, 1946-47, p. 21. 
10. Davidson, SC, 5. 
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gods gave in equal measure to all men a sense of justice and 
ethical reverence to enable them to live unitedly and thus 
to preserve their values.11 He found the nature of practical 
life in primary ethical feeling which served as a liaison 
between men, in society or in the state. 
3. Ethics Based on Relativity of Knowledge 
The ethical argument of the Sophists is supported on 
the epistemological doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. 
From a universal principle, the Sophists shifted to a prin-
ciple of the part~uular, homo mansura, man is the measure of 
all things. This did not mea:~ genetic man, genus homo, but 
the individual who becomes a law unto himselt.l2 Professor 
Peter A. Bertocci describes the Sophists as follows: 
They busied themselves (for pay) with teaching 
the art of practical affairs, argumentation, 
personal achievement, and the worst of them 
were unscrupulous as to the truth of a question. 
They are rationalizers not reasoners 1 The im-
portant thing was to "ae11• your merchandise; 
win your point, trip and confuse your opponent1 
Be tactful1 These were the men who deserved 
the wrath of Socrates, Anaxagoras, and Plato. 
But some of these philosophical bake-breaders 
developed a good defense of their procedures, 
by asking whether it was not true ( 1) that 
objective truth is impossible, that all opinions 
are influenced by the person expressing them.l3 
11. 'lindelband, HOP, 74. 
12. Thilly, HOP, 57. 
13. Bertocci, Class Syllabus, course in Histor,y of Ancient 
Philosophy, 1946-47, p. 22. 
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Protagoras applied Heraclitus' doctrine of flUK to 
knowledge: "Man is the measure of all things; of things 
that are that they are; and of things that are no• that they 
are not." Because the senses intervene between the object 
and our knowledge, we never sense things exactly as they 
are, so the constitution of each individual determines what 
he will know. Hence each man' a opinion i a true and nobody 
can be successfully refuted. As Plutarnh stated it: 
"Nothing is such rather than such, for I alone know." 
Although the worth of the institution as a social 
structure, to give order to society and morals, was recognized 
by Protagoraa and Gorgias, later Sophists, already stripped 
of convention, shed as a cloak all responsibility to order. 
Thus the negating skepticism inherent in sophistry was pushed 
into inveterate radicalism by the youthful, clipper Sophists 
such as Polus, Thrasymachus, Callicles, and Euthydemus. Now 
morals, already robbed of any objective status, become the 
whim of human fondness. 
4. Basis of Ethics Shifted to Reason 
Thus from a material first principle the basis of ethics 
was snifted to human reason. The status of immanence did 
not change, however, for the idea of the material first prin-
ciple implied the "inwardness" which connotes immanence. It 
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was not, therefore, a difference of kind, but rather of 
degree. Even then reason was not employed in a potentially-
constructive way. Proper reasoning gave way to rationalizing, 
and what native divinity man possessed was turned into an 
instrument of desire. Free intelligence was only partially 
released; the arbitrary goal set for reason, to justify 
desire through pleasure, limited the function of intelligence 
to an ordained achievement. The recourse to reason waa 
praiseworthy, but the inflexible limits imposed on it forced 
the quest out-of-bounds. Professor Frank Thilly asserts 
that "Sophistry exaggerated the difference in human judgment 
and ignored the agreements; it also laid too much stress on 
the illusoriness of the senses.•l4 
The accentuation of epistemology by the Sophists located 
the inherent fallacies of the former philosophers who had 
almost naively assumed the adequacy of the human intellect 
to discern truth. The intellectual jolt given the thought-
pattern of the day opened the door to a more rational and 
stable epistemology, in Which the laws of thought were 
ascribed central importance. Consequently, logic was stim-
ulated. The same revolution occurred in ethics. Blind 
commitment to traditional views of thought and morals yielded 
to reflection, and the value of ~rscnal choice, the crux to 
future moral theory, was heightened. From this day forth all 
14. Thilly, HOP, 61. 
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systems of customs, morals, and tradition in order to survive 
were required to justify their existence in the light of 
reason. In the minds of many, the false pitch in the sub-
jective self-interest of Sophistry, evident in the moral 
anarchy and vain self-seeking of some of its adherents, was 
compensated for in the awakened interest in the power of 
reason. 
5. Nature of Socratic Ethics 
The most valuable achievement of the Sophists, so far 
as the writer is concerned, was to pave the way to Socrates: 
to bridge the gap from early naturalism to Socratic rationa-
lism. In this transition philosophy came one step nearer 
locating the ground of ethics in reflection. The Sophists' 
blunt questioning of the conventional norms and the ability 
of the human mind to reach truth brought the entire problem 
of knowledge, and concomitantly ethics, into clear focus. In 
the struggle to clarify its position and to justify its stand, 
philosophy became stronger. In attempting to think through 
the fog of twisted notions, philosophy, in the brilliant wit 
of Socrates, reached firm ground. Sophism dialectically pro-
vided the Hegelian principle of negativity for the ri&e of a 
new and stronger synthesis. 
Although rational morals appear more clearly in Socrates, 
the era of the So phi at a marked the transition of moral 
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foundation from non-personal matter to personal intelligence. 
Immanentism as a principle of moral judgment is seen in the 
unstable, ill-defined Protagorean coocept of man as the 
measure. For all things, knowing or doing, are related to 
the uninhibited expression of the free individual. Even 
though it remained for Socrates and later thinkers to correct 
the ugly errors and to give luster to the new doctrine, 
important implications are credited to the Sophists. 
Virtue for Socrates inhered in knowledge, knowledge of 
the good. The good, or what is beat for man, is the main-
spring of virtue. Because it is knowledge, it can be taught. 
Thus out of this spring of virtue, related immanently to the 
will, man acts truthfully. Wrong acts are not chargeable to 
will but to lack of insight. To know is to do, and knowing 
depends on intellectual penetration. No one acta against 
his better judgiDIInt. Knowledge, which determines the will, 
will in right measure insure the act as man lives out the 
immanent moral rightness within him. 
With Socrates, the source of moral theory moves away 
from Sophistic relativism toward an unchanging principle 
which applies universally to all men. This source is still 
located in the not-clearly defined and undifferentiated 
personality of man so that moral expression springs immanent-
ly from the rational best of human excellence. Thus reasoned 
human manifestations are the clue to immanent moral reality. 
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B. Plato and Aristotle 
From Socrates lead two divergent views of philosophy, 
the rigorous rationalism of the Cynics and the pleasure-
grounded irrationalism of the Cyrenaica. The fate of ethics 
was involved in this division of thought. The Cynics ela-
borated the more severe aspect of tba thought of Socrates, 
whereas the Cyrenaica chose the more convivial traits, for 
it is quite clear that Socrates embodied both. The Cynics 
subjugated all physical drives and desires. Virtue was 
freedom from want, complete independence of the outer world. 
The moralist lived under the undeviating discipline of reason 
and suppressed every impulse to physical satisfaction, save 
the minimum indulgence required for a bare existence. 
In contrast to the Cynic interpretation of virtue, the 
Cyrenaica set the standard as the ability to enjoy. Rather 
than intelligent conduct, as the Cynics held, virtue was en-
joyment unlimited. The rising Hedmism found little use for 
rational concepts of morals, but it did concede the ultimate 
ground that social convention should act as a balance to the 
dangerously-rampant individualism. The more radical Cyren-
aica, however, refused to relinquish the sweet fruits of 
independence. Tbeodorus branded patriotism as foolishness 
and Aristippus proclaimed joyously his wandering indifference 
141 
to state obligation.l5 As leader, Aristippus gave to 
pleasur. a physical connotation, a position modified by 
Epicurua, who gave to Hedonism a sense of proportion, refined 
taste, and cordial geniality. Epicurus redeemed in part the 
cause of Hedonism from crude animality by locating pleasure 
primarily in the mind. 
Although the opposing conclusions of the Cynics and 
Cyrenaica led them to widely-diverging points, they found one 
mutual bond--that human personality, regardless of how it ia 
conceived, contains immanently tbe basic principle of ethical 
expression, that some deep underlying spring was the ground 
for human ethical conduct. The source of morals was immanent 
in •n• Whether the moral eenae was accredited to nature as 
the physical medium, or to a psychogenetic process, as in 
Protagoras, the judgment was the same--morals issue from an 
iiiiii!ILilent condition within the human personality. 
It required the systematic endeavor of two great minds 
to impose greater order in moral speculation. These minds 
were supplied by Plato and Aristotle. Their era of systema-
tic philosophy was shared with Democritus, and together they 
gave to the world the first great systems of thought. They 
surpassed their predecessors in scope, insight, and character 
of work, and from the minds of Democritus, Plato, and 
15. Rogers, SHOP, 71. 
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Aristotle emerged three typical, but different, conceptions 
of the 1JOrld. Windelband explains this period of development 
as follows: 
The course of this development was more 
particularly this: the two opposing systems 
of Democritus snd Plato arose from the 
application to cosmological and metaphysical 
problema, of the principle gained through the 
doctrine of the Sophists and of Socrates; from 
the attempt to reconcile these opposites pro-
ceeded the concluding doctrine of Aristotle .16 
1. Rationalism in Ethics 
The relativity of sanae-perception was replaced now by 
a thorough-going rationalism, but a rationalism which improved 
on the previous discipline by expanding the psychological 
field. Whereas Democritua veered away from ethics toward 
theoretical rationalism, Plato, true to the insight of his 
famous teacher, pursued the quest in the direction of morals 
and ended in an ethical rationalism. Ethicists find, there-
fore, the system of Plato a more fruitful hunting-ground 
than the materialism of Democritus. Whereas the system of 
Democritus connotes a complete materialism, Plato pressed on 
to the full determination of the idea and concludes that 
ideas are the true forms of reality. Thence the intuition of 
idea gives knowledge, in contrast to the opinional value of 
sense experience. Here is marked the first time in philo-
16. Windelband, HOP, 100. 
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sophical histor,v that a claim to immaterial reality was . 
made. 17 One snould not confuse Plato's meaning of immaterial 
reality with spirit or mind. This incorporeal world is 
known only as Being and is related to the material world as 
Being is to Becoming, as the permanent is to the changing. 
The first principle of logic, ethics, and physics is the aame. 
2. Development of Psychology 
The demand for a developed psychology grew in Plato's 
systematic treatment of knowledge. The pre-Platonic psy-
chology had arisen out of the presumptions of natural 
philosophy and was incapable, therefore, of meeting the de-
mands of Plato's highly-developed metaphysical system. 
Psychology far Plato, like the metaphysical structure of 
Kant, rested on postulates, for Plato a postulation of the 
realm of ideas. By the Ideas Plato tried to understand the 
psychical life from a different angle from that of his 
predecessors, namely from within. Soul or mind bridged the 
gap in the dualism of the doctrine of Ideas, soul being the 
animate element which moves of itself, perceives, knows, and 
wills. Cebes holds that the soul is independent of the body, 
both preexisting it and possibly outlasting it. He holds 
that it not only affects the body but is itself affected by 
17. Windelbend, HOP, 117. 
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it as well. Soul and body are two substances interacting on 
one another .18 
Immersed in the lower world of phenomenal Becoming,l9 the 
soul contacts the objects of sense, but by its true knowledge 
of the Ideas the soul affiliates with the eternal, immutable 
Being which constitutes Reality. In this position and re-
lation the soul becomes immortal, for, although it feels the 
drag of the earthly, it nevertheless participates in the life 
activity of the eterna1,20 in which it resolves the factors 
of both experiences, temporal and eternal. Therefore the 
ethical ideal of Plato lay not in the direction of the 
happiness of the individual, but in the ethical perfection 
of tb!l individual.21 
The World-Soul,22 as intermediary between the ideal and 
the phenomenal worlds, creates rational hUJ11811 souls,23 leav-
ing it to the lower gods to create animals and the irrational 
parts of the human soul.24 None of these gods, higher or 
lower, enjoy the ascription of personality by their philo-
sopher. AccordiDg to Thilly the Demiurge "is the source and 
principle of all power, energy, and activity in nature and 
18. Phaedo, 84 C ff. 
19. Rep. VII, 518, 521. (Compare ~XII, 957 E.) 
20. Theaeteteua, 185. 
21. Laws V, '729. 
22. Timieua 30 B, 34 E. 
23. Timaeus 41, 42. 
24. Timaeus, 42, 43. (Also Phaedrua 246-250.) 
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in mind. 1125 It is the form of the Good which serves as a 
principle in Plato's cosmology to insure purposiveness in 
things and to provide the teleological and valuational 
aspects of nature and mind. Man can rationally intuit Be-
ing and proportionately relay that knowledge to others. 
Profeasor Wild believes that Plato• s doctrine prescribes that 
"the faculty of reason infallibly apprehends being universally 
aa it is in itself.•26 It was this infallible apprehension 
that procured ethical truth for human understanding. Reason 
grasped moral reality subjectiTely by its insight and con-
veyed the noble secrets of Reality to those who sought to 
know rationally. 
(a) Ethics in Soul Harmony 
Ethics for Plato inhere in aoul harmony. The harmonious 
accord of the three principles, reason, appetite, and spirit, 
is termed justice, the virtue of virtues.27 Justice as the 
supreme virtue in sure s the soul against wrongdoing. The life 
of reason is the summum bonum and happiness accompanies this 
virtuous state. Reason as master seems to require not only 
the subordination of the lower desires but almost elimination 
of them, and the notion borders on asceticism. Thilly even 
25. Thilly, HOP, 85. 
26. Wild, PTM, 270. 
27 0 Rep. IV, 430, 442, 443. (Also Laws II 653 B). 
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suggests that it foreshadows the doctrine of contemptus 
mundi whiCh is encountered later in primitive Christianity.28 
And, one might add, in the nee-Platonism of Plotinus also. 
At least it seems quite evident that what tendency toward 
asceticism there was in Plato eventuated in a definitely 
mystical asceticism in Plotinus. 
3. Immanentism in Aristotle 
The immanentism strongly evident in Plato reached fuller 
expression in his illustrious pupil, Aristotle. The highest 
good for man becomes self-realization in Aristotle, the 
immanent development and function of the rational soul. "Vir-
tue is a disposition, or habit, involving deliberate purpose 
or choice, consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, 
the mean being determined by reason, or as a prudent man would 
determine it.n29 
This self-realization is possible through the activity 
of the entelechy, or soul, the Form which realizes itself in 
the rational behavior of man. 30 All bodily performance is 
soul activity, for the soul is the cause of the body's motion 
and change. Neither can be independent of the other. Soul, 
28. Thilly, HOP, 91. 
29. Nic. Eth., II, 1107a. 
30. An interpretation taken from D. W. Parker in a course 
in "Aristotle," 1942-43, at the University of Michigan. 
This writer is indebted to Dr. Parker for the 
present interpretation. 
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or form, and body, or matter, constitute all being and 
existence. Everything is formed-matter. The form represents 
the eternal ideas of Plato, with matter the phenomenal 
appearance. These had been separated in Plato; at least a 
dualism seemed inevitable, but Aristotle brought them to-
gether in an inseparable unity. In this way Aristotle's 
metaphysics and psychology amalgamate to provide the ground 
for his ethics, which is the first comprehensive scientific 
system of morals. The problem central in Socrates's moral 
philosophy--what is the highest good--is made pre-eminent in 
Aristotle. The ever rising dialectical process points 
toward a highest good, that good which attaches the character 
of goodness to everything else. This highest good is 
audaemonia, usually translated happiness. It is not pleasure, 
but that quality accompanying the full and proper function 
of man as a human baing, or a realization of his specific 
natura. Pleasure is a complement of virtuous activity, a 
part of the highest good, but not identical 1dth it. 
(a) Soul Function in Immanentism 
The immanent function of the soul in ita relation to 
the body assumes a novel and interesting arrangement in 
Aristotle's thinking. The soul is both formal and final 
cause. The body is compared to a musical instrument, where-
as the soul is the musical score the body renders. Soul is 
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the repetoire, the potential behavior. In this potential 
state the soul is the first entelechy. But the soul has a 
further function. It is also the second entelechy, the pro-
gram being rendered. In Aristotle's naturalism this 
performance constitutes consciousness. It is behavior it-
self. Aristotle did not follow Plato, and the Pythagoreans, 
in a belief in the transmigration of souls. Soul is not 
body, but something pertaining to body, and to this particu-
lar body. 
Aristotle's theory of the intellect depends on a lower 
faculty in man, the imagination. Without the imagination 
one could not use his intellect. And there is no imagination 
without senaation. Hence intellect is connected with sen-
sation through the imagination. The intellect is the 
function by whieh one pereeives forms. By in-celleet we can 
pereaive a form independent of the objeet; we ean perceive 
form as sueh, independent of sensuous experienee. But we 
ean think triangular! ty only from an image, for there is no 
sueh thing as an imageless thought. Professor Brand Blanshard 
rejeets this theory in his monumental work The Nature of 
Thought, in whieh he states: 
In eertain special cases the image does 
supply the atuff of thought, but the theory 
that would identify them generally is 
riddled with eonfusions and diffieulties. 
We can only list rapidly a few of the major 
objections. If the thought of a thing were 
the image of it, the characters of the one 
would vary with the characters of the other. 
But in fact their variations do not even 
remotely correspond. (1) The thought often 
grows better as the image dies away, and 
(2) when the image is moat perfQct, the 
thought may be most inadequate.3l 
For Aristotle, one is bound to the world by his sensuous 
experience. Imagination frees him from the world as 
intellect is free to roam. One cannot, however, imagine 
anything he has not sensed. 
(b) Nicomachean Ethics a Socratic Discussion 
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Aristotle's theory of morals, set forth in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, is a Socratic discussion. It is not 
based on supernatural principles, but on an examination of 
the soul of man himself. Based on his metaphysics, 
Aristotle's naturalistic ethics is a civilized ethics, a 
rational system not based on convictions which are not open 
to further reflection. The only superstitious part of his 
ethics is seen in the instance of the dead parents being 
affected by what tneir living children do. 
In accord with Greek thought, Aristotle inquires what 
is the goal of human life, or what is the good for man? If 
all organs of the body have ends, purpose, is it not true 
that man, the whole organism, has an end? He concludes that 
there is no dispute among men as to the goal--it is happiness. 
31. Vol. I, 260. 
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To the question, what is happiness, Aristotle answers that 
it is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.32 
Happiness is virtuous activity. Only man can enjoy such 
activity; a boy or animal, such as the ox, cannot share in 
this activity.33 As a builder becomes a builder by building, 
that is by practice, so man becomes virtuous by doing 
virtuous acts.34 ActiTity gives life its character.35 When 
this character is attained it cannot be lost, for "no happy 
man can become miserable, for be will never do the acts that 
are hateful and mean."36 Since training and practice are 
important, Aristotle agrees with Plato that "we ought to have 
been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, so 
as both to delight in and be pained by the things that we 
ought; for this is the right edueation.n37 
Happiness follows from the fulfillment, or living out, 
of nature's plan. Aristotle confirms Plato's notion that 
harmony of soul is virtue, and that harmony is the music our 
bodies produce; not a aeries of noises, but a composition. 
This character attained is lived out immanently in virtuous 
expression, as an instrument renders the music of which it 
is capable. 
32. Nic. Eth., I, 1098a 30. 
33. lie. !tn., I, llOOa. 
34. :Ric. Etli., II, ll03b. 
35. Nic. Eth., II, ll03b 10. 
36. 'N!c. Eth., I, llOOb 30. 
37. 'Nic • Eth., II, 1104b 11. 
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(c) Virtue Taught by Practice 
Can virtue be taught? Aristotle concedes to Socrates 
that it can, but not by precept, rather by practice.38 Pre-
cept is important as in teaching a pupil to play the piano, 
but practice is necessary in order to achieve. Virtue is 
conceived as a means, not an end, an idea reaching back to 
Pythagoras. Aristotle was unlike Pythagoras in that he did 
not believe that virtue was a mathematical conception. The 
mean cannot be applied mathematically to conduct. Means and 
extremes vary for the individual; what would be a mean for 
one could be an extreme for another and no mathematical 
formula can control it. 
There are other important features of Aristotle's ethical 
theory which do not bear directly on the body of this 
dissertation; hence they will be omitted. There are, for 
instance, the implications of the doctrine of the mean, the 
conditions of happiness, the kinds of virtue, and others. 
There is the longest and most comprehensive discussion of 
friendship in ethical writings. But the writer believes 
that only the parts of Aristotle's theory related directly 
to the actual structure and function of the soul are re-
quired for the continuity of the history of immanentism in 
ethics. 
38. Nic. Eth., II, ll05b 13. 
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If Plato's dualistic concept, which supposes the 
immanent function of reason in the human moral situation, 
implies the presence of ethics as iDUilanent, Aristotle's 
concept of man as a unit, formed-matter, represents the notion 
of immanentism even better. For the body is the instrument 
and the soul the score the body renders, an expression of 
nature, a living out of character. 
c. KBnt and Other IDUilanentists 
Aristotle exerted an incalculable influence on all 
subsequent ethical thinking, in fact an all subsequent 
philosophy. Although his influence affected the Middle Ages 
more than any other definite period, still his concepts and 
terminological usage marked all philosophy from his day to 
this. Definite traces of his thinking are found in such 
succeeding systems as those of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. 
Immediately following the time of Aristotle there arose 
other systems of philosophy: the Epicureans with their 
emphasis on pleasure, and the Stoics with their stress on 
reason. In both of these theories is the restrained idea 
that man's overt behavior is an expression of his natural 
state, that he lives out the real within him. His ethics 
is an iDmlanent principle foreshadowed in his true nature 
and revealed in his life expressions. 
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The next great system of ethic a to follow the period of 
the Epicureans and Stoics is represented in Christianity, 
which will not be treated here. It is also a concept of 
immanentism, but one 'lllhich involves the basic notion of im-
partation. It constitutes an elaborate scope of thought 
which will be treated in the fourth, and final, part of this 
work. 
1. Immanentism in Plotinus 
The idea of immanentism is disclosed in the neo-
Platonism of Plotinus, where the germ ideas of Plato issue 
into a fUll absolutism, a combination of rational Greek 
philosophy and Oriential religious mysticism.39 It is a 
pantheism in that it conceives everything as an emanation of 
God, but it is theistic in its belief in a transcendent God.40 
The final goal of the soul is to find rest in the mind of 
God, an instance of the Oriental influence. The human soul 
is a fallen soul in that it has gazed vainly on the "tree of 
good and evil." 
Redemption from this fallen state consists in a right-
about-face for the seeker of truth whose earth-bound gaze is 
then fixed on God. In the true Oriental sense the returning 
prodigal seeks union with God. This union, or beatific 
39. Thilly, HOP, 154. 
40. Ibid. 
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vision, is attained only by a rigorous mortification of the 
deeds of the body, as diracted in the Jlew Testament.41 Hera 
again the good life is reached by releasing through human 
faculties the inherant disposition or tendency to do right. 
2. Immanen ti 11111 in Spinoza 
To limit the field of consideration, only Immanuel Kant 
among modern philosophers will receive intensive study. 
Others will be mentioned to maintain continuity. Spinoza, 
in a brilliant treatment of ethics, resolvad moral problems 
in the Absolute. For him, our highest good inheres in our 
intellectual love of God, amor intalleotualis Dei,42 and our 
behavior is the life of the Absolute being unfolded in the 
modes. Everything follows necessarily from the nature of 
God so that man's moral action is God's moral manifestation, 
or God working immanently in the parts. 
In The Foundations of the Moral Life Spinoza avers that 
virtue is living out the laws of one's own nature: "Since 
virtue means nothing but acting according to the laws of our 
own nature, and since no one endeavors to preserve his being 
except in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it 
follows that the foundation of virtue is that endeavor itself 
to preserve our own being.n43 He states further that "to 
41. Romans 8:13 and Colossians 3:5. 
42. Thilly, HOP, 329. 
43. Ratner, POS, 266. (Modern Library) 
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act absolutely in conformity with virtue is nothing but act-
ing according to the laws of our own proper nature • 11 44 Man 
acta by the dictates of his own nature and, "necessarily desires 
that which he considers to be good, and avoids that which he 
considers to be evil.• 45 Morals, therefore, are the natural 
expression of an immanent condition within the individual. 
3. Immanentism in Hegel 
The dialectical process of Georg Wilhelm Hegel compares 
with the development of Aristotle' a absolute. 46 Active 
reason by a process of evolution of the Spirit eventuates in 
a community of self-conscious individuals as the dialectic 
proceeds from synthesis to synthesis, culminating in the 
Absolute Mind. Thus the philosophy of Hegel becomes 11 the 
final ayntbtl sis in which the Absolute Mind becomes conscious 
of itself: it recognizes the content of ita being in the 
historical development thrcugh which it has passed.n47 The 
life of the individual is tile actiTity of the Absolute. The 
real and the ideal are one. Man is a particularized display 
of tbe Universal and true Self, or Idea. Immanent in his 
pattern of behavior is the will and life of the Totality of 
which be is a small, but significant, part.48 Hegel describes 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
Ratner, POS, 269, 270. 
Ratner, POS, 268. 
Hegel Sale ctions, 16 (tr. 
Student I a Library). 
Thilly, HOP, 488. 
Hegel Selections, 27. 
J. B. Baillie, The Modern 
the subject and its relations thus: 
The subject, more definitely seized, is 
Spirit (the Mind). It is Phenomenal when 
essentially relating to an existent object; 
in so far is it Consciousness. The Science 
of Consciousness is, therefore, called 
the Phenomenology of Spirit (or Mind),49 
He states 
further: 
The absolute mind, while it is self-centered 
identity, is always also identity returning and 
ever returned into itself: if it is the one 
and universal substance it is so as spirit, 
discerning itself into a self and a gonscious-
ness, for which it is the substance, 0 
4. Immanentism in Kant 
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Kant's rationalization of many of the historical 
Christian views, such as the Golden Rule, freedom, immortali-
ty, and God, represents a forward step in the progress of 
ethical immanentism. According to Windelband, Kant inter-
prets ths essential portions of the Christian doctrine in an 
"ideal of the moral perfection of man in the Logos, 
redemption through vicarious love, and the mystery of the 
new birth.• Windelband continues: 
He thus restores to their rightful place, 
from which they had been displaced by the 
rationalism of the Enlightenment the truly 
49. Be,el Selections, 69. 
50, Ib d,, 281. 
religious motives which are rooted in the 
felt need of a redemption--though he does 
this in a form which is free from the histori-
cal faith of orthodoxy.51 
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Thilly observes in Kant that •the moral imperative is 
the expression of man's real self, or the very principle of 
his being. It is his innermost self that expresses itself 
in the moral law.•52 Thus morality is immanent within the 
individual. 
Kant concluded that nothing is absolutely good in 
this world or out of it except a good will. "Nothing in 
the world--indeed nothing even beyond the world--can possi-
bly be conceived which could be called good without 
qualification except a good will.n53 
Kant continues: 
Even if it should happen that, by a parti-
cularly unfortunate fate or by the niggardly 
provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will 
should be wholly lacking in power to accomplish 
its purpose, and if even the greatest effort 
should not avail it to achieve anything of its 
end, and if there remained only the good will 
(not as a mere wish but as the summoning of 
all the means in our power), it would sparkle 
like a jewel with its own light, as something 
that had its full worth in itself.54 
This good will needs only to be •crought to light:• "We 
have, then, to develop the concept of a will which is to be 
esteemed as good of itself without regard to anything else. 
51. Windelband, HOP, 567. 
52. Thilly, HOP, 443. 
53. Kant, CPR, 55. 
54. Ibid., 56. 
It dwells already in the natural sound understanding and 
does not need so much to be taught as only to be brought 
to light.•55 
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Man aebs from conscious duty, a good motive. "Thus the 
first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth 
an action must be done from duty.•56 The ideas of morality 
are resident in reason: "all moral concepts have their seat 
and origin entirely a priori in reason. This is just as 
much the ease in the most ordinary reason as in reason which 
is speculative to the highest degree.n57 Will is practical 
reason, and the will and the act are the same. 
The moral law, latent in man, is a categorical impera-
tive, and its nature is to command categorically (no 
condition exempted). The categorical imperative states: 
"Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law.•58 It 
demands action because of duty. There is no promise of 
reward, of happiness or pleasure, connected with this duty; 
it is duty pure and simple as a fundamental principle. Since 
it is a rational state, contradiction cannot infect it, and 
thus Kant claims to eeeure his moral thesis against attack. 
For instance, no one could rationally will the universality 
of lying, or the injury of another. 
55. Kant, CPR, 58. 
56. Ibid., 61. 
57. Ibid., 71. 
58. Ibid., 80. 
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As a complement to the categorical imperative, Kant laid 
down a universal imperative, the "universal imperative of 
duty which em be expressed as follows: Act as though the 
maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal 
law of nature. 11 59 The motive here is moralized in its pure 
respect for the moral law, for 11pure respect for the law is the 
sole motive of genuine morality. 1160 To complete the imperatives, 
Kant formulates another, the practical imperative which specifies 
that we should 11Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in that of another, a:lw ays as an end and never as 
a means only.n61 This last law compares with the humanitarian 
concept of man in the Stoic and Christian systems, and in our 
day with the democratic concept of man. W. T. Stace defines it 
as 11 the infinite value of the individual. n62 
Kant does not make clear whether the treatment of men 
as ends and never as means is a principle innate in reason, 
but he does hold that the categorical imperative is a 
universal, necessary law, a priori, a fundamental attribute 
of reason itself. This law governs man's moral judgments, 
with or without his conscious knowledge of it, and it becomes 
the norm for his ethical behavior. Man's autonomy is seen 
in his rational imposition of this law upon himself. Further, 
59. Kant, CPR, 80. 
60. Thilly, HOP, 442. 
61. Kant, CPR, 87. 
62. Stace, DWM, 125. 
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this moral law demands holiness,63 or an absolutely good 
will. Holiness, designated sacredness by E. s. Brightman,64 
is not, however, reached in a moment of time. It requires 
eternal progress toward the goal of perfection.65 Here Kant 
varies from Christian Perfection, as taught by John Wesley, 
in that for Wesley perfection is a character of love,66 and 
the subject can be perfect in love, though imperfect in 
other respects of his being.67 Perfect love requires only 
perfect, or full, commitment to God, a state attainable in 
this life. 
An interesting sidelight is apropos here. In a dis-
cussion on Christian Perfection in a seminar on Kant, 
Dr. Brightman was askBd: "What about Christian Perfection, 
Mr. Brightman?" To which he replied: "If by Christian 
Perfection you mean perfect ability, judgment, or skill, 
the answer is no, it is not possible, But if you mem full 
commitment, or devotion, I cannot see why it is not possible." 
This brief survey of Kant's ethical deductions reveals 
the basic idea that ethical ground is inherent in man, and 
that moral living is the overt phase of principles immanent 
in reasw. Thus for this great modern mind, perhaps the 
greatest, morals are immanent, a constitutional part of 
63. Kant, CPR, 189. 
64. In class discussion in a seminar in Kant. 
65. Kaat, CPR, 225. 
66. Sermon LXXXI, Wesley Sermons, vol. II, 169. 
67. Sermon XL, Wesley Sermons, vol. I, 355, 356. 
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human inbeing. This is alluded to in the following statements: 
It is a priori {morally) necessary to bring 
forth the highest good through the freedom of 
the will; the condition of its possibility, 
therefore, mug~ rest solely on a priori grounds 
of knowledge • And , 
These postulates are those of immortality, 
of freedom affirmatively regarded {as the 
causality of a being so far as be belongs to 
the intelligible world), and of the existence 
of Gpd. The first derives from the practically 
necessary condition of a dura t.ion adequate to 
the perfect fulfilment of the moral law. The 
second comes from the necessary presupposition 
of independence from the world of sense and of 
the capacity of determining man's will by the 
law of an intelligible world, i.e., the law of 
freedom i:tself; the third arises from the 
necessary condition of suCh an intelligible 
world by whi~ it may be the highest good, 
through the presupposition of the highest 
independent good, i.e., the existence of God.69 
5. Immanentism in Recent Philosophy 
The idea of inherent ethics, or immanentism, is dis-
cernible in many other modern philosophers after Kant. They 
are successors only so far as ebronology is involved; they 
do not necessarily bold his views. There is the feature of 
immanentism in all absolutism, such as the systems of 
Spinoza, Royce, Bradley, Bosanquet, and Blansbard. Pan-
psychista, such as A. N. Whitehead, inculcate a form of 
immanentism in their systematic order of thought. Since 
the general idea of absolutism has been treated in 
Aristotle, Spinoza, and Hegel, we will pass on to Whitehead 
68. Kant, CPR, 217. 
69. Ibid., 235. 
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for special attention, Like Kant, he tried to reconcile 
the opposing claims of rationalism and empiricism. Rather 
than use the physics of Newton, he was guided by the dual 
insights of Plato and Heraclitus, and by the implications of 
recent developments in mathematics and science. 
(a) Whitehead 
For Whitehead, the actual world is a process,70 the 
becoming of actual anti ties which are the con ere see nee of 
many potentials, His philosophy of organism views the world 
as a quantitative pluralism, or actual entities (including 
God and all actual occasions), which are the basic units. 
However, since these entities can be analyzed into feelings 
(prehensions), the philosophy of organism might as readily 
be distinguished a qualitative monism. 
The Platonic Ideas become the realm of eternal objects 
in the primordial nature of God, These are the pure 
potentials, Agency, which is God's primordial valuation of 
this realm of eternal objects, makes these eternal objects 
relevant to the concrescence of each novel actual occasion. 
Thus actuality and definiteness are given to what was before 
only potentiality, or indefiniteness and multiplicity. The 
ultimate category and the principle of novelty is creativity.7l 
70. Whitehead, PR, 317. 
71. Ibid., 31. 
163 
A fundamental character of this process is becoming, a 
creative advance into novelty, as in Bergson and Alexander. 
The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from the 
disjunctive to the conjunctive, which creates a novel entity. 
Creativity is the ultimate drive toward the endless production 
of new syntheses, the underlying energy of process.72 It is 
the principle of novelty, of individuality, the eternal 
process of the breaking up of the One in the Many and the 
growing together again of the Many in a new kind of unity of 
the Many into One. Creativity in Whitehead does not exactly 
correspond to either Alexander's nisus or Bergson's elan 
vital, but rather stands for the relatively simple notion of 
process or activity. 
The three philosophers just mentioned, Whitehead, Bergson, 
and Alexander, have enough in common to be treated together. 
All found tbair metaphysical structure on an underlying 
process, wbether it be designated as impulse in Bergson, 
activity in Whitehead, or mobility in Alexander. Although 
they do not agree in a few major tenets and in many many 
minor details, still the basic notion is the same for all 
three--some intrinsic cause is responsible for all subjective 
and objective experience. For them all reality is an 
evolutionary process working out the details of existence. 
72. Whitehead, PR, 31. 
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In each case, value is an immanent quality related to the life 
proce sa of that reality. 
(b) R. w. Sellars 
Realists infer an ethical immanentism. R. W. Sellars, 
who rejects psycho-physical dualism for a monistic evolution-
ary naturalism (physical realism or critical realism), 
contends that in the course of eargent evolution physical 
existents are integrated into new and ever more complex 
pattem a until there emerge a a "living organism" which, even 
properly and adequately conceived, includes consciousness, 
which is the sole source of that differential behavior which 
distinguiShes it from leas-integrated bodies. He asks: "May 
not consciousness be a complex of qualitative events in the 
brain rather than a unique kind or self-sufficient stuff?"73 
The organism as a complex functional system has inherent the 
urge to exist, which in a more advanced stage is the fact of 
existing conaciousne as. In thl_s urge, immanently inbred is 
the quest of morals, so that the natural mode of' the subject 
is at the same time its moral character. 
(c) R. B. Perry 
Ralph Barton Perry holds that right, or intellectual 
mental action, consists in the establishment, corresponding 
73. Sellars, PPP, 317. 
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to outward relations, of such inward relations and reactions 
as will favor the survival of the thinker, or at least his 
physical well-being. Mind is not a mirror but it initiates 
and tries, and its correspondence with the "outer world" 
indicates that its effort successfully JO:lets the environment 
in behalf of the organic interests from which it springs. 
Consciousness is not a substance, or quality, but a grouping, 
exclusive and inclusive, of characters borrowed from the 
environment. Self is the peculiar assemblage or field of 
elements. There is not consciousness an sich. This view 
approximates the pragmatic thesis of William James, Perry's 
teacher. In this thesis, ethics, or moral activity, is 
immanent in the life expression, or grouping of the elements 
of the individualized self. 
(d) John Dewy 
Finally, let us turn to John Dewey for a consideration of 
pragmatic ethics. A naturalist and humanist, Dewey by-passes 
God as indispensable to moral theory and turns to natural 
processes for the answer to every problem, including the pro-
blem of ethics. He locates intellectual authority in the 
perceptions and senses. Metaphysics, as knowledge dealing 
with a reality that is independent of its cognitive act, is 
impossible. To find out what a thing is, one must go to 
experience and see what it is experienced as. Urges replace 
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cognition, and sensation is a call to action. This is the 
key to Dewey's philosophy. Knowledge is man's act of adapt-
ing himself to a changing environment. The true idea is a 
token of successful adaptation. Dewey's The Quest forCer-
tainty is actually a crusade against certainty. The 
greatest error of religion or philosophy, he holds, is to 
claim, or even seek, certainty. Doubting gives to responses 
a mental quality. 
Here moral implication belongs to the total response of 
the organism. Morality is a normal part of the existence 
and function of the human organism; in some way it grows 
out of, and expresses, his own nature. Its origin is within 
himself, and morality is the living out of that state. 
6. Summary 
That the involved doctrine of immanence may be more 
clearly grasped the following distinctions Should be made: 
1. Since all moral behavior involves the expressing 
subject, it follows then that there is a degree of immanence 
in all ethical expression. For instance, in imposed ethics, 
even though the source of authority is external to the sub-
ject, the psychological factors of will and reason are 
involved. In other words, the suc;j.ect gives consent to the 
subjection of his moral rights and commits them to the 
authority of an other (individual or institution). In the 
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case of imposed ethics as discussed in this dissertation that 
"other 11 is the Roman Catholic church. In imparted ethics 
the same reaction on the part of the subject obtains: The 
subject foregoes his own rights and submits to the process 
of transformation inherent in the relationship said to 
exist between God and man in which man reflects the imago 
Dei. As regards imposed, immanent, and imparted ethics 
elements of all can be found to some degree in each, but 
each does not embody these elements in equal proportion and 
emphasis. The need to classify moral standards as imposed, 
immanent, and imparted is discovered when we attempt to place 
emphasis on the source. Because all standards of morals do 
not originate in the same source, the foregoing distinctions 
seem notonly helpful but advisable. At least the writer 
does not know where in ethical theory these distinctions 
have been clearly drawn. Thus, in this dissertation, a dual 
purpose is served: To analyze, compare, and evaluate the 
ethical ideas of Maritain, Stace, and Ramsey, and as an 
additional contribution to present their ethical theories as 
representative of three distinct sources of ethical standards, 
imposed, immanent, and imparted. 
Imposed ethics is said to be external to the subject, 
for the source of authority is located outside the subject. 
That the process of imposition involves internal factors 
(will and reason) to some degree or in some sense does not 
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alter the fact that the source of moral authority is external 
to the subject. Immanent ethics is said to be internal for 
it arises from a source internal to the subject, it is the 
product of his own rational powers and insight. Here again 
other factors may be involved.· For instance, the subject 
may resort to external sources in the form of empirical data, 
but the source of standardization is inherent in reason 
from which his ethical behavior iss~es. Imparted ethics is 
said to originate external to the suoject, from a source 
outside his person, God. As Professor Ramsey resolves the 
problem it will be seen (Part IV) that this External Source 
through image reflection involves and transforms the subject 
so that he lives out a form of immanentism even though his 
expression is the reflection of an external source of 
authority. 
2. The doctrine of natural law ethics is generally 
believed to be rooted in Plato and Aristotle. The rational 
part of Roman Catholic ethics, as strongly indicated by 
Maritain, is a natural law ethics. The question that follows 
then is: Where does the distinction lie? Such thinkers as 
Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Whitehead, and others reject 
religious revelation as a basis for an immanent ethics, and 
one could almost say that they go from immanent ethics to 
transcendent postulation, in which they differ from Stace, 
whereas Maritain, and the Roman Catholic church, grounds 
ethics on both natural law and religious revelation, and re-roots 
the doctrine of love in revealed law as metaphysical ground. 
PART THREE 
CHAPTER V 
IMMANENTISM IN W. T. STAGE 
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According to W. T. Stace, contemporary ethical 
naturalist and humanist,1 ideals, moral and political, are 
ultimately founded on some theory of the nature of man. 
Morality, therefore, "arises out of the interrelation of the 
internal factors of man's peculiar personality, his reason, 
his appetite, and his spirit."2 
Satisfaction, or happiness, is attained by an adequate 
expression of the human nature, the rational function of which 
is the essence of morality, being "healthy, happy, harmonious, 
3 
and satisfactory." Although his concept of immanentism 
follows closely the functional theory of morality prescribed 
by Plato,4 his modern version is singularly interesting and 
important to this writing because of its clear formulation 
and representative nature. His theory, therefore, becomes 
the basis of inquiry in this chapter, an investigation 
directed to an understanding and criticism of that theory. 
Professor Stace's theory of morals rests on the theory 
that there is a common human nature.5 This common human nature 
1. Stace, TE, Preface, vi; DWM, 45. 
2. Stace, DWM, 39. 
3. Stace, DWM, 256. Also COM, 256. 
4. Stace, COM, 260. 
5. DWM, 31. Also COM, 259. 
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must possess a common psychological nature.6 These concepts 
become the ground-work for his whole argument. To get the 
satisfactory life he combines the primacy of reason, from 
the Greek philosophy, with the primacy of sympathy, from 
his conception of Christian idealism; 7 together they 
motivate and direct the course of human conduct which ad-
equately expresses human nature, a pattern of behavior which 
results in the good life, or the life that man, himself, 
believes to be the most satisfactory. Following is ~rofessor 
Stace's definition of morality, which, of course, is Platonic 
although the basis of Plato's concept is metaphysical: 
Morality is thus the harmonious working of 
human personality through the proper fUnction-
ing of each of its parts. If the parts of 
the soul function each according to its 
nature, we have morality; if not, immorality.8 
Immanentism is not a modern conception of morality; it 
was undoubtedly basic in the teaching of Protagoras that man 
is the measure of all things. Professor Stace credits the 
Sophists with faulty insight in formulating the idea.9 In 
Professor Stace's opinion, the Sophists made morality an 
invention of the intellect, whereas he believes, with Plato 
and Aristotle, that morals are the normal expression of a 
healthy mind.10 Invented morality would find itself outside 
6. DWM, 43. 
7. DWM, 121. 
8. DWM, 35; COM, 259. 
9. DWM, 37. 
10. DWM, 37. See Rep. IV, 444; ~II, 65; Nic.Eth. I, 1102a 15. 
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the intellect, just as any invention becomes external to the 
intellect, and is, therefore, no part of man himself. For 
Professor Stace the relationship between man and morals is 
an organic one, such as the relationship between the flower 
and the beauty of its petals. His phenomenalistic conception 
of metaphysics states it thus: 
The ground on which a metaphysical hypothesis 
can be recommended will consist in showing (1) that 
it is internally self-consistent, (2} that it accounts 
for the facts of the world, and \3) that there are 
reasons for preferring it to other rival hypotheses 
which may also claim to be acceptable under heads 
(1) and (2) .n 
Morality is not a product, a commodity, related to man as the 
inventor is to the invention, for example, Eli Whitney and his 
cotton gin. Morality becomes the "harmonious functioning of 
all the elements of human personality, which is another way 
12 
of saying that it is the proper expression of man's self." 
Plato began the correction of the defective Sophistic 
method and carried it through to a sound, convincing system 
in which the measure of man is reason, the one factor which 
distinguishes him from the animal, with morality a "human 
thing.nl3 Aristotle strengthened the idea of immanentism by 
making a strong case for functional ethics; but, according to 
Professor Stace, the teaching of Jesus and the Christians 
was a form of impositionism in ethics, and immanentism almost 
11. Stace, NOW, 85. 
12. DWM, 33. 
13. DWM, 42. 
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perished in the centuries controlled by the church. One may 
take issue with Proressor Stace in derining Christian ethics 
as a rorm or impositionism, on the ground that in its 
primitive state Christian ethics was a type of immanentism, 
expressing a spiritual concept and not a code. 14 A similar 
notion is conveyed in the teaching or Taoism, 11The Way. 11 The 
term Tao originally meant the revolution or the way of the 
heavens about the earth. In the course of time this concrete 
expression became abstract, and the Tao was viewed as the 
universal cosmic energy behind the visible order of nature. 
This cosmic energy regarded as Being was impersonal, omni-
present, and eternal; viewed as the Becoming it worked spon-
taneously, orderly, unselfishly, and continuously for the high-
est good of all beings. The human order is the product of the 
eternal energy,l5 which is immanent in all existence. 
Professor Stace defines imposed morality as 11moral 
principles imposed upon man from some outside source. Their 
origin is external to him. 11 The theory of morality as 
immanent, on the contrary, holds that "morality is immanent 
in man; in some way it grows out of, and expresses, his own 
nature. 111 6 These definitions are precisely the same as used 
in this dissertation. He identifies imposed ethics with 
17 Judaism and Christianity and immanentism with Greek thought. 
14. St. John 4:24; Galatians 5al6. (King James Version). 
15. Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 21, 797. 
16. DV!M , 19 • 
17. D\YM, 19. 
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He makes no distinction, unfortunately, between New Testament 
Christianity and Medieval Roman Catholicism, both being des-
ignated as forms of impositionimn. Even though true Christ-
ianity has its concepts of revelation and basic moral princip~s, 
the New Testament emphasis falls on the inner life.18 The 
assertion that Roman Catholicism and Christianity are synonymous 
terms and systems is a deep-seated error. 
Bentham and Mill, in Professor Stace 1 s opinion, recap-
tured the teachings of immanentism, although their utilitarian-
ism embodied 11various rather crude mistakes. 1119 Man is now 
freeing himself from the false accretions gathered to the theory 
of immanentism, and, as Plato and his brilliant student 
Aristotle overcame the moral skepticism of the Sophists, the 
ethical humanism of Professor Stace proposes to revitalize 
the doctrine of immanentism and help it to prevail in the 
present day battle with the moral skepticism of the ethical 
relativists and positivists.20 
A. Common Human Nature 
To understand Professor Stace 1 s ethical humanism,21 one 
must consider first what he means by the common human nature. 
His case rests on the ground that human nature is everywhere 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
St. Matthew 5:18; St. Mark 12:30; Acts 8:21; 
Ephesians 3:17 \King James Version). 
DWM, 41. 
DWM, 47. 
DWM, 45. 
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the same, and with the fact of the common human nature estab-
lished, he believes that the proximate condition follows, 
that there is also a common psychological structure.22 The 
logic of this position must be sustained to make way for the 
further idea that morality is the expression of human nature. 
It implies that for all human beings there remains through 
diversity of color, creed, culture, and geographical distri-
bution an element which links all men together in a common 
bond of nature.23 The American, Hottentot, or Laplander has 
race, cultural, and geographical distinction, but in them 
all is an essential basis of similarity which outweighs the 
superficial differences attributed to background. Differences 
of a sectional kind are not denied, but human sameness is 
stressed as fundamental, the common denominator which gives 
relationship to different peoples in the same sense that 
blueprints give relationship to the many, and almost infinitely 
diverse, kinds of houses. 
We may ask, then, what are the special parts of human 
nature which give birth to morality? Professor Stace answers 
that they are two in number: (1) The social nature of man, 
and (2) man's capacity to be made happy by the happiness of 
24 
others. These factors may be unevenly developed, especially 
the second. But if they are present in man at all, "even in 
22. DWM, 43. 
23. COM, 260. 
24. COM, 262. 
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germ, they are capable of being the seeds out of which morality 
and moral obligation grow."25 Owing to their presence, a 
universal morality is possible, and Stace interprets Plato 
as setting forth the notion of universalism in morals and 
accepts it as his thesis. 26 
The success of Professor Stace 1 s venture depends entirely 
on his ability to establish a common human nature and its next 
of kin, the common psychological nature. His argument for the 
common human nature is not exactly novel; it is rather the 
belief in the integrity of anthropology, the well-known 
universality found in the application of the rules of science, 
for instance the use of medicine and surgery on all types of 
human beings with approximate results. Regardless of where 
the human type is found, he will respond identically as 
others scattered widely over the face of the earth because the 
common human nature is psychological. This unity is taken by 
Professor Stace as adequate evidence of the common human nature 
of men. OtherWise there would be distinct moralities dis-
tributed according to group differences, with no possibility 
of a universal moral situation. Unless moral precepts apply 
~o all men, chaos would result; moral issues would be consigned 
to relativism.27 
25. COM, 262. 
26. COM, 269. 
27. COM, 58, 67. Also KMM, 261. 
176 
1. Criteria of Morality 
Professor Staae recognizes the logical demand that 
ethical humanism must provide society with positive criteria 
for judging moralities. He admits that the criteria are 
"very general" and not "very precise or exaat,"28 but he 
contends that neither will they be useless. Exactness is 
impossible because of the lack of uniformity in the unity of 
the common nature; an instability which does not, however, 
destroy the nature itself. Thus the creed of human~m is 
expressed in the following propositions: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
that morality is an expression or outgrowth 
of human nature or personality. 
that it consists in those principles of con-
duct which lead to the most satisfactory life 
for man, having regard to his special nature. 
that human personality, though it is no doubt 
in one sense unitary, contains a variety of 
11parts11 (Plato's word), or aspects, or facul-
ties, or elements, -- such as reason, desire, 
emotion, will, sensation, eta. 
that each of the elements of human personality 
has a proper function to fUlfill, This is of 
vital importance because the notion of the prop-
erness of the function is really the basis ~ 
the idea contained in the conception of the 
moral 11 ought. 11 29 
From these principles, Professor Stace derives the 
following criteria: 
(1) A better or truer morality is one Which more 
adequately expresses human nature; an inferior 
morality is one which expresses it less 
adequately. 
28. DW!Il, 63. 
29. DWM, 63, 
(2) A better or t~er morality is one which assigns 
to each element of personality its proper 
function, place, and importance in human 
activity; an inferior morality is one which 
fails to do this. 
(3) A better or truer morality is one which leads 
to a more satisfactory human life; an in-
ferior morality is one which leads to a less 
satisfactory human life.30 
17'7 
These criteria are held to be three different expressions 
of the same idea. The satisfactory life is defined as the 
one which the individual living it intuitively feels to be 
satisfactory. Professor Stace is not, however, a hedonist, 
for the good life is not synonymous with pleasure, for 
pleasure is not the only good. It is possible that pain 
under some circumstances may be part of the satisfactory life. 
While Professor Stace denounces the primacy of will, there is 
nothing in his doctrine to prevent the will from being primary 
so long as it gives the satisfactory life. Right acts are 
those which are conducive to the good life of the individual. 
2. Stace and Relativism 
Owing to the apparent danger of relativism in the thought 
of W. T. Stace, it becomes necessary at this point to clarify 
his position on the problem. He mediates between extreme 
relativism at one pole, which holds that "there are no 
objectively true moral standards at all,"31 and absolutism 
30. DWM, 64. 
31. COM, 11. 
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in morals at the other pole. which is comndtted to the 
opinion that "whatever the true moral code may be, it is 
always the same for all men in all ages."32 His own position 
is described as "radical empiricism,n33 which he defines as 
follows: 
The essence of the theory of meaning which 
radical empiricists hold is that any word which 
purports to stand for an entity which could not 
possibly be experienced by any conceivable mind 
in any conceivable circumstances is entirely 
meaningless; and that any sentence which affirms 
the reality or existence o£4any such entity is also entirely meaningless. 
Pressed to its logical conclusion, Professor Stace 
observes that 
ethical relativity can only end in destroy-
ing the conception of morality altogether, in 
undermining its practical efficacy, in rendering 
meaningless many almost universally accepted 
truths about human affairs, in robbing human 
beings of any incentive to strive for a better 
world, in taking the life-blood out of every ideal 
and every aspiration which has ever ennobled the 
life of man. In short, the charge against it is 
that it revolts and outrages man's moral feelings. 35 
Relativity in morals renders meaningless all proposi-
tions which attempt to compare moral standards of social 
groups in respect to their worth.36 This in turn "implies 
that the whole notion of moral progress is a sheer delusion. 1137 
Progress means "an advance from lower to higher, from worse 
32. COM, 3. 
33. COM, 27. 
34. COM, 19. 
35, COM, 45. Also. RMM, 261. 
36. COM, 46. 
37. COM, 48, 
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to better. But on the basis of relativity it has no meaning 
to say that the standards of this age are better (or worse) 
than those of a previous age,n3S Ethical relativity is not 
only disastrous in its consequences for moral theory, 8it 
cannot be doubted that it must tend to be equally disastrous 
in its impact upon practical conduct. 839 Ethical relativity 
is simply defeatism in morals.40 
3. Intuition in Morals 
Returning to the consideration of feelings Professor 
Stace gives place to intuition in morals. By intuition he 
does not mean that "man possesses a kind of separate and 
supernatural 'organ' of intuition, a sort of super-eye which 
enables him to contradict his reason.n41 This "insight" 
belongs no doubt to the majority of men, for he says, 
There are men--and perhaps they are the 
majority of men--who through insight, intuition, 
or feeling, attain a view of moral truth which 
may be hidden from those who rely exclusively 
upon what is called "scientific method. 11 I am 
not proposing to raise again the ancient and 
foolish quarrel between 'intuition' and 'reason'. 
There are two kinds of truth standing in opposi-
tion to one another. But in the claims of 
'intuition'--distorted, exaggerated, and fantas-
tic as they have often been--there is at least 
this element of truth, that men frequently feel 
dimly, in the obscure depths of their personality, 
38. Loa. cit. 
39. COM, 58. 
40. COM, 60. 
41. COM, 60, 
a truth which, because it has not yet risen 
to the surface of consciousness, is not for 
them clothed in the forms of understanding, 
is unexpressed in words, and may even seem--
for lack of ~ccessful verbalization--
ineffable. rt4 
An even clearer definition of Stace 1 s meaning of 
intuition is seen in the following expression: 
The view that the moral intuition is the 
result of unconscious inductive inference, 
based on long human experience of the art of 
trying to live successfully and happily, has 
been urge~3by the present writer in earlier writings. 
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This definition of intuition lifts it out of 
the realm of the fantastic. There seems to be same relation 
between Stace's notion of intuition as the learned act of the 
human race an:i Brand Blanshard 1 s idea of "implicit thought," 
which is a "species of genus" developed through patient 
interest of the individual.44 
4. Universalism in Ethics 
Approaching the positive side of the argument against 
relativity, Professor Stace avers his belief in the univer-
sality of morality. "I am to assert that this morality, 
which I have sketched, is, in some sense, universally 
applicable to all men.n45 This assertion does not imply that 
42. Loc. cit. 
43. TE, ill. 
44. NOT, vol. I, 226. 
45. COM, 227. 
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there exists a universal morality accepted as a matter of fact 
by human beings everywhere now and in the past. "What the 
doctrine primarily means is that there is a single moral law 
which ought to be accepted by all men, even if as a matter of 
fact it is not.w46 He continues: 
Hence my main contention is not that the 
Japanese, Chinese, Melanesians, and the rest, all 
do as a matter of fact have the same ideas of 
morality; but rather that the same morality is 
applicable to them in the sense that they ought 
to recognize and acknowledge it whatever their 
actual ideas of morality may happen to be. I 
want to show, not that all men think the same 
things moral, but that the same things are moral 
for all of them, whatever they think.4~ 
The common denominator which links all people morally, 
according to Stace, is altruism. His explanation follows: 
First of all, then, I do not mean that all 
the people and races of the world take the same 
view as we do of murder, stealing, suicide ••• 
courage, honesty. We should look, amid differ-
ing moral systems, not for a consensus of 
opinions upon the particular duties of life, or 
the particular maxima of morality, but for some 
recognition of the general law of morals.48This general law is the principle of altruism. 
This, for Professor Stace, is the essence of morals, and all 
that he means to assert is that all moralities have this for 
their esaence.49 The imperative of the morality of altruism, 
as expressed by Professor Stace, is, 
46. COM, 228. 
47. Loc. cit. 
48. COM, 233. 
49 • Loc • cit. 
Act always so as to increase human happiness 
as much as possible. And at the same time act 
on the principle that all persons, including 
yourself, are intrinsically of equal value.50 
1~ 
The essence of the morality in question, that of 
altruism, consists in the idea of being fair, kind, just, 
considerate (so far as these terms are understood), to one's 
neighbor, of treating him as one would oneself like to be 
treated, the idea of having regard for the needs and desires 
of other people, or in a word, "the idea of unselfishness.n51 
From this conception of morals it is understandable why in a 
later writing, The Destiny of Western Man on which this Chapter 
is based, Professor Stace turns to Christianity for one of the 
two primacies on which he predicates his theory of democracy. 
As we shall see later, these primacies are, reason, from the 
Greeks, and sympathy, from Christianity. 
Professor Stace admits that the principle of altruism is 
not developed equally in all peoples. That is the reason for 
the wide divergences in moral beliefs and practices. A lower 
morality exists where this principle is undeveloped and a higher 
morality accompanies its development. Christianity contains 
the highest ethical doctrine yet given to the world because "in 
it the principle of unselfishness shines out pure and clear, 
and because the principle is extended to all human beings."52 
50. COM, 234. 
51. COM, 244. 
52. COM, 248. 
In concluding his treatise on the philosophy of 
religion,53 Professor Stace states that moral ideals are 
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more than mere human devices for achieving survival and in-
creased pleasure or happiness. They are that, but they are 
more. As he concludes: 
In the long and tragic struggJe of 11 fe on 
this planet from lower to higher forms; in the 
terrible sufferings of mankind reaching upward 
to grasp at nobler ways of living, constantly 
falling backward, yet as constantly striving 
higher; in the vague aspirations of men for 
immortality, for a more blessed mode of 
existence, for God, for a life which shall be 
not merely animal but also divine; in all this 
can be seen, not merely the futile, because 
ultimately purposeless, efforts for survival 
or pleasure by an animated piece of clay, but 
an influx into the darkness of such a life of 
a light w~ich has its sources in that which is 
eternal.5 
5. Ethics Product of Human Nature 
Thus conceived, morality is not "a sort of strait 
jacket clapped upon man by an external agency; it is the 
product of human nature itself.n55 This is clearly immanen-
tism in morals, and "it advances beyond sophistic immanentism 
by making morality a genuine expression of human nature, not a 
mere invention.n56 Human goodness "is now seen as that mode 
53. Religion and the Modern Mind. Here the essence of religion 
is not morality but mysticism. (229) 11After Further 
Thought", Time, May 5, 1952 (p.59) is a further sanction 
of this notion. Here God is independent of nature, but a 
mystery and reasoning about Him is 11doomed to failure." 
54. RMM, 281. 
55. DWM, 37. 
56. Loc. cit. 
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of life in which a human personality is operating naturally 
and normally,n57 Professor Stace believes that this life 
is most easily attainable under a democratic form of govern-
ment, which is a merging of Greek reason and Christian 
sympathy. With the notion of immanentism in morals estab-
lished on the common human nature, which is the common psych-
ological nature, the need being simply the rational expression 
of that nature to obtain the satisfactory life, life is lived 
by the harmonious fUnction of the parts of human nature, 
B. Merging of Reason and Sympathy 
"The spiritual forces which have molrled the West are 
Christianity and Greek philosophy.n58 The Greek contribution 
to Western civilization was reason, whereas Christianity 
contributed sympathy. These developed necessarily into the 
ethos which is now central in democracy. This development is 
a natural course, the logical effect from the primary causes 
of self'le ssness and rationality. Logically pursued, Greco-
Christian ethics becomes the democratic ideal which can be 
always realized when conditions are conducive. 
Civilization for Mr. Stace is an attempt on the part of 
the people of any era to interpret the good life,59 This 
attempt, made through institutions, ends in an ethical concept, 
57, Loc. cit. Cf, Nic, Eth, I, llOOb 20; ~· 187; Laws II, 653. 
58, DWM, 83, 
59, DWM, 1-5. 
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so that every civilization, designated as the democratic 
civilizations of Europe and America, embodies the Greco-
Christian ideal. There are three ideals basic in European 
thought. The first is the Greek idea of reason and moderation, 
the second is the Christian notion of sympathy, and the third 
is derived from the Nietzschean concept of ethics in which will 
and power are dominant.60 Mr. Stace combines the first two to 
constitute the democratic ethos, and the third is left to 
totalitarianism as exemplified in the Italian and German states 
of the period just prior to World War II. The reaction or 
influence of nations within the physical boundaries of western 
civilization on each other obtains from the fundamental 
conflict arising between the first two and the third ethical 
ideals. This belligerency is an essential contradiction 
existing in the struggle for primacy among the elements of the 
human personality. Both reason and will cannot be primary at 
the same time, nor can will and sympathy. However, reason and 
sympathy can serve a single purpose, both being sufficiently 
primary to achieve that purpose, because they supply separate 
and necessary aspects of the one personality. The function of 
either need not preclude the work of the other, rather they 
operate as complements, each facilitating and serving the other.61 
Personality needs a way-finder and this need is met by 
60. DWM, 85. 
61. DWM, 126. 
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reason. 62 The Greek notion of reason was that it is right 
and ought to dominate the personality; it should have dominion 
over the appetites. Reason, especially as taught by Plato, 63 
is aided and encouraged by the spirit, the third part of the 
human economy, for spirit is needed to obviate the dictates 
of reason. Spirit is the power of motion; it provides the 
incentive for action. 
Now while reason envisages 1he goals and serves as a 
guide to them, a stimulus is required to get action. Mr. Stace 
recognized this difficulty, and in transferring Greek reason 
to western civilization he fc:und it necessary to correlate 
it v4th sane ideal which could provide the drive or force to 
obtain action. He could have taken over the third pert of 
the Greek doctrine of personality, spirit, but he chose 
rather to graft in the motivating power of Christianity, 
sympathy, 64 even though he freely admits that he does not 
believe in religion so far as the Christ ian concept of it is 
concerned. 65 
l. Primacy of Sympathy and Reason 
From the ccmmon human nst ure he derives direct facility, 
primacy of reason and sympathy, to arrive at his conception 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
DWM, 135. 
~i· IV, 167. 
, 138, 141. 
Art. nMan Against Darkness,n Atlantic Monthly, 
September, 1948. 
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of the infinite value of the individual, the fundamental 
principle of the democratic system of ethics. The primacy 
of reason assures the right goals. As the "root idea" of 
our democratic culture this primacy safeguards the society's 
ideals md orders its progress toward the ends for which it 
exists. Reason as the specific in man, the factor by which 
he is distinguished from the animal, protects that society 
against the ruthless rule of will as characterized in the 
totalitarian state. Therefore, reason, not will, must be 
king; it must govern the other elements of the personality. 
The primacy of reason as conceived by Mr. Stace does 
not, he is careful to point out, imply any nonhuman or cosmic 
scale of values; it is consistently humanistic. 66 What is 
meant by the primacy of reason is that if Wman is to achieve 
perfect health of personality (which is morality) then his 
reason must be in control. Otherwise he falls into spiritual 
ill-health (which is moral badness).n67 
Reason ought to be dominant in the personality because 
it alone guarantees the satisfactory life for man. Mr. Stace 
charged the Greeks with logical fallacy in supposing that 
moderation follows from the primacy of reason. It is related 
instead to the Greeks' aesthetic taste. There is nothing 
66. DWM, 142 • 
67. DWM, 95. J. J. Mcguire charged Stace with illogical pro-
cedure and condemns him for saying "religion is gone for 
good," "Illogical Dr. Stace • 11 Catho lie World, November, 
1948, pp. 102-105. 
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inherently rational about moderation, and according to Mr. 
Stace, reason might as imaginably direct an individual to 
either extreme, as excess or abstinence, as to moderation.68 
Mr. Stace challenges the right of history to determine 
what conception of reason any individual or society must hold, 
For him reason is rooted in human psychology, not in a meta-
physical order; he therefore rejects Kant's use of reason, 
because the great eighteenth century philosopher ascribes 
intrinsic cosmic value to reason, The characterization of 
the universe as nonhuman is definitely an inadequate expJana-
tion, but Mr. Stace does not tarry for a more competent 
definition, Since the idea of democracy is the best way as 
judged by purely human standards, the doctrine of absolute 
cosmic value in reason would consequently be superfluous,69 
Even though reason is established among the elements of 
the personality as primary, Mr. Stace is still aware of a 
real deficiency in his theory. Although reason is surety 
for vision and guidance, there is yet another element needed, 
an animus to carry out the purpose and plan of reason. The 
Greek spirit is evidently unsatisfactory, perhaps because it 
did not lend itself readily to self-sacrifice; hence Christian 
sympathy is inculcated in his theory despite his outright 
rejection of the Christian religion. Sympathy, probably what 
68. DWM, Chapter IV, 
69, DWM, 97, 
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the Christian calls love,70 is assessed worthy of being the 
complement of reason in the dual primacy concentric in a 
democratic ethos, Sympathy provides the strength to put 
reason's mandates into action; in fact, action is a tendency 
of sympathy, 
2, Function of Reason and Sympathy 
How do reason and sympathy fUnction ~thin the same 
personality? !~. Stace seems less inclined toward the logi-
cal aspect and concludes that since they do work together 
obviously in a democratic civilization, the pragmatic 
validation is sufficient evidence of their presence and 
accord. An illustration will serve to show how they fUnction 
harmoniously in the same being. Suppose our neighbor is in 
need, He is ill, and his family is suffering privation. The 
outlook is gloomy, the situation is desperate. In this case, 
reason would act as way-finder by pointing us to the right 
goal--aid to our neighbor. Discerning the goal is only a 
primary step; right judgment is mandatory but incomplete. 
We need more than proper direction in an instance such as 
this; there is required the moving spirit to augment 
rational perspicacity, or the neighbor will continue to 
suffer in his need, untouched by the excellence of judgment. 
70. D\~4, 104. In seeking a single word which will express 
the Christian moral ideal, Professor Stace thinks 
it may be selflessness, or love. 
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This, then, will be the office of sympathy, to provide motive 
power for reason, 
Therefore sympathy is just as indispensable to Western 
civilization as reason, 
For the Christian ideal has entered into the marrow 
of that (Western) civilization. Our failure to 
attain the ideal may be abysmal. But the life of 
love, charity, and selflessness is nevertheless 
our traditional occupation of the good lite. It is 
at the root of our institutions, custcms, and laws, 
It is the fundamental inspiration of the democratic 
way of life, 71 
Sympathy is derived from Christianity indirectly because it 
is not a clearly-formulated philosophical thesis, according to 
Mr. Stace. He believes that neither Jesus nor Paul gave any 
hint of the philosophical basis of the ideal of selflessness. 
It can be readily admitted that there is no clear philosoph-
ical formulation of the ideal of unselfishness in the teaching 
of Jesus. No part of his teaching, or that of his successors, 
can be identified as clear philosophical formulation; but to 
say that not even a hint of selflessness is apparent in the 
teachings of the Master and his followers is much too general, 
What did Jesus mean when he said: 
Truly, truly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat 
falls into the earth and dies, it remains alone; but 
if it dies, it bears much fruit. He who loves his 
life loses it, and he who hates (loves less) his 
life in this world will keep it for eternal life,72 
This obviously is a substantial hint of selflessness, of 
71, DWM, 105, 
72, St. John 12: 24 (Rev, stand, ver,) New York: Thomas 
Nelson & Sons, 1946, 
giving one's life for others, the unselfish approach to 
social integration. 
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Mr. Stace sees the Christian ideal of selflessness 
evolved out of the theory of sympathy, which is a prime 
factor of human nature. He accepts with cautious reserve 
Bergson's definition of sympathy as 11 the infectious 
character of feelings and emotions, 1173 in preference to the 
common notion with its "sickly overtones." Sympathy is the 
flow of feelings and emotions from individual to individual. 
Panic in a crowd is given as an example of sympathy. Even 
animals have it in some degree as evidenced in a stampede. 
It is shared with other animals, but it is more highly 
developed in the human species. Sympathy is as much a 
normal part of human personality as is reason. 
In the merging of reason and sympathy a proper basis 
for natural human expression is found. Both are immanent 
principles which coordinate to produce the satisfactory life. 
Their most important function is to denote the infinite value 
of the individual. 
c. Infinite Value of the Individual 
The danger of conflict between the primacies of reason 
and sympathy is solved by referring them to two different 
areas of human interest: reason being active in man's conduct 
73. Bergson, TSMR, 45. 
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toward himself, with sympathy effectual in his conduct toward 
others. 74 All that is required to secure the harmony of these 
two elements is that they be strong enough in each individual 
to insure the good life. Althrugh there is a difference of 
temper between them, there is no real contradiction, for they 
can be merged at least pragmatically in one personality, and 
have been successfully combined in the American civilization. 
The merging of these primacies conduce to one indispen-
sable democratic judgment the infinite value of the individual. 
Democracy revolves around four central ideas: the infinite value 
of the individual, the equality of all men, individualism, and 
liberty. 75 Of these, the infinite vaJue of the individual is 
primary, the 11key idea," and the other three are deduced from it. 
1. Individual as End 
The infinite value of the individual is a focal point 
of the democratic way of life because it attributes to each 
person the value of being an end in society, and not just a 
means to an end. 
The conclusion is as follows. The natural ma1 can 
place everything in the world outside himself in a 
scale of values; and every such thing will have a 
finite value in that scale. But himself, the 
satisfaction of himself, the satisfaction of his 
personality, cannot be placed in that or any other 
scale. This end, the satisfaction of himself, 
74. DWM, 133. 
75. DViM, 124. 
exceeds beyond measure all finite values within 
the scale. It is for him infinite.76 
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The infinity of value man places on himself is seen in the 
conclusion that there is no other value in life for him that 
possibly could be greater. It is the value which man 
ascribes to no other creature but himself. 
Reason would impute this value to the individual, for 
it is the guarantee of the satisfactory life. Since man 
assigns this value to himself, sympathy would warrant the 
extension of that value to all men, since this is the way to 
treat men as ends. The infinity of value is related to the 
indispensability of the individual. Values have meaning only 
for individuals. Reason and sympathy, if primary, pledge to 
society this security for its members, and through them the 
safety of the society itself as a result of this democratic 
process. 
Infinity is freed of all theological and eschatological 
associations by Mr. Stace, who attempts a rigid humanistic 
definition of the word.77 He foregoes the theological 
meaning, with a frank admission that he does not understand 
it. Taking the way of the humanist, he proudly affirms "we 
who have shaken ourselves free from this influence feel, in 
our return to humanism, that we have passed out of dark 
caverns into healthy air and pure sunl1ght. 11 78 The infinite 
76. DWM, 133. 
77. DWM, 127. 
78. DWM, 129. Also 49. 
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value of the individual, and consequently of democracy, does 
not rest on the embodiment of cosmic values; it is a human 
device, made by human beings, and is preserved by human 
beings for purely human purposes. 79 It finds its only justi-
fication as a theory in serving the needs of human beings. 
At least it is in no wise dependent on metaphysical ground, 
Notwithstanding his resolute opposition to religion, 
Mr. Stace borrows from the Christian religion a phrase which 
he finis adequate to explain what he means by the infinite 
value of the individual. The reference is found in the King 
James version of the Bible, St. Matthew 16:26: 11 For what is 
a man profited if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his 
own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" 
This means that there is attributed to the soul a value greater 
than the whole world: an infinite value. This precisely is 
the meaning which Mr. Stace gives to the word infinite. "The 
point is that for him only one individual has infinite value, 
namely h1mself, 11 80 
Thus the founders of Western civilization were Plato 
and Christ.81 This is not exactly a new conception, for 
many writers have outlined history in this manner, accrediting 
our present liberal society to a Greco-Roman-Christian back-
ground, Whether one agrees w1 th Mr. Stace or not, his theory 
79, DWM, 128-134. 
80, DWM, 133, 
81, DWM, 233, 
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is of interest, and despite instances of incompleteness and 
hasty generalizing, it provides a stimulating investigation 
into the problem of ethics from the immanentist 1 s standpoint. 
The value he attributes to Christian sympathy, which is 
based on love, a fact he failed to note, cannot be explained 
merely as a human element among other parts of the personality. 
The early Christian believed that the spirit of sympathy, 
if not entirely a supernatural factor, was at least somehow 
related to a system of cosnic values which gave to 1t meaning 
and purpose. Whether he was right or wror:g is beside the 
point; we seek only a factual interpretation. Sympathy was 
much more than "infectious feelings and emotions; 11 it was the 
direct byproduct of the divine essence at work in the human 
persom.li ty. 82 
2. Problem of Egoism 
Further, one must elicit from Mr. Stace's writing his 
position on egoism. Although he opposes Hobbes in a 11 vely 
manner, 83 it seems impossible for him to avoid some form of 
egoism fimlly owing to his emphasis on the individual. 
Professor Stace 1 s counter to egoism is the principle of 
sympathy. 84 Since egoism asserts that no man ever considers 
the happiness of another person as an end in itself, Professor 
82. 
83. 
84. 
Romans 5: 
Version. 
DWM, 12. 
DWM, 113. 
5; Esp. Philippians 2: 13 (Revised Standard 
New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1952). 
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Stace must reject it. In saying that all human actions and 
motives are selfish, "is either denying the possibility of 
sympathetic action or is at any rate guilty of an abuse of 
1 enguage. 11 85 He adds: 
If he (the egoist) denies that a mother may 
be motivated by nothing but a desire for her child's 
happiness, because that may in itself yieli the 
greatest possible happiness to her, he is denying 
plain facts. What he is denying is the psycholog-
ical law of sympathy. But if he admits these 
facts, and yet argues that, since the mother seeks 
the child's happiness because it makes her happy, she 
is for that reason selfish, he is then guilty of a 
serious abuse of language. To see this we have only 
to ask what we ~ by the words selfish and unselfish.86 
An unselfish act is defined as one "which is motivated by the 
desire for the happiness of another as an end in itself, and not 
as a means to any further end."87 Acts must be disinterested, 
and "the psychological basis of every disinterested, unselfish 
action is the principle of sympathy. 11 88 
3. Concept of Goodness 
Finally we will consider briefly Professor Stace's con-
cept of the concrete nature of goodness. By morality he means 
the principles of the good life, and by the good life he means 
11 the life which men themselves feel to be good, healthy, satis-
85. Loc. cit. 
86. Loc • cit. 
87. DWM, 114. 
88 • DWM, 117 • 
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factory, and happy.n89 He is referring to a healthy person-
ality rather than the healthy body. He says "I mean to 
suggest the Platonic idea that morality is the health of the 
soul, immorality its disease. n90 
This conception of goodness and morality connotes that 
they "arise out of the interrelation of the intel'Ilal factors 
of man's peculiar personality, his reason, his appetite, and 
his spirit.n91 "Morality is the product of human nature itself. 
This is genuine immanentism. n92 
89. DWM, 5. 
90. Loc. cit. 
91. DWM' '37 • 
92 • Loc. cit. 
PART FOUR 
IMPARTED ETHICS 
PART IV 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPARTED, OR TRANSF\JRMIST, ETHICS IN PAUL RAMSEY 
198 
The basis of imparted ethics is a transforming rela-
tionship between God and man in which the moral image of God 
is reflected in man through obedient love, a theological 
ethics "rooted in the nature and activity of God, 11 l 
Paul Ramsey, the exponent of this conception, has 
set forth his thoughts in Basic Christian Ethk s. His 
ethical ideal, although hard to reduce to a simple term such 
as impartation, is distinctly a theological ethics presenting 
a God-centered morality in a love-for-the-neighbor context. 
"As a consequence, man's relation to God was thought to be 
of vital importance, not simply for ethics, but~ thin ethical 
theory itself. 11 2 This is essentially the view of both the 
Old and New Testament writers, and Professor Ramsey takes 
great pains to remind the reader that "Christian ethics ••• can-
not be separated from its religious foundation. 11 3 Beginning 
with this premise, he delineates a theory which starts ~th 
the righteousness and love of God and proceeds through a love-
occasioned transformation of man to a "social policy" in 
which "love for neighbor and fulfilling the JB. w11 4 are the 
1. Ramsey, BCE, 1. 
2. Ibid, 
3, Ibid, 
4. Ibid. 
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prime factors. 
A. Impartation in Ramsey Explained 
By Imparted Ethics is meant morality based on the 
conditioning of man's spiritual selfhood, always consequent 
upon a vital relationship between God and man in Which the 
moral incentive is imparted directly to man in a transforming 
experience occasioned by obedient love, The synonyms for 
impart are bestow, share, grant, and communicate. Such 
statements as "the sun imparts warmth" or 11 the furniture 
imparted an air of elegance to the room" are representative 
of what is implied in the term impart. 
Professor Ramsey employs the analogy of the mirror 
imaging the form before it in an attempt to make clear what 
he means by the activity of God in the ethical experience. 
"The mirror in itself is not the image; the mirror images; 
God's image is in the mirror. The image of God, according 
to this view, consists of man's position before God, or rather, 
the image of God is reflected in man because of his position 
before him. 115 This imago Dei relationship has a transforming 
effect on man, so that the ethical ideal of Professor Ramsey 
could as readily be denoted 11 transformism11 as impartation.6 
Impartation, or "transformism," Professor Ramsey 
hastens to explain, cannot be defined 11 by probing deep into 
5. Ramsey, BCE, 255. 
6. 11Transformism11 is a word supplied by the author in 
written communication regarding terminology. 
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the nature of man or by employing some sub-Christian sources 
of insight into what it means to be man."7 The term can be 
defined only "derivatively by decisive reference to the basic 
'primitive idea' in Christian ethics, i. e., the idea of 
Christian love which itself in turn can be adequately defined 
only by indicating Christ Jesus. ns Thus in Jesus 1 "pure 
humility and prompt obedience to God and his actions expressing 
pure and constant love for neighbor: these were in fact the 
same thing, the same image, the very image of God. 119 Then 
standing wholly "within the relationship of imaging God's 
will11 such expressions as "reflecting as a mirror the glory 
of GodnlO and fully obedient love are in reality the same. 
Love fulfills every requirement of the law and the gospels so 
that "existence within the image of God is the same thing as 
existence for another. 1111 For "we can resemble God only in 
loving. nl2 "To be in the image of God means to do the work 
of love in valuing one's neighbor."l3 
According to Professor Ramsey, man stending in the 
position before God of reflecting God's image goes through 
a transformation consonant, or accordant, to the state of 
7. Ramsey, ECE, 259. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ramsey, ECE, 259. 
10. Goodspeed's translation of II Corinthians 3: 18. 
11. Ramsey, ECE, 259. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid., 355. 
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divine love, which he calls obedient love. Thus God imparts 
His image, or likeness, to man but only when "God has 
infinitely bec0111e the eternal and omnipresent object of' 
worship, and man always a worshipper, do they resemble one 
another."14 So as a gorgeous bouquet imparts its beauty to 
the mirror which in turn ref'lects it, or the Louis XIV piece 
of' furniture communicates its elegance to the room which 
accomodates it, God imparts His likeness, which is love, to 
man positioned bef'ore Him in f'ull obedience in which a condition 
of' obedient love is created md exists. Impartation, there f'ore, 
consists in the ef'f'ect God has upon man in this imago Dei 
relationship. 
B. Christian Ethics and Obedient Love 
Impartation in ethics is a Bible-centered view, and the 
"central ethical notion or 'category' in Christian ethics is 
1 obedient love '--the sort of' love the gospels describe as 
'love f'Ulf'illing the law' and St. Paul designates as 1 f'aith 
that works through love. 11115 Only through a proper under-
standing of' obedient love can such ethical ideas as justice, 
right or obligation, duties to oneself', vocation, and virtue 
be made clear. 
14. Kierkegaard, Works of' Love, Princeton University Press, 
1946, p. 52. Quoted from Ramsey, BCE, 259. 
15. Ramsey, BCE, Introduction. 
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The term 11 Chri stian11 is used by Professor Ramsey not 
as a pious attachment to 11 christianize11 ethics by ascertain-
ing what is true in the field of ethics and then to label it 
Christian, but rather his task is to discover what may 
properly be defined as basic Christian morality. He takes 
for granted that the Christian scriptures are the proper 
place to find out what Christian ethics means. Since the 
problem of equivalence thwarts the scholar as he tries to 
transmit meaning by vocal expression, then it will be found 
difficult to confer precisely what Professor Ramsey means by 
the term 11 Christian. 11 He solves the problem by example; he 
merely points to Christ who transcribed in His life the meaning 
of divine love. Hence Christian ethics is dependent upon 
Christ as the center. 
Professor Ramsey, in defining 11 obedient love, 11 which 
is the heart of Christian ethics, carefully specifies that 
11 Jesus did not act like a would-be mystic yearning to attain 
a religious experience or some other-worldly union with God, 
but like a man who had already seen his heavenly vision and 
was obedient to it in this world. 11 16 Christian ethics cannot 
be swallowed up in an other-worldly mystical experience, it 
stems r 11 ther 11 from a this-worldly, not an other-worldly, 
16. Ramsey, BCE, 129. 
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supernaturalisn. And it is the incarnational element in all 
'Christ-mysticism,' the controlling love of Christ, which 
turns a man's face toward his neighbor in all concreteness."17 
Obedient love is a human response to a divine initiation; it 
begins in God and is reciprocated in man. Christian ethics 
on that account centers in Christ put forth by GodlS as the 
prime example of obedient love. Man, thence, fUlfills the 
requirements of the law and the gospels in assuming the fully-
obedient position of Christ before God by which he, man, like-
wise becomes a subject of obedient (responsive) love. This 
is the basis for ethical expression. 
1. Sources of Christian Love 
The Hebrew-Christian religious heritage, with its 
covenant-eschatological presuppositions, becomes the source 
of Christian ethics to Professor Ramsey, for he says 
Christian morality means extending the life 
of Jesus by imitating him in our lives, yet it means 
this only because his life itself was a prolongation 
visible 1in the flesh' of the humility of Christ and 
of the God who put him forward.l9 
Again, 
The connecting link between divine righteous-
ness and human justice is the covenant of the 
events believed to have occasioned Israel's origin 
as a religious nation. The core of Old Testament 
ethics, its central, organizing principle, is to 
17, Ramsey, BCE, 132. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid,, 19, 20, 
be f'ound underneath an abundance of' external 
codes of' law in God's active righteousness which 
through the covenant became 1 the nature of' the 
kingdom' (mishpat). (I Sam. 10: 25)"20 
The lif'e of' Christ, in which God's ethical concept is revealed, 
"was but an extension into human history of' a line started in 
eternity going down toward man. n21 
(a) Ethics in the Covenant 
Ethics, inhering in God's righteousness, so f'ar as man 
is concerned began in God 1 s covenant with Israel.22 Bearing 
this out, Prof'essor Ramsey states that 
We must first of' all discover in the strange, 
new religious world of' the Bible the source of' 
the ethical perspective peculiar to the Hebrew-
Christian heritage. For a proper study of' the 
origin and nature of' Christian ethics, a dis-
tinction may be made between (1) God's right-
eousness and love and (2) the reign of' his 
righteousness in the Kingdom of' God. These are 
two sources of' 'Christian love.' Never imagine 
you have rightly grasped a Biblical ethical 
idea until you have succeeded in reducing it to 
a simple corollary of' one or the other of' these 
notions, or of' the idea of' covenant between God 
and man f'rom which they both stem. 23 
The main theme of' the Bible, theref'ore,.is the righteousness 
of' God revealed in His 11 judgment and his steadf'ast f'ai thfulness 
to the covenant he 1111.lie s with men. 1124 
20. Ramsey, BCE, 5, 388. 
21. Ibid., 19. 
22. Ibid., 5. 
23. Ibid., 2. 
24. Ibid. See also 367, 386-388. 
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(b) Love Goes Beyond Justice 
Christian ethics proceeds from love, which encompasses 
and goes beyond justice in the popular meaning of that word. 
According to Professor Ramsey, Bible justice means more than 
equality before the law or receiving one's just due. The 
biblical meaning of justice 
"can be summed up in the principle: To each 
according to the measure of his real need, not 
because of anything human reason can discern in-
herent in the needy, but because his need alone is 
the measure of God's righteousness toward him. 
Such justice or righteousness is primarily neither 
'corrective' nor 'distributive,' as in the Greek 
view, but 'redemptive,' with special bias in favor 
of the helpless who can contribute nothing at all 
and are in fact 1due 1 nothing."25 
So far as ethics is concerned, Jesus has become 'the 
righteousness of God' to Christians, for He exemplifies that 
righteousness through love, and using the proper measure of 
divine love inverts self-love; thus the neighbor, the 
object of God's righteousness, is discovered.26 11 Not that 
we should do to others as we would be done by, or merely love 
our neighbors as ourselves •••• , but that we should love our 
brothers as Christ who laid down his life for his friends and 
for those predestined to be his disciples. 1127 The activating 
power which moved Jesus was 11 obedient love, 11 not simply some 
25. Ramsey, OOE, 14. 
26. Ibid., 21. 
27. Ibid. 
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humanitarian ethics. "It arose from his prompt and total 
response to the demands placed on him by God's inbreaking 
kingdom. 1128 God initiates this love, which, exemplified in 
Christ, is reflected through man as love for neighbor.29 
(c) God's Reign and Love Identical 
In the ethics of Christian love is seen the "infinite 
superiority of neighbor-need in comparison with legal right-
eousness in detennining the meaning of human obligation.n30 
The "obedient love" of Jesus, the prototype for the Christian's 
moral attitude, "points to the religious ( eschatological) 
setting as well as to the ethical attitude fUndamental in 
his outlook.n31 This is interpreted as "instantaneous, total 
obedience to the demands of God's reign (the eschatological 
phase of Biblical morals) and perfect love for man. 1132 God's 
reign and love for man are one and the same. These, as has 
been stated, are the sources of Christian love, and the 
natural extension is Christian ethics. 
2. Ethics without Rule 
Conventional morality rests on some authority; it is 
represented in such a statement as "sticking as close to the 
28. Ramsey, BCE, 57. 
29. Ibid., 129. 
30. Ibid. , 34. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid. 
207 
rule as you can.n33 The ethics of Christianity is morality 
without rule for, bound by the attitude of its F'ounder, the 
Christian is concerned not with the rule but with human 
need. 34 Then 
Strictly speaking, this is a new 'principle' 
for morality only in the sense that here all 
morality governed by principles, rules, customs, 
and laws goes to pieces and is given another 
sovereign test. For this reason Christianity is 
relevant, as relevant as a revolutionary threat, 
to every culture yet identical with none. It 
announces to every age: man is not ma~e for your 
institutions.35 
For example, the disciples of Jesus 
"plucked and ate some ears of grain, rubbing them in their 
hands." (Luke 6: 1) The act of the Master and His disciples 
"was not discriminating between the importance or unimport-
ance of laws so much as between their fundamental or derivative 
character. 1136 Nor was the act an occasion of law-breaking 
"because the love co~~ndments were drawn from the religious 
heritage of Judaism" and thus "Jesus 'fulfills' the law.n37 
The teachings of Jesus "constitute an ethic of perfection 
which transcends any possible legal formulation,"38 as con-
tained in the New Testament stipulation, "Be ye perfect even 
as your Father which is in heaven is perfect" (Matt. 5: 48.) 
33. Ramsey, BCE, 57. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid., 64. 
37. Ibid., 66. 
38. Ibid., 73. 
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Thus "Jesus finishes the law in the sense of completing 
it ••• in the sense of destroying its very nature as law. 1139 
{a) Do As You Then Please 
In answer to the question: What does the Christian do 
without law? Professor Ramsey answers 11 love and do as you 
then please. 1140 This does not open the noodgates to anarchy 
for it is not the same as 11 do as you please, 11 for by 
definition "Christian love will be pleased only by doing what 
the neighbor needs. 1141 In the place of law and regulation by 
external code comes "self-regulation, and not merely the self-
regulation of free, autonomous individuals but the self-
regulation of persons unconditionally bound to their neighbor 
by obedient 'faith working through love 1 • 1142 The procedure of 
love is not Aristotelian "moderation" in all things, striving 
to hit the "mean" between too much and too little, but in 
contrast it becomes all things to all men. 43 As Professor 
Ramsey summarizes it: "By being immoderate about this one 
thing, namely Christian care for the neighbor's needs, 
Christian ethics is on principle alternatively more lenient 
{more free from regulation) and more severe with itself (more 
39. Ramsey, BCE, 73. 
40. Ibid,, 77, 
41. Ibid., 78, 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid., 79. 
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subject to command) than any other ethics, 1144 "Only love, 
and not special knowledge, inspiration, or clear conscience, 
liberates the Christian from bandage to the laws and con-
ventions or society,n45 
(b) Love Overcomes the Extremes 
Love enables Christian ethics to escape the dangerous 
extremes or absolutism and relativism. "With whatever is 
relevant to actual need, love changes its tactics; against 
what is irrelevant love stands rirm. 1146 The first phrase 
resolves absolutism, whereas the second overcomes relativism. 
In other words, 11 the commands or love are as stringent as the 
needs or the world are urgent: sensing this, let any man 
then do as he pleases."47 Love thus dissolves absolutism at 
one pole and conquers relativism at the opposite extreme. 
3. Christian Love and Our Neighbor 
Professor Ramsey turns from a definition or Christian 
love to a definition or neighbor, Christian love was round 
to mean 11 being a Christ to our neighbor" (Luther). With 
Christ as the personification or love, it becomes necessary to 
rind out who our neighbor is, to whom this love is directed, 
44, Ramsey, BCE, 79, 
45. Ibid., 88, 
46. Ibid,, 89, 
47. Ibid., 90, 
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Neighbor, in the sense used by Professor Ramsey, has sig-
nificance only in relation to Christian love, for Christian 
love "discovers the neighbor in every man it meets and as 
such has never yet met a friend or an enemy."48 Thus 
Christian love means "an entirely 'neighbor-regarding concern 
for others, 1 which begins with the first man it sees. 1149 
That man may be any man; hence the implicit meaning is love 
universally applied, a fact which gives universal validity 
to Christian ethics. "It begins by loving 'the neighbor, 1 
not mankind or manhood.n 50 
(a) Neighbor Loved as Self 
A neighbor is never loved for his usefUlness, friend-
liness, or his worth in any respect. This attachment would 
be defined as "enlightened selfishness.n51 How does a 
Christian love his neighbor? As he loves himself. 52 How 
does he love himself? For his own sake. So he loves his 
neighbor for his neighbor's sake alone. W. T. Stace calls 
this notion the "infinite value of the individual.1153 
(b) Christian Ethics "Goes it alone" 
Christian love is in conflict with philosophical ethics, 
48. Ramsey, BCE, 94. 
49. Ibid., 95. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid., 96, 
52. Matthew 23:39; Mark 12:31; Luke 10:27. 
53. DWM, 133. 
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which is concerned with enlightenment and value-centered 
morality. 54 Christian ethics is a ndeontological ethics, 
not an ethics of 1 the good;•n55 thus it differs from the 
ethical concept of the good in Plato and the idea of duty in 
Kant. 
Strictly speaking there can be no 1duty 1 to 
gain good; the good is naturally desired, and not 
gaining it comes only by mistake or from ignorance, 
not from failure to do one's duty. In contrast, 
neighbor-love defines what is 'right' or obligatory. 
Love for neighbor comprises 1 the meaning of 
obligation,' which some philosophers suppose was 
disclosed only by Rousseau and Kant, the founders 
of the philosophy of idealism and deontological 
ethics in the modern period.56 
Connotatively, Christian 
ethics is not a composite of other systems of ethics, and 
at no "point does it stand in need of any aid from other 
systems of morality."57 It ngoes it alone" on the thesis 
that love, not 11light," is the true basis of morality, for 
the "chief concern of Christian ethics is not with spreading 
enlightenment, desirable as that may be, but with purging 
away vul turous self-interest.u58 
c. The Search for Objective Validity 
Having attempted to establish the neighbor-centered 
54. Ramsey, BCE, 115. 
55. Ibid., 116. 
56. Ibid., 115, 116. 
57. Review by Peter A. Bertocci of Basic Christian Ethics 
in Crozer's Quarterly, January, 1952. 
58. Ramsey, BCE, 111. 
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concept of ethics based on "obedient love," Professor 
Ramsey moves away from the limitations of the single-neighbor 
situation to the many-neighbor complexity, which he denotes 
°Christian Love in Search of a Social Policy. 11 59 He has 
proposed that all other fundamental ethical concepts, such 
as justice, right, obligation, virtues, are to be interpreted 
in the light of the meaning of obedient love. Notions of 
self-realization, moderation, value, personality are all 
swallowed up in the one consuming, encompassing ideal--
neighbor-love. The problem which Professor Ramsey next 
attacks is: How can an eschatological ethics be universalized? 
He begins this hazardous process with a consideration of 
virtue and its relation to work and human nature, finally 
reaching, in the last chapter of his book, the discussion of 
a social policy which universality naturally requires. 
of the 
1. The Source of Virtue 
Designed as an "essay on the Christocentric ethics 
60 Refor.mation," Professor Ramsey's moral ideal of 
11 obedient love 11 is an attempt to avoid the philosophical 
pitfalls of other writers in respect to virtue, for too 
often "analysis of moral goodness springs from some form 
of coalition ethics in which Christian themes prove the 
59. Ramsey, BCE, 326. 
60. Ibid., Introduction xiv. 
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sleeping partner." Nevertheless he takes cautious advantage 
of the moral philosophies of such time-honored thinkers as 
Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Kierkegaard. 
(a) Christian Ethics Extreme 
The ethical ideal of Jesus, "the ethic of the extreme," 
is in conflict or contrast with other historical notions. The 
Greek, in Aristotle especially, offered the ethic of the 
mean, "in nothing too much, and something of everything.n62 
The classic and Renaissance ideal of moderate and well-rounded 
human activity, and the Romantic ideal, so well expounded by 
Goethe, of never fixing upon any single moment in experience 
as if it were enough without something of all the other possi-
bilities going to make up a full life--these must undergo 
radical revision before they could qualify as Christian. 
The problem of giving unity and fulness to 
moral character Christian ethics answers, not by 
encouraging a moderate or well-rounded development 
of all human capacities, but by pointing man to a 
standard of excellence altogether outside himself. 
We need to 'grow up in every way into him who is 
the head, into Christd' into the stature of his 
fullness (Eph. 4:15). 63 
Self-realization, which centers 
value in the self, stands in contrast to the selflessness of 
"obedient love." "Christianity does not compose its own 
61. Ramsey, BCE, 192. 
62. Ibid., 194. 
63. Ibid. 
214 
conception of maturity out of available cultural values; it 
points maturity out, defining righteousness by indication, 
by citing the man Christ .Tesus.n64 
(b) Unity of Virtues 
The need to unite all virtues, such as justice, 
moderation, right, obligation, has found important consider-
ation among thinkers. In Plato virtues were divided into 
many parts;65 with five enumerated (wisdom, temperance, 
courage, justice, and holiness).66 The four cardinal virtues 
(excepting holiness) are made basic, 67 A sense of balance 
through the mean is found in the ethics of Aristotle; nvirtue, 
then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in 
a mean •• ,n 68 St. Augustine speaks of a "fourfold division of 
virtue, n69 instead of four cardinal virtues, thus emphasizing 
the unity of virtue in all its aspects. St. Paul lists the 
virtues under the 11 fruit of the Spiri t.n70 Professor Ramsey 
observes that nthe principle of unity in a Christian account 
of moral goodness does not consist in a neat balance of 
virtues one against another but in referring to some end beyond 
64. Ramsey, BCE, 195. 
65. Laches, 190, 198A. 
66. Protagoras, 349, 359A. 
67. The Republic, 4.428ff. 
68. Nic. Eth., II, 1107a. 
69. On the Morals of the Catholic Church, xv (Basic 
Writings of St. A(iustine, ed. Whitney .T. Oates. 
New York: Random ouse, 1948, I, 331.) 
70. Galatians 5: 22. 
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itself whieh all virtue explicitly aervea."71 Before St. 
Augustine and St. Paul, Socrates taught "the fundamental unity 
of all virtues as 1 forma 1 of knowledge. 1172 That moral 
excellence is to be aougnt for ita own sake alone, making 
virtue ita own reward, provides a basis for unity in Aristotle 
and the Stoics, according to Professor Ramaey. 73 St. Thomas 
Aquinas, in contrast to Augustine, insisted on a division of 
Christian character into a lower level of natural virtues 
and a superstructure of theological virtuea. 74 
Professor Ramsey stresses the unity of virtue that 
he may found the mainspring of the moral ideal in love. 
Otherwise Christian character "would imitate Don Quixote 
75 dashing off11 in many directions. He resolves the problem 
by delineating and discussing the source of virtues, finding 
an aspect of truth in each view. 
In ita genesis virtue may be traced to (a) 
evocation or elicitation, as in the view of 
A~atine, (b) infused grace, as in Thomas Aquinas, 
(c) acquirement, as in Aristotle, or (d) justifying 
grace~ according to the principles of the Reforma-
tion.-16 
For Augustine only a Christian virtue is a virtue; the 
rest are "splendid vicea."77 He attempts to ground the unity 
71. Ramsey, BCE, 202. 
72. Ibid., 204. 
73. Ibid. 
74. Pegia, BiiTA, Vol. II, 366-480. 
75. Ramsey, BCE, 208. 
76. Ibid., 209. 
77. City of God, XIX 25 (Basic Writings II, 504). 
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and origin of virtue in man's love for God,78 Ramsey is 
ready to give unqualified support to the view 11 that such 
love evokes virtue. From love virtue 1arises,rn79 Aquinas 
held that virtue originates in an infusion of character by 
God's grace.80 Professor Ramsey notes, however, that this 
operation is confined to the seven sacraments as the sole 
channels or means of grace, and registers his objection that 
such a theory accounts for character perfection miraculously. 
"Ethical phenomena should be explained 1n ethical ter..ns, n 
and character building must be "an operation with us as 
cooperating moral agents.•81 According to Ramsey the process 
mentioned should be properly denoted "elicitation of virtue" 
rather than infusion,82 11The expression 1elicited 1 or 'evoked 
virtue, 1 unlike 'infused virtue, 1 rightly suggests an opem tion 
in us of our own love or devotion to something other than our 
own character calling for habits of strength in us. 1183 
Aquinas combined Aristotle and Augustine. Aristotle 
speaks of the acquirements of virtue and Augustine stresses 
elicitation of virtue by love based on faith. Aristotle's 
ethics, therefore, are rationally discerned, whereas Augustine 
grounds his morality in faith. Thus in Aquinas one finds 
acquired virtue, the lower virtue, grafted in from Aristotle, 
78. Ramsey, BCE, 213. 
79, Ibid. 
80. Pegis, EWTA, Vol, II, 1022-37. 
81. Ramsey, BCE, 213, 
82. Ibid., 214. 
83, Ibid., 215. 
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and also the theological, or higher, virtue, borrowed from 
Augustine. The Reformation transforms the Aquinian concept 
of infused, or elicited, character to an understanding of 
grace as grace for justification "manifesting itself in God's 
attitude of gracious forgiveness toward men.n84 This latter 
interpretation corresponds closely to what Professor Ramsey 
believes; it is the "Christocentric ethics of the Reformation.n85 
Thus virtue finds its source, not in elicitation (Augustine), or 
infusion (Aquinas), or acquirement (Aristotle), but in justi-
fying grace "decisively oriented toward the infinite gracious-
86 
ness of God who put forward Christ." 
2. The Work of Christian Love 
The function of Christian love in its relation to 
work is to create and maintain human life in a community.87 
In order to create and maintain community of 
persons, or to evoke and sustain personality in 
community, much more (and more intentionally) 
than in economic exchange it is necessary that 
each seek not his own good, but the good of his 
neighbor (I Cor. 10t24). There is nothing 
illogical about this idea, however unusual such 
an attitude may be in practice.88 
(a) Utilitarianism Rejected 
The utilitarian concept of "greatest happiness for the 
84. Ramsey, BCE, 220. 
85. Ibid., Introduction, xiv. 
86. Ibid., 226. 
87. Ibid., 234. 
88. Ibid., 235. 
greatest number" is written off by Professor Ramsey sinoe 
the issue arises as to whether "the good of the aggregate 
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of all persons is eaoh person's good, and for what reason.n89 
Only an element of oonoern for the other person for his own 
sake orestes community among men.9° Christian ethics differs 
from utilitarianism in the primacy assigned to Whose good? 
The utilitarian refers to What is good? while for the 
Christian there oan be no more fUndamental question than, 
Whose?91 The contrast is seen in Henry Sidgwick 1 s notion 
that "each man is morally bound to regard the good of any 
92 
other individual as much as his own, 11 or similar to his own. 
According to Professor Ramsey, Christian ethics stands in 
sharp opposition to "the last of the utilitarians," Sidgwick, 
for Christian love" treats similar cases dissimilarly, 
regarding the good of any other individual as more than your 
own.n93 
that 
89. 
90. 
91. 
92, 
93. 
(b) The Community and Personality 
In preserving the community, Professor Ramsey affirms 
Instead of talking about how the object 
of love ought to be in order to be worthy of love, 
Christian ethics talks about how love ought to be 
Ramsey, BCE, 23 7. 
Ibid., 238. 
Ibid 'I 242. 
Sidgw1ck, Henry, Methods of Ethics. New York: The 
Macmillan Company~ 1913, 382. 
Ramsey, BCE, 242, :.::53. 
in order to be love.94 For this reason, 
Christian love bears all things, believes 
all things, hopes all things, endures all 
things, never ends (I Cor. 13: 7,8), while 
other love changes. For this reason, 
Christian love also preserves community when 
otherwise it would cease to be. This is the 
reason it is said or Jesus Christ that in 
him is reconciliation, that 1all things were 
made through him 1 (John 1:3), and also that 
1 in him all things hold together 1 (Col. 1:17) • 95 
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The very nature or Christian love focuses great worth 
on personality. "It can also be said that Christian love is 
the source from which men learn to attribute value to human 
persons. 096 The central value of personality in western 
culture is attributable to the working or Christian love, 
Professor Ramsey believes. "~ its very nature Christian 
love counts men to be things of value, ends to be served in 
spite of everything.097 He quotes T. S. Eliot who said: 
"Ir you remove from the word 'human' all that belief in the 
supernatural has given to man, you can view him finally as no 
more than an extremely clever, adaptable, and mischievous 
little animal. 098 
94. 
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
3. Human Nature and Imago Dei 
One of the basic principles of Christian morality is 
Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1946, 140. 
Ramsey, BCE, 24 6. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 247. 
"Second Thoughts about Humanism, 11 Selected Essays. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace Company, 1932, p. 397. 
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that man is created in the image of God. In accepting the 
foregoing thesis, Professor Ramsey declares that the idea 
lends dignity and sacredness to human personality. 
The image of God as resident capacity in man is denied 
by Professor Ramsey. The idea that man's larger brain is 
significant, or that man is a tool-making animal, man as ~ 
faber, falls into the common error that views "all civilization 
as an extension of man's thumb.n99 
(a) Imago Dei and History 
The Stoic notion that reason is a "spark" of divinity in 
man is likewise rejected. So too is Aristotle's conception of 
man as a rational animal, if it implies that reason is the 
imago Dei 1n man. Romanticism, which gives divinity to the 
imaginative and creative in man, and Kant's dictum that 
"nothing in the whole world, or even outside the world, can 
possibly be regarded as good without limitation except a good 
will,nlOO are unsatisfactory examples of "the good in man." 
Because personal idealism bases its moral ideal on man's moral 
freedom, it, according to Professor Ramsey, comes short in the 
same sense as the theories mentioned above, which "have in 
common the definition of the image of God as some capacity 
99. 
100. 
Ramsey, BCE, 250. 
Fundamental Principle~ 
section 1. 
of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
native to man or some part of the substantial form of his 
nature.nlOl 
(b) Man Reflects God's Image 
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The image of God is a mirror image, not a faculty 
image or capacity. 11The image of God is rather to be under-
stood as a relationship within which man sometimes stands, 
whenever like a mirror he obediently reflects God's will in 
his life and actions. 11102 Man is a "theological animal to 
the root of his essential being," and nothing whatsoever 
about man 11not presently involved in response to God11 CB.I). 
possibly be labelled God's image. Professor Ramsey states 
it thus: 
The mirror in itself is not the image; 
the mirror images; God's image is in the mirror. 
The image of God, according to this-view, con-
sists of man's position before God, or rather, 
the image of God is reflected in man because of 
his position before him.l03 
St. Augustine, Soren Kierkegaard, and Karl Parth are cited 
as examples of the foregoing interpretation. 
(c) Imago Dei and the Fall 
A further distinction in the imago Dei in man is made 
by Professor Ramsey: the image of God in which man was 
101. Ramsey, BCE, 251. 
102. Ibid., 255. 
103. Ibid. 
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created and the image of God which he acquired by virtue of 
the Fall,l04 Since reason and intelligence are not the 
imago Dei of the Genesis story, then there must have been 
another image which preceded the second one which came to fUll 
flower in the "knowledge of good and evil." The original 
image was characterized by innocence when man "stood within a 
relation of responsive obedience to his Creator and had the 
blissfUl happiness of innocently reflecting the will of God in 
all his actions and attitudes.nl05 The act of sin awakened 
slumbering reason which "came to its fUll height only through 
an act of sin. 0106 So reason and intelligence as we know 
them empirically in man found their inception in the Fall when 
the original image of God was lost. Whatever moral implica-
tions, therefore, the Fall had for man, it was by this logic a 
vastly improved state. Knowledge is a good result of the Fa11. 107 
(d) The Quandary of Naturalism 
Then the crux of redemption for Professor Ramsey seems 
to be that "Man the Reasoner" is "still a creature whose 
fUndamental nature requires him, if he would be himself, to 
be himself before God and to place all his attitudes and actions 
within the will and activity of God.nl08 Man is able to do 
104, Ramsey, BCE, 262, 
105, Ibid., 263, 
106, Ibid, 
107. Ibid,, 264, 
108, Ibid, 
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this because he can transcend nature, which leaves naturalism 
in a quandary, for "if any viewpoint is ever known to be 
~. then nothing can be more certain than that man transcends 
i i t nl09 nature n apprehend ng the truth about na ure. This fact 
Professor Ramsey holds as invariable, that "only a mind 
transcending nature can know truth about nature,nllO In 
transcending nature, man exercises more than awareness, for 
human reason means more than awareness of the world which as 
animals we gain exclusively through the senses. Man 
experiences in addition to awareness, self-awareness. "Vfhat 
stands out in man above nature is his rational self-consciousness 
or awareness of self,nlll Professor Ramsey denotes idealism 
as a bearer of this truth: 
He (man) never experiences pure animal 
impulse, pure thought or pure value-judgment. 
Always is he conscious of himself feeling, think-
ing, and desiring. This understanding of the 
spiritual nature of man derives in large measure 
from Platonism end it was a crucial point in St. 
Augustine's 'order of natures. 1 In the modern 
period, idealism became the bearer of this truth 
that man is a spirit and that personal spiritual 
existence plays the primary role in all knowledge 
and in all human activity--a truth which in the 
present day 1 existentt~lism 1 has rediscovered in 
its own special way. 
Even though man transcends nature by self-awareness, 
he has physical ties to nature which bind him in a kind of 
109. Ramsey, BCE, 2 69. 
110. Ibid., 273. 
111. Ibid., 274. 
112, Ibid., 275. 
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"theocentric naturalism," a notion which has as sound a 
biblical foundation as theocentric or Christian humaniam.ll3 
Pro feasor Ramsey admi ta that there is enough "freeplay11 
between the Christian view that man reflects the image of God 
and insights concerning man's inherent nature drawn from 
various schools of philosophy or social science for "Christian 
naturalism" "to remain permanently a possible position for 
Christiana in the present day.nll4 
To view man thus as a theological animal drives one 
11 to regard all truly human worth as derivative, not inherent.nllS 
Hence the Christian interpretation of man 1 a dignity affirms 
something about men in a positive relationship to God, and not 
just something about men ~ ~· This adding-aomething-to-man 
imago ~. which distinguishes man the theological animal from 
the merely natural animal centers in love, for man can 
"resemble God only by loving. 11116 In answer to the pressing 
question, How can man lose this 11 image 11 as in the Genesis 
account? Professor Ramsey replies, 11 by turning itself from 
the chief good, the mind loses the being a good mind; but it 
does not lose the being a mind. 11 117 
(e) Sin Personal 
In his treatment of sin, Professor Ramsey avers the 
:-:-;:,...-~-113. Ramsey, 
114. Ibid. 
115. Ibid. 
116. Ibid., 
117. Ibid., 
BCE 
278. 
279. 
' 
277. 
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time-accepted doctrine that sin is real, having to do at its 
deepest level with man as an individual, and not with mankirxl. 
in general. He suggests: 
Christian ethics in the present day should try 
to understand sin both as man's own doing and as a 
dynamic structure or pattern or orientation within 
man's activity which goes to the root of his 
existence as apiri t or person. To apea}~ of sin as 
'original' means that it originates in man himself 
by his own will, and cannot be traced away from 
man to find its origin in something man suffers or 
in some auper~icial aspect of his person. There 
is a sense in which the doctrine of 'original' 
sin is the moat significant thing you can say about 
man, because it make a him reaponai ble for the 
origination of sin.ll8 
Man sins by "the crises created by 
personally confronting Chriat."119 Sin means exactly the 
opposite of all that Christian love implies. To fall short 
of disinterested love for the neighbor for his own sake is 
the basis of sin. Therefore sin, largely, is of a social 
nature. Thus concisely sin means: "anxious self-centerednesa 
or self-centered anxiety.nl20 
Sin always assumes the guise of idolatry, the position 
directly opposed to "obedient love." And idolatry is "the 
work of aelf-love,nl21 and "subconscious egotism. 11 122 This 
element of aelf-centerednesa is essential to the definition 
118. 
119. 
120. 
121. 
122. 
Ramsey, BCE, 287, 288. 
Ibid., 289, 
Ibid,, 291. 
Ibid., 295, 
Ibid., 296. 
of sin. Sin, therefore, is always related to some act or 
state of self-warship. 
The 'origin' of sin, certainly the nature 
of sin, is revealed most clearly in the fact 
that the human spirit, in its self-transcendence 
and freedom, with overw'1elming probability 
centers itself upon itself in the guise of 
some idol rather than in faith living for 
another,l23 
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Otto Baab supports Ramsey's view when he says, "when 
an idol is wora~ipped, man 
desires, his purposes, and 
is worshipping 
124 his will." 
(f) Conflict with Idealism 
himself, his 
In concluding his consideration of human nature and 
the image of God, Professor Ramsey charges that philosophical 
idealism is the chief rival of Christian ethics in the modern 
era. This position he holds is necessary because of idealism's 
emphasis on self-realization, What idealism calls "the good" 
he believes Christian ethics calls sin or idolatry, namely, 
125 11 the intentional pursuit of self-realization." Caustically 
he alleges that "the idea of seeking self-realization through 
self-giving comes to no more than covering self-centeredness 
under the cloak of idolatrous devotion.nl2 6 
123, Ramsey, ECE, 297. 
124. The Theology of the Old Testament, New York: 
Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1949, 105, 110. 
125. Ramsey, BCE, 301. 
126, Ibid. 
4. Toward a Social Policy 
The nature of Christian love is to be in search of a 
social policy. 
On the one hand, stands Christianity, which 
is a religion seeking a social policy; and, on the 
other, there are a multitude of social policies 
generating religions, or seeking to attach them-
selves to the Christian religion. Chri~~~an love 
is always in search of a social policy. 
{a) Love and Social Organization 
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Christian love cannot stand alone; however, it must 
clothe itself in the "flesh of some specific social order."128 
Yet it is not limited to this incarnate order; indeed it could 
not be, for to be Christian, love must be subject to nothing 
save its inherent urge toward the neighbor. In incarnating 
itself in a social order Christian love employs that order to 
its own end. When conflict impinges on Christian love, in 
order to maintain its purity love must separate itself from 
encumbering alliances. 
{b) Negative Aspect of Christian Ethics 
The negative aspect of Christian social ethics is to 
restrain sin through the institution, and this tradition "sums 
up in large Pirt the way Christians understand the nature of 
127. Ramsey, BCE, 326. 
128. Ibid. 
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social institutions and justify their existence.nl29 The 
institution provides the means of "restraining and remedying 
sin." The coin box on public buses is an example of this 
control. People "need restraint because of the primary fact 
of sin.nl30 If it were not for the sinfulness of human nature, 
the ~populi would not need to be institutionalized as a 
curb to man's waywardness. Because 11 you can fool too many of 
the people too much of the time,11131 the democratic technique 
must be developed to a science to insure a reign of justice 
and equality among men. Reinhold Niebuhr sums the situation 
up thus, "man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; 
but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary, 11132 
On that account, right policy for any political society must 
be made with some reference to Christian realism involving 
the necessity of curbing and curing sin,l33 
(c) Positive Aspects of Christian Ethics 
From the negative aspect of Christian ethics, Professor 
Ramsey turns to the "positive" character of his theory. If 
Christian ethics negatively "restrains and remedies" sin, 
then what is its positive nature? His answer seems to be: 
129, Ramsey, BCE, 327. 
130. Ibid., 328. 
131. Thurber, James, "The Owl Who Was God," Fables for Our 
Time. New York: Harpers, 1939, pp. 35-40. 
132. The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. 
New York: Scribners Sons, 1944, xi. 
133, Ramsey, BCE, 337. 
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"Christian love works as a rerment underneath every social 
institution and conventional code or conduct in Christendom.n 134 
This leavening permeation or the social structure result a in 
11 the constant critic ism and reshaping of the institutions of 
society in the course or using them" (underlining m1ne).l35 
This rermentatian produces a gradual change, tranarorming 
society indirectly by the imago Dei rerlected in the personal 
participation or each Christian individual in the social 
movements. 
(d) Intuition Rejected 
Intuition in ethics is rejected because (1) 11 no content 
immediately presented ••• can countermand human conscience or ••• 
the dawning ethical insight that it is wrong to orrer children 
as blood aacririces, 11 and (2) moral reason is negated by a 
136 11high degree or relt-absoluteness." Ramsey holds that 
Maritain is in contradiction in assessing natural law such 
a noble place in basic Christian ethics since either the 
natural law 11has speciric content and may be 'unrolled' 
according to these stages" or else we must mean by natural 
law 11 a rorm or intuition ethics." In any event, "neither or 
these provides a distinctively Christian social policy. 11137 
134. Ramsey, BCE, 351. 
135. Ibid., 349. 
136. Ibid., 339. 
137. Ibid., 341. 
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So Ramsey concludes that "Christian social ethics consists 
neither of intuition in search of a social policy nor of 
natural law possessed of a social policy. 11138 
(e) Christian Love on "Ground Floor" 
The connection between Christian love and social 
policies in Ramsey's view reduces to this: "While Christian 
love cannot get along without seeking to find from any source 
the best possible social ethic, such love remains dominant 
139 
and free in any partnership it enters." This implies that 
Christian love ought never to be identified with or bound 
permanently to any particular program or stipulation for 
action, regardless of the importance attaahed. Christian 
love occupies the "ground floor" exclusively. It suffers 
no rivals; it enters no coalition. Should Christian love 
make an alliance with convenient media of insight and 
information, it makes concordat with none of these; the union 
is superficial and transient, serving only temporarily the 
cause of Christian love. Only as a contextual convenience 
to be a 11 Christ to one's neighbor" are pacts and parties 
useful and maintained. In a dual utilitarian-separatist 
relationship the 11 foundation of human life in the communi ty11 
138. Ramsey, ECE, 342. 
139. Ibid., 343. 
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must rest on "Obedience to God."14° Finally, 11 consenting 
to the sovereignty of God manifestly means acknowledging 
his righteousness or justice to be the sovereign rule of 
life.nl41 Therefore obeying the covenant and doing justice, 
love for neighbor and fulfilling the law are, in fact, the 
same thing. 142 
140. Ramsey, BCE, 3f57. 
141. Ibid., 388. 
142. Ibid. 
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CHAPTER VII 
PROBLEMS CCNFRONTING IMPARTED ETHICS 
The major errors of Professor Ramsey's theory of 
impartation as a moral ideal are readily self-evident from 
the philosophical viewpoint, the exponential approach of 
this investigation. 
Had Professor Ramsey remained within theology and 
not invaded the realm of philosophy, the urge to examine 
his basic theses would not have moved the writer; but as 
a recent exponent of a novel theoretical pursuit of the 
historic ethical ideal, Professor Ramsey's work, Basic 
Christian Ethics, evokes more than passing interest and 
stimulates the philosophical spirit to eager scrutiny. 
His able and forthright effort has presented the writer 
with a delightful and challenging task. 
Beginning with the premise that Christian ethics 
is more like "labor and fortitude" than "sweetness and 
light," he banishes the saccharine fantasy of Herman 
Melville's novel Pierre in which tha gospel of love is 
described as "a volume bound in rose-leaves, clasped 
with violets, and by the beaks of hummingbirds printed 
with peach-juice on the leaves of lilies." Professor 
Ramsey's notion of "obedient love" comes nearer the 
labored, onerous toil and task of Christian in Bunyan's 
allegory, Pilgrim's Progress. 
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Because Professor Ramsey grafts philosophy into his 
admittedly theological ethics, his effort becomes the object 
of rational inquiry. This writing will not attempt to 
determine the accuracy of his biblical interpretations, 
but rather examine his philosophical deductions in which the 
principles of logic hold such an important and critical 
place. His position is pinpointed when he asserts that his 
quest is the Bible viewpoint. •As a treatise on basic 
Christian ethics, this book endeayors to stand within the 
way the Bible views morality,•l is his frank statement. 
This attitude tends to force his critics into a position 
of opposition to the Bible; but this inquiry does not 
question the truth or falsity of the Bible, nor necessarily 
Professor Ramsey's beliefs supposedly based on its history 
and doctrine, but it does view with anxious want of confidence 
the philosophical implications of his cautious, logically-
involved treatment. 
In his systematic attack on Christian ethics as a 
composite of other ethical notions, the "best in other 
moral perspectives," one finds earnest and helpful 
suggestions regarding the biblical and secular history of 
moral ideals; but Professor Ramsey's significant rational 
methods and philosophical allusions entangle him in certain 
precarious standpoints that disturb a direct, empirical 
search for truth. As Professor Peter A. Bertocci observes, 
1. R&msey BCE, Introduction, xi. 
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"if we are to present a conception of Christian ethics to 
our generation of students and scholars, we shall confrc.nt 
them with questions and difficulties that may well force 
them to look away from the Christian perspective.n2 
Considering Professor Ramsey's ethical ideal as one 
of many approaebe a, and not the only approach to Bible 
ethics, we now proceed to the philosophical assumptions 
latent within his writings. 
1. Universalism and Eschatology 
The inevitable clash of the concept of eschatology 
as defined in Christian theology with the denotation of 
universalism involves Professor Ramsey in the first cJe ar-
cut practical difficulty. How can we resolve the self-
evident contradiction between the universal application 
of ethical principles with the necessarily restricted 
scope of eschatological morality? In an effort to face 
this problem one must, and Professor Ramsey does, attempt 
to show that what works in the limited eschatological 
situation will work also in the comprehensive general 
circumstance. The apocalyptic ethics inheres in a one-
man-to-one-man relationship; hence it must be shown that 
the same moral obligation and action are relevant in a 
2. Crozer 1 s Quarterly, January, 1962, 
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world-wide one-man-to-many-neighbors context. This case 
must also be argued successfully against the confused 
background of civilization in which group conditions, moods, 
and obligations vary. This leap is not logically achieved; 
Professor Ramsey employs the eschatological group as a 
controlled case, assuming that since moral norms apply in 
this instance, they will work equally as well in every 
situation. 
A. Grounds for Eschatological Ethics 
The foregoing assumption raises the question: On 
what grounds can an eschatological morality be universal-
ized? The obvious need is sensed by the author of Basic 
Christian Ethics, for he notes: 
The basic problem we shall face in trans-
porting the ethics of Jesus to a non-apocalytic 
setting is this: What possible bearing can an 
ethic which specifies to the full what a man 
should do in relation to a single neighbor, an 
ethic which reveals with no qualification at all 
what the reign of 'righteousness' means in 
regard to any man, what bearing can this possibly 
have upon moral action in a world where there 
alwl:s is more than one neighbor and indeed a 
who cluster of claims and responsibilities 
to be considered?3 
He admits frankly that •this problem cannot be avoided by 
reducing Christian ethics to the status of an inner 
disposition.n4 Hence Christian ethics is a form of 
3. Ramsey, BCE, 42. 
4. Ibid. 
moral recover, or development which lends itself 
readily to any and all objective demands regardless of 
time or place or condition. 
(a) Christian Ethics Affects All Cultures 
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The strenuous temper of the eschatological ethics 
is also noted by Professor Ramsey in the statement 
"Christian ethics constitutes a standing judgment upon all 
human conduct and upon every human culture requiring of 
them absolute obedience to God and single-minded love for 
neighbor.•5 Christian ethics is not, like Judaism, a 
"religious civilization;" it is rather a proper criticism 
of any civilization, whether religious or not. All codes, 
customs, and traditions come under its jurisdiction. 
This is possiole because it does not derive from any 
particular situation, nor does it accomodate itself to 
historical relationships.s 
Professor Ramsey's effort to equalize the situation 
created by the above viewpoint is obscured in the major and 
minor premises which commit the whole enterprise to a 
proper understanding of Jesus' eschatological expectations. 
This turn of events leaves one with the single choice of 
accepting or rejecting Professor Ramsey's definition of 
"eschatological expectations" and his further position 
5. Ramsey, BCE, 44. 
6. Ibid. 
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that what he believes is actually the indubitable meaning 
of the teachings of Jesus. Bu1< our interest does not 
require acceptance or rejection of his theological insights; 
it does demand, however, that we look into the soundness 
of his philosophical method. It is proposed, therefore, 
that whether or not he is theologically stable, his 
philosophical procedure is unsound and incomplete, for 
he no where provides adequate logical, systematic 
evidence for the conclusions he sets forth. 
(b) Faulty Major and Minor Premises 
To connect his original premise, that Christian 
ethics is a man-to-one-man teaching, to his conclusion, 
that Christian ethics also can be a one-man-to-many 
activity, Ramsey must account logically for the steps 
taken in arriving at that result. It seems that he gives 
up the prospect of a universal Christian ethics when he 
admits that "the first step to an understanding of the 
validity of Jesus• strenuous teachings must involve 
pu1<ting a limitation upon the area of their intended 
application."? With this the writer agrees, but if this 
restriction is observed it clearly precludes all hope 
of a universal Christian ethics. Surely the author is 
7. Ramsey, BCE, 39. 
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aware that "such an account of the genesis of the supreme 
ethical revelation has nothing to do with its validity,n8 
nor does it speak helpfully about its universality. It 
shuts the case up to a one-man private interpretation 
which defeats any successful effort to obtain an open-
minded, logical conclusion. It appears to this writer 
to circumscribe the problem within the province of a 
single mind and single explanation. Even though the end 
result may be true, the principles of philosophical 
inquiry are violated; thustruth would be an accident 
not an ahllievelll8nt. 
alarm: 
Professor Bertocci views Ramsey's results with 
This question is indeed crucial for 
an ethics which claims universal validity, 
let alone relevance to the complicated 
problems of choice. It is at this very 
point, when one would suppose Christian 
ethics has reached the nadir of irrelevance 
to the human situation, that Ramsey steps 
in to save the day with an observation 
which reveals one of the basic orientations 
in his thought. It becomes clear that he 
would rid the moral agent of any excuse to 
rationalize self-preference, social 
provincialism, or relativism.9 
Here, then, is the real difficulty; an ethics 
which owes no allegiance to any human situation, which 
makes the demands of reason and human judgment irrelevant, 
comes in as a universal code to all men embracing their 
8. Crozer's Quarterly, January, 1952. 
9. Ibid. 
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every moral principle and obligation. Again, even though 
the assumption may be true (or it may not be), the 
process is faulty. 
What justification is there for saying, provided 
it be true, that the strenuous Christian ethics is valid 
for the eschatological situation and therefore it is also 
valid for any stiuation independent of time or place? 
Although he states in one place that "for these moral 
maxims a degree of obvious and universal validity may 
be claimed,nlO a degree or absolute status remains 
improbable until proved. Can this form of reasoning 
escape the fallacy of composition: what is true of a 
part or most of the parts is also true of the whole? 
Can a moral norm which stipulates what a man should do 
in a single-neighbor situation apply generally to a 
social complex, with its confusion of issues and life-
and-death struggle for self-preservation? Despite the 
fact that one's beginning situation is a typical case, 
to start with it and universalize the maximum that any 
and all possible circumstances will yield to its ethical 
ideal is at best "strange reasoning." 
B. Reason versus Assumption 
Throughout his extensive work Professor Ramsey, 
10. Ramsey, BCE, 33. (Underlining mine) 
as the foregoing indicates, is faced with the problem of 
deduction. Despite a faulty middle premise, A is B, he 
goes on to deduce the conclusion that A is c. The 
syllogism would look like this: Eschatological ethics 
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is based on God's universal reign of righteousness (B is 
C), Christian ethics is eschatological (A is B), therefore, 
Christian ethics is universal (A is C). Overlooking the 
need of inductive verification for the major and minor 
premises, the conclusion deduced can at best be relative 
or conditional; for deduction shows, at most, that some 
beliefs are justified if other beliefs are admitted to 
be true. 11 Francis Bacon, among others, revealed the 
weakness in the Aristotelian logic: no conclusion 
arrived at deductively can be reliable unless the original 
premise, especially, is inductively established. 
"Deduction, therefore, though a valuable aid, cannot be 
relied on exclusively" Professor Black affirms.12 
Professor Ramsey, no doubt consciously, begins with derived 
beliefs rather than basic beliefs,l3 but seems to say that 
if you grant my premises you must grant my conclusion, 
which logically follows. 
The problem, accordingly, that logic must resolve 
is to show the unity and interrelation of all of the 
11. Black, CT, 252-253. 
12. Ibid., 353. 
13. Ibid. 
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intellectual processes. No one of the a teps or stages 
in this process can be completely understood when viewed 
by itself: each is what it is only in and through its 
connection with the whole of which it forms a part. So 
the modern contention is that deduction and induction are 
two inseparable, though distinguishable, aspects of 
scientific reasoning. The logician must, despite the 
justification of distinction of phrases, ultimately 
endeavor to grasp all the aspects of his subject in 
their concrete unity of structure and function. It is 
likely that most logicians now recognize that both 
Aristotle and Mill had oversimplified the areas of 
deduction and induction respectively, each giving a 
phase of logic direct emphasis; but now the logical 
process requires for fullest accuracy an interrelated 
balance of both the deductive and inductive forms of 
reasoning. As Professor Creighton suggests 11 it would, 
indeed, be contrary to universal experience in the case 
of every other science, that its pioneers should have 
comprehended their subject in its full complexity at the 
very beginning.nl4 In the attempt to pass from his 
original premise to his conclusion, Professor Ramsey 
neglects the obvious need of induction, assuming that 
since eschatological ethics is based on God's universal 
14. AIL, :39-40. 
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reign of righteousness, and that Christian ethics is 
eschatological (both deductive in their orientation), then 
Christian ethics is universal. We repeat, at the risk of 
belaboring the point, that the assumption that "eschatological 
ethics is based on God's universal reign of righteousness" 
is in itself a highly debatable assertion. Even though 
Professor Ramsey is convinced that the notion is biblically 
basic, it is a question on which there is no universal 
agreement. The middle premise, that "Christian ethics is 
eschatological" is likewise a moot point. Consequently, how 
can one deduce an unquestionably valid conclusion from 
major and minor premises which are at the best hypothetical 
in nature, which not only bear on the face of them the 
mark of faulty induction, but which hold no empirical 
promise of validation from the standpoint of history 
and science 1 
c. Human Experience and Christian Love 
The foregoing has been an attempt to show that the 
premises which constitute Professor Ramsey's syllogism of 
ethics are inductively unfounded, and since both premises 
lack scientific validation the conclusion is likewise 
deductively relative. 'l'he integrity of the author of 
Basic Christian Ethics, or the works he explores,is not 
under question; it is rather his philosophical method, 
which, certainly from the viewpoint of logic, is faulty. 
(a) Ramsey's Universalizing Medium 
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We must now look into the question: How does he 
universalize ethics? Or, what is the medium, not necessarily 
logical, whichmakes Christian ethics capable of universal 
applications? Since his data are not scientific but religious, 
Professor Ramsey's answer is love: "it was apocalypticism 
within the context of biblical faith in God's saving love 
which produced Jesus' decisive statement of divine righteous-
ness as the eaaure and meaning of human obligation.nl5 
One may say, therefore, that "it is the incarnational element 
in all r Christ-mystiei am,' the controlling love of Chri at, 
which turns a man's face toward his neighbor in all concrete-
ness."l6 All other media properly credited for human 
welfare and uniTersal betterment, for Professor Ramsey the 
central point remains that Christian love is the sole 
medium by which world-wide moral obligation can obtain and 
be functionally useful. 
(b) Problem of Category 
The problem here is that "Christian love is an 
ultimate which cannot be defined in terms of non-Christian 
15. Ramsey, BCE, 45. 
16. Ibid., 132. 
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categories. 11 17 Jesus Christ is the center and source of 
the light shed on the problem, Professor Ramsey states, a 
position which unless qualified commits the author to Bible 
revelation exclusively. From the theological point of 
view this may be sufficient. His unqualified support of 
the recondite eschatological ethics is stated clearly in 
the following: 11 The DIB aning and measure of full human 
obligation are to be found only in the biblical conception 
of righteousness, and not elsewhere in some moral norms 
derived from reason operating apart from the Hebrew-
Christian religious heritage.•l8 
Provided Professor Ramsey is taken seriously, to 
many his ethics would sound more like impositionism than 
impartation. It canes as an authority enjoined upon all 
men without respect to reason or any human notion of right 
and wrong. Does not the position nullify man's basic 
capacity to respond to any intelligent moral proposal? 
Does Professor Ramsey mean that Christian ethics, obedient 
love, is void of thought, basically opposed to reason? 
Despite his original rigid claim to exclusive right to 
authority for Christian ethics, near the close of his work 
he credits reflection on the part of man as having some 
value, when he says 
17. Bertocci, Crozer's Quarterly, January, 1952. 
18. BCE, 3. 
Nevertheless, the Christian no less than 
any other man will find it salutar,y to re-
flect a great deal upon man's great native 
potentialities, lest in actual life he 
sometimes fall far short of treating another 
person as every human being should be treated. 
Idealistic estimations of the worth of man, 
when they do not became vehicles for pressing 
the claims of self, may very well serve to 
remedy sinful and calloused use of another 
person, and direct attention to his real 
qualities, evan though Christian love in 
itself would do much more.l9 
This sounds like a 
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damaging concession to idealism, for it specifies that 
when "claims of self" are not pressed, which implies that 
idealists are capable of such insight, a position seemingly 
positively denied on page three of Basic Christian Ethics, 
then reason can prevent the "sinful and calloused use of 
another person," which is supposed to be the exclusive 
function of obedient love. If this be true, reason is not 
ruled out, neither as a primal nor supplementary principle. 
w. T. Stace makes reason and sympathy (love) both primary, 
thus enhancing the value of both.20 If reason is admitted 
at all, how and where will it, or can it, be limited? At 
best the answer is arbitrary. 
(e) Problem of Human Nature 
Another obstacle arises in Professor Ramsey's way, 
the danger of too great a divergence in the concept of human 
19. BCE, 353. 
20. DWM, 85. 
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nature. If human nature is basically depraved to the point 
that it cannot help itself, by what process of reasoning can 
we show that that same depraved nature is capable of even 
receiving help? If man's sinfulness provided the block 
to communication between himself and God, the situation is 
somewhat relieved, but if it is man's fUndamental nature 
that obstructs the process of redemption, then the 11 break11 
is too great and there is no way to show that the situation 
can be remedied at all. Since God created man, He would 
not require of him a kind of response wholly unrelated to 
his basic nature. It seems r.rom the Scriptures themselves 
that God takes advantage of man's constitutional ability 
when he urges man "Come now, and Jet us reason together, 
saith the Lord: though your sins be as scarlet, they shall 
be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they 
shall be as wool.n21 John Calvin's notion of man's utter 
depravity faces the same difficulties in the process of 
redemption. Calvin's "prevenient grace11 has a parallel in 
Ramsey's "initiating love,tt22 but both face the same 
dilemma, with its mutually unsatisfactory horns: If man 
is wholly depraved, how can we show that he can receive 
"prevenient grace" or "initiating love," and on the contrary 
if he is not wholly depraved, and reason functions at all, 
21. Isaiah 1:18. (King James version) 
22. BCE, 129. 
how can we judge the apparently needed limitation of 
reason as to its primal or supplementary status so as to 
get the best out of reason and yet leave sufficient room 
for "obedient love" to operate? 
(d) Problem of Example 
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Still another obstacle obstructs Professor Ramsey's 
progress, the problem of example as a source for ethical 
motivation. He indicates that Christ is the example to 
imitate,23 but as Kant noted "eadh example of morality 
which is exhibited to one must itself have been previously 
judged according to principles of morality to see whether it 
is worthy to serve as an original example. 11 And again, "no 
one could give poorer counsel to morality than to attempt 
to derive it from examples. Imitation has no place in moral 
matters and examples serve only for encouragement. 1124 
Undoubtedly the Kantian observation is correct. Morality 
cannot be imitated, for even the accuracy of imitation 
could not make up for the lack of genuine moral status 
within the individual. The practice of emulation may be 
a good thing in itself, but it begs the logically-prior 
question: Who will vouch for the example? Had Professor 
Ramsey said that imitating the example of Christ was an 
23. PCE, 23. 
24. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. L. W. Beck. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949, p. 68. 
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excellent practice in the performance of one's moral 
obligations, for the sake of direction or instruction, the 
conclusion would be much different; but to base morality 
on imitation is to give up the logical pursuit. 
(e) Problem of God's Goodness 
Finally, in relation to an ethics of love, there is 
nothing in Professor Ramsey's argument to show that God is 
good, and consequently that His love would be good. This 
question raised is not an attempt to forestall confidence 
in the goodness of God or the love that theologically is 
understood to flow from Him. But unless our author follows 
through and substantiates these supporting points, his whole 
argument begins to slide. Professor Bertocci has put it 
this way: 
We shall not expatiate here the funda-
mental question as to whether an act is 
good simply because God does it. Ramsey 
might insist that this question never comes 
up in a biblical world view which simply 
assumes that God's way is good no matter 
what happens to human beings, and then 
proceeds to show that God's way is 'self-
emptying love. 1 
He suggests that this 
logically begs a prior question, 
Why must we assume 
that what we know about human goodness apart 
from this supernatural measure should not 
be a way of measuring the goodness of the 
supernatural? Cries of blasphemy and pride 
of reason will not down this logical 
question, especially when it presupposes 
an unargued claim that whatever the Cosmic 
Being does must be good. If the best in 
human experience (apart from 'revelation') 
can give no light on the true nature of 
the good, Christian ethics at the very 
beginning faces the theoretical disadvantage 
of at once by-passing the question: How do 
we know that God is good? and insisting 
that persons must accept a supernatural 
measure if they would discover the human 
good for human beings. The whole problem 
of the autonomy of ethics is here solved 
without discussion.25 
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The philosophical approach to the goodness of God 
has been argued by Professor Bertocci26 and Sorley27 among 
others. Both agree that God is good. But their accounts 
attempt to show on what grounds God is to be considered 
good. Thus philosophical support is added to the idea 
that God is good. Whether Professor Ramsey's sayings are 
true or false is beside the potnt; rational methodology 
v.ould enhance his position. 
2. Obedient Love and A Scale of Values 
As Professor Edwin T. Mitchell says ttthe comparative 
neture of valuation suggests a scale of values.n28 Professor 
Brogan has worked out a series of studies on the tendency 
25. Crozer 1 s Quarterly, January, 1952. 
26. IPR, 290, 299-301. 
27. !MG, 85, 163, 183, and espc. 346. 
28. SOE, 123. 
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among various groups to give rank to value.29 Without a 
scale of values how could one rate his experiences of value 
as to benefit or injury? Or, how could a group build up a 
tradition of customs or mores? Choice, basic in man's 
experience, and based on the results of test and judgment, 
tends to fit value into a scale. As choice is repeated, 
habitual preferences are noted, and combining these 
preferences the individual develops a scale of values 
characteristic of himself, and the group characteristic 
of it. In fact we use the scale of values to determine 
an individual or group's character. The pragmatic use of 
value by John Dewey in his personalized notion of 11 invaluables 11 
does not alter the case in view, for the goods get ranked 
in the problem situation even though they return to their 
status as "invaluable s" after the problem has been solved,30 
A. Vf.hat A Scale of Values Involves 
Valuation begins in choice, and a scale of values is 
built up in the following manner; With a choice facing him 
29. In Internationai Journal of Ethics as follows: 
0A Study in Statistical Ethics," XXXIII, 2 (January, 
1923) 119-135; "Group Estimates of Frequency of 
Misconduct," XXXIV, 3 (April, 1924), 254-271; 
"Moral Val ua tiona About Men and Women, 11 XXXV, 2 
(January, 1925), 105-124; and "Moral Judgments of 
High School Students (with G. S. Slavens), XXXVIII, 
1 {OctobeD, 1927) 57-69. 
30. DE, 279-280, 
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an individual makes a decision. He males the decision in 
the light of two factors, desire and reason, When his 
decision is rendered, he then observes the results. If in 
his judgment, and according to his desires, the results 
were satisfactory in relationship to his concept of the 
good, he tends to repeat the decision, Under such 
circumstances a scale of values is unavoidable. 
(a) A Need of Preference 
Professor Mitchell observes that "the first stage 
in the development of universal moral judgments is simple 
preference , 1131 On the animal level, which is perceptual 
and prelogical, the act of preferring is usually, if not 
always, a response in "physiological sale ctivity." As 
we ascend the scale of developing response, we reach the 
intelligence level, man's rational response stage. This 
level is enlightened by experience and inference; choice 
is affected by a second dimension, reason. He is thus 
able to pass from private judgment to universal valuation. 
This is done by testing, by scientific validation. 
Enlightened preference requires the function of reason, 
especially in the instance of generalization. If an 
individual says "this is good for me," he has a single 
31. SOE, 93, 
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referent and even though desire may play a major part in 
his decision, reason is active. When, however, the same 
individual says "this is good," he universalizes his 
judgment. To make that judgment sound it must be validated 
by reason through testing. Hence preference, the simplest 
choice, i8 necessary in personal and social ethics, and it 
eventuates in a scale of values. 
(b) The Principle of Selectivity 
Professor Titus has delineated certain principles in 
the process of sele ctivity.32 They are: the greater, the 
intrinsic, the productive, and the permanent. The purpose 
of this observation is not to investigate at ~ngth the 
classification of values, but rather to show that ethicists 
do follow some scale of values, and that such a scale is 
essential to intelligent understanding of morals. Professor 
Titus's discussion of productive value, for example, shows 
how a value principle works. He says 
The productive values are to be sought 
rather than the unproductive. Some values, 
such as friendship, increase as they are 
used. To share these values with others is 
not to Jessen the value for oneself. The 
more common they are, the more productive 
they are. In this respect they are in 
marked contrast to material values which 
diminish in quantity as they are shared 
and used.33 
32. ET, 227. 
33. Ibid. 
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(c) Scale and System 
In addition to a scale or values there is, in 
intelligent social action, also a system of' values. A scale 
of values may consciously and unconsciously be arrived at 
by an individual, or perhaps a community, without much 
rational comparison of' values. For instance, food has a 
ranking value in the lif'e of any individual or community, 
even first place, and desire alone is the directive. The 
scale may run something like this: Hunger, sex, shelter, 
devotion, etc. The rational content is small in most 
instances. But provided a community, or an individual, 
wishes to elaborate its, or his, values in a reasonable 
pattern, the concept of system is born. Professor Bertocci 
explains the systematizing of values as follows: 
What 'ought to be,' then, is that 
system of values which takes account of' the 
similarities and differences among men in 
their environments, which protects values 
already acknowledged and realized, but which 
also takes into account the possibility of 
growth. The final test of any true-
values, as we hsve said, is not the 
vividness, the directness, or 'immediacy' 
of any one cognitive act; but the final 
test is the ability of that value to knit 
other values together more harmoniously 
and lastingly.3-l 
34. IPR, 264. 
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B. Intelligibility of Ethics at Stake 
In view of the foregoing qualification of the moral 
experience in relationship to a scale of values, an imperative 
appears: Ethics to be intelligible, philosophical, must 
undergo the scrutiny and order of reason. To remove the 
prime factor of reason endangers the whole venture; the 
intelligibility of ethics is at stake. 
(a) A Place for the Intelligible 
~ven Ramsey does not deny a place to the intelligible. 
It comes "as a secondary though quite essential concern, 11 
after the Christian has established 11 right relation tot he 
neighbor.n35 The relationship to the neighbor is effected 
in a leap of love to his side, and only then "does it enter 
into a Christian's head for his neighbor's sake to ascend 
whatever scale of values he may find reasonably creditable."36 
It is odd that a "reasonably creditable" situation develops 
only after the love relationship has been established--when 
the loving creature was possessed of reason evidently before 
he felt the strong impetus of love. Without speaking 
disparagingly of love, one might ask Is love essentially 
blind? That "love is blind and marriage the eye-opener" 
35. Ramsey, BCE, 116. 
36. Ibid. (Underlining mine) 
may or may not represent man 1 s venture in the strong 
predilections or Eros or Cupid, but such blind gropings 
reduce to a shambles the attempt to order man 1 s ethical 
aspirations and ideals. Love may be better than "the 
gold or Darius 11 37 or "stronger than death in Alcestis 
and Achilles,n38 but without the direction of reason as 
a way-finder it may deteriorate into 11madness 11 and 11 lead 
to loss of character. 11 39 
The 11 leap or love" according to Proressor Ramsey 
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is grounded in faith. 40 It is a "leap which breaks 
entirely through the circle of self, goes bare-headed out 
of the 1I-castle,' and sets the agent rully on the side of 
another person, where for the first time he discovers 11 the 
neighbor' and 'seeks the other's own. rtt41 This leap, which 
is so self-effacing, enables one ttto care for another for 
his own sake alone and not for some ulterior purpose, even 
giving 1 so tba t the girt looks as if the gift were the 
recipient's own possession. 11142 For all that, Professor 
Ramsey concedes that "neighbor-love, or course, contains the 
presupposition that every man loves himself. 1143 The problem 
here is that in order to reach his neighbor man leaps by 
37. Plato, Lysis, 211. 
38. Plato, Symposium, 179. 
39. Plato, Phaedrus, 231 E, 265 A, and 239. 
40. Ramsey, ECE, 101. 
41. Ibid. , 102. 
42. Ibid. (Quote from Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love,22.) 
43. Ibid. 
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faith to his side, a strictly unreflective approach, but 
this very same leap must be preceded by a love of self, 
which implies a rational procedure, or else love of self 
is a selfish impulse which has no place in obedient love. 
Or is Professor Ramsey ready to say that the love of self 
is also an act of faith? Stace considers the establishment 
of the infinite value of the self a process of reason in 
relation to a scale of values in which all other values are 
finite: man's own soul "to him is more than the value of 
44 
the whole world." It is therefore infinite. If the 
presupposition that every man loves himself is sound, and 
Christianity begins with this supposition as Professor 
45 Ramsey declares, then it must be attained by some other 
factor than faith, for it is a rational concept. 
Consequently, there is not only a place for the 
intelligible; there is a logical need for it. Had Professor 
Ramsey, as did Stace, prescribe to each, faith and reason, its 
proper place, such an irreducible puzzle would not have 
arisen. It requires at least a minimum of reason to know 
that faith is faith; thus faith cannot go running off on its 
own, for even though it may be "belief which is not based on 
proof, 1146 it is presupposed in an enlightened approach to 
44. DWM, 133. 
45. Ramsey, BCE, 102. 
46. The American College Dictionary. New York: Random House, 
1948, p. 433. 
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whatever it bases its confidence in. The charity agent who 
raps on my door is first investigated before he receives 
my trust. Reason and faith work hand-in-hand. They are 
complements, not exclusive sovereigns. In Christianity 
faith does not negate reason; it absorbs, or utilizes it, 
and goes beyond it. There is no conflict between the faith 
of Christianity and its intelligibility. 
(b) The Value-Scale Predicament 
Professor Ramsey's primary concern, to get man to the 
side of his neighbor, encounters at the outset another 
important consideration, value, for he insists that we shall 
never f1 nd the full meaning of Christian neighbor-love by 
discriminating the higher and lower values, or some scale 
of values. 
When we predicate worth or value, we assert or imply 
that the object is worth being or ought to be, 11 a bearing 
which this essence has upon existence. 1147 Value is more than 
the quality of an object, despite Meinong's assertion that 
11 the heavens are called beautiful in no other sense than 
that in which they are called blue. 1148 Valuing is not mere 
apprehension of an object; it is an assertion of worth, a 
giving to that object an ethical 11 oughtness. 11 Further, 11it 
47. Urban, Jour. Phil., vol. XIII (1916), 449 ff. 
48. Logos, III {1912), 11. 
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is in the existent, the individUal, that value is found, not 
in the general or universal."49 Valuing is a personal 
experience, and value has no meaning apart from such 
experience. If value is to be raised above the level of 
perceptual apprehension, another factor must be added, 
meaning. And meaning is arrived at by two methods only: 
the non~rational and the rational. To illustrate the 
first method, or means, to a lion an antelope has only 
one value, food. The hungrier the lion the more significant 
the antelope to him, but on a purely physiological basis. 
The rational concept of value goes beyond the physiological, 
even though it may involve it. In other words, reason gives 
to the object another dimension; it can add meaning on the 
abstract level. Furthermore, value can be increased in 
both areas, for the hungrier the lion the more attractive 
the antelope, and t~e more meaning attributed to the object 
the more value it has. If value can be increased, a scale 
of value is needed to measure it. It is the value-scale 
predicament: When value exists at all it exists in some 
measure. The only way to ascertain value on the Christian 
level is by rational measurement and measurement requires 
a scale. To repeal this verdict is to commit intellectual 
suicide. 
49. Sorley, MVIG, 113. 
(c) Highest Value Implies Gradation 
As Sorley notes, "values may be divided into higher 
50 
and lower according to the degree of their importance." 
The meaning of the word value indicates gradational 
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comprehension. Certainly 1f there is no distinction in the 
worth of things, the term value would not have appeared. 
Belaboring a truism is not the most profitable way to 
utilize time and space, but if the obvious makes this 
observation ridiculous, the same judgment applies equally 
well to Professor Ra~mey's assertion that the love of 
neighbor escapes a scale of va lnes. 
The unavoidable impact of value-claim upon man's 
consciousness, especially in moments of reflection, forces 
him to a gradational qualification of his experiences. 
Even though we take the line that we can put an end to the 
matter and reject the notion of degrees of value, as Sorley 
puts it, 
We are confronted with the fact that 
we are constantly compelled, whether on good 
grounds or on bad to make some preference 
of the kind described--to select one value 
rather than another when the attainment of 
both is imposs$£le, but a choice between them 
is open to us. 
He continues further, 
Now the subject of values--that is, the 
conscious person--when he tries to rationalize 
50. Sorley, MVIG, 50. 
51. Ibid., 50. 
his life, does attempt also to systematise 
his values; partly deliberately, partly 
unconsciously, he gradually forms a dom-
inating conception which determines his 
conduct and his view of what is of greatest 
worth. Under this dominant conception, he 
will arrange other conceptions contributory 
to value in his life, and will negative 52 suggestions which interfere w1 th that value. 
Inasmuch as Sorley is describing the function of a system 
of values, it should be noted that, by his admission, a 
scale of values precedes any possible system, Rfor that 
260 
problem has been resolved into another--the problem of the 
organic unity or systematic whole into which all values enter.R53 
Professor DeWolf affirms the gradational approach to value in 
saying Rif distinctions of value were not taken seriously, 
science and superstition would be on equal footing as actual 
phenomena of human history.R54 
It is the concept of Rhigher and lower valueR which 
gives Professor Ramsey's "neighbor-loveR ideal whatever 
worth it may possess. To make the Rneighbor-love 11 ideal 
workable, neighbor must receive the highest evaluation, the 
neighbor must stand at the top of the scale of values. So 
far Ramsey seems to consent, at least implicitly. But how to 
determine such high worth is his problem. Ostensibly recourse 
to value-centered appeal must be made despite his scorn of 
52. MVIG, 52. 
53. Ibid., 53. 
54. RRAR, 193. 
philosophical ethics, which he charges with "enlightened 
selfishness.n55 With "neighbor-love" the highest value, 
other aspects of experience in the nature of worth descend 
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the scale in gradational proportion based on value ascription. 
Thus higher and lower values imply grades of value,and grading 
is best denoted in a scale. So Professor Ramsey, by the 
involuntary force of circumstances, cannot escape finally 
some form of value appreciation, and consequently value 
gradation. 
C. Christian Ethics and Self-Realization 
The distinction between Christian ethics and the ethics 
of self-realization, according to Professor Ramsey, is seen 
in the fact that Christian ethics stresses service whereas 
self-realization emphasizes the common good. He says, 
In idealistic, self-realization ethics, right 
for self are forms of service to the common 
good. In Christian ethics, rights for the self 
are forms of service to the neighbor, and 
ideally a Christian agent gives no express con-
sideration to whether he participates in, or is 
a mutual recipient of the good he does. In one 
case, mutual self-realization in the common 
good is the ideal, and in the other, self-
sacrifice to the good of the neighbor.56 
(a) The Ethics of Self-Realization 
In defining the ethics of self-realization, Professor 
55. BCE, 115. 
56. Ibid. , 187. 
Bertocci has the follow1 ng to say: 
But if we are to challenge the ethics of 
self-realization which, in the name of truth, 
holds that men ought to will the complete 
realization of human personality in themselves 
and others as far as possible, it is hardly 
fair to argue that the ideal of self-
realization be given up because human beings 
will fail in their attempt to do so--unless 
we are prepared to give up Christian ethics, 
or any other, which fails of achievement 
owing to human abuse of free will and other 
weaknesses.57 
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As Professor Bertocci 
suggests what must be argued is whether Christian ethics 
can actually disengage itself, as Ramsey says it must, from 
the ethics of self-realization centered in a value system.58 
As has been shown already in this consideration,59 any 
ethical aspect fails logical accreditation which does not 
somehow fit into a system of values. Intellectual integrity 
is secured in a rational classification of value-claims, and 
value apart from reason is blind. The systematization of 
values must begin within the individual, for value is not 
only person-centered, it is person-wise distinguished. Value 
has meaning only to a person. It begins in him, it starts 
its system in him. In man's experience, as we have seen, the 
scale of values evolves. In the presence of this reliable, 
unequivocal datum Professor Ramsey asks us to 11 begin wholly 
57. Crozer 1 s Quarterly, January, 1952. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Section on "Highest Value Implies Gradation." 
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outside of ordinary human nature itself" as a starting 
point for ethical evaluation. 
Apropos this person-centered empirical situation we 
call moral experience Professor Ramsey must first explain 
how any ethical datum can arise "wholly outside" human 
nature itself. And further how any kind of experience can 
detach itself "wholly" from direct human implications. Is 
it not the whole personality that is involved in experience? 
Whereas certain elements of man's personality may be more 
deeply involved in some experiences than others, it is 
impossible to conceive of man in successful egress, entirely 
detached, at the moment of experience. It is this ego-
predicament, which is the only intelligent access to 
knowledge, that captures Ramsey in its relentless value 
system.thus preventing any clear break between Christian 
ethics and self-realization. The question pressing for an 
answer is: Since all experience modifies the person-
centered situation, can Christian ethics, less than any 
other aspect of experience, avoid direct or indirect influence 
on personality development, and if this be true, and it 
undoubtedly is, should not it therefore align itself with 
complete realization of human personality as far as possible? 
Self-realization in ethics, as interpreted by 
60. Ramsey, BCE, 194. 
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Professor Titus, "tales for its goal the development of the 
self as a thinking, feeling, and acting being ••• the 
harmonious development of the normal capacities of human 
nature." 61 Professor Titus finds that Christian ethics, 
when not conceived as authoritarian, has stressed the 
62 development of persons. He also points out that self-
realization ethics is social as well as individual, and that 
there is "no true realization of the self which does not 
involve the development of others." 63 Properly interpreted, 
self-realization cannot thrive on selfishness, for in the 
long run selfishness is destructive of the self. True self-
realization involves and requires the same for others; hence 
in the last analysis the Ramseian conflict between Christian 
ethics and the ethics of self-realization disappears. 
(b) Self-Love and the Love of Others 
Philosophically the problem reduces to this: Are we 
to construct our ethical system around an unargued theory of 
God and man, or are we to develop concepts of God and man in 
the light 
objective 
of the data of value experience which are open to 
64 investigation? It appears at this point that 
value experience cannot lie outside man, that all value is 
61. ET, 184. 
62. Ibid., 189. 
63. Ibid., 192. 
64. Bartocci, Grazer's Quarterly, January, 1952. 
not only person-centered but also thought-centered so that 
even though the occasion of valne may arise outside man, it, 
revealed or otherwise, must derive its meaning at least in 
part through personal evaluation. Consequently our concepts 
of God and man must be amenable to a cooperative system of 
moral values in which the known, or logically-implied, 
elements conform to the natural circumstances involved. 
Whether this system is God-centered, theological ethics, 
or man-centered, the ethics of self-realization, the known 
attributes of both must be properly accounted for. 
(1) Self-Love 
The second commandment given by Jesus 11 thou shalt 
love thy neighbour as thy self11 65 clearly indicates that 
man is to possess self-love, but the nature of that love 
is not defined by the Master. Professor Ramsey explains it 
"you naturally love yourself for your own sake. 1166 This 
suggests the infinite value of the self as noted in W. T. 
67 Stace's writing, The Destiny of Western Man. Professor 
Ramsey borders dangerously on self-realization when he 
further notes that "self-love makes you desire worth for 
68 yourself. 11 Is this worth in the mere existence of the 
65. St. Mark, 12: 30 (King James Version). 
66. BCE, 100. 
67. Page 133. 
68. BCE, 100. 
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self or does it also include the development of self? If 
one could love himself and not desire, and seek, the 
development of self it certainly would be a 11 poor love." 
For if love means anything, it yearns for the increase of 
worth 1n its object; and if it is intelligent in any sense, 
it would by necessity seek that improvement. 
Hence self-love and self-realization seem to be 
the obverse and reverse of the same coin of truth. How one 
could exist logically without the other is impossible to 
see. Self-love, rather than separating itself from the 
value experience, appears to be the mainspring for neighbor-
love evaluation. As Soren Kierkegaard has put it, 
Self-love is the underlying principle, or 
the principle that is made to lie under, in all 
love; whence if we conceive a religion of love, 
this religion need make but one assumption, as 
epigrammatic as true, and takes its realization 
for granted: namely the condition that man 
loves himself, in order ~6 command him to love 
his neighbor as himself. 
To get Christian love, Professor Ramsey inverts 
self-love. For Christian love is not tied to feelings, 
emotions, taste, preferences, temperaments, etc. 70 But does 
this not overlook the original premise that self-love is 
not mere feelings, emotions, or temperaments? Self-love 
is self-evaluation, a worth not arrived at by "liking 
69. PF, 30. 
70. BCE, 100. 
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yourself or thinking yourself very nice, 1171 but by a 
reflective comparison of values. For as Professor Ramsey 
states "regardless of differences in temperament or capacity 
for deep emotion, one person probably wishes his own good 
about as much as another person wishes for his. 1172 Self-love, 
therefore, is not a nice feeling ane may have about himself; 
it is a basic conception of value inherent in the self as 
such, which according to Stace "exceeds beyond measure all finite 
values within the scale. It is for him infinite."73 
{2) Neighbor-Love 
In accordance with what has been shown thus far, self-
love and self-realization are not incompatible opposites. 
They are rather vitally engaged, self-realization appearing 
as the extension of self-love. Now we must face the second 
important constraint in the function of love: How does the 
self fair in relating itself to the neighbor? Or, what is 
the fate of the ethics of self-realization when the neighbor 
is involved? The position to be taken will be that neighbor-
love does not negate self-realization but it rather enhances it. 
It seems clear to the writer that Christian ethics 
cannot disengage itself from the ethics of self-realization, 
as Ramsey claims it must. It also appears certain that 
71. BCE, 100. 
72. Ibid. 
73. DWM, 133. 
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self-realization cannot be left behind in man's love-quest 
for his neighbor, If it could be he would definitely be an 
inferior person W2en he reached his neighbor, a poor situation 
for both self and neighbor. The logical conclusion follows: 
if man realizes self in self-love, which has been already 
argued, then love offered to neighbor requires without doubt 
an extension of the process of self-realization in the 
attempt to help the neighbor, for neighbor-love is a form of 
increasing personal worth by its very nature, We may put it 
this way: if doing good to neighbor is a good in itself, the 
good done not only aids the neighbor but it certainly increases 
the worth of the agent doing the good, or else what meaning 
has good, Does not the doing of evil deprec ate the agent? 
Then the doing of good increases his value in a form of self-
development. Even though the good derived by the agent in 
the act is purely an unselfish acquirement, it is by all odds 
an unavoidable acldition to his worth. Inasmuch as living out 
the implications of neighbor-love inadvertently (apart from 
motive or intent) increases the worth of the individual so 
occupied, the immanent aspect of self-realization cannot be 
eliminated from the relationship. 
The general meaning of Professor Ramsey's thesis that 
man should forget himself in a neighbor-love ethical enterprise 
is well taken, for doubtlessly selfishness is society's greatest 
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enemy. But the philosophical process pursued in reaching his 
objective is wanting. 
For instance, as Professor Bertocci notes, 
If the neighbors must not be forgotten 
out of a concern for neighbor, then any person 
Who has real concern for his fellowmen will 
develop his own capacities and enrich his o~ 
life both for his own sak~4and for the sake of his obligation to others. 
In short, is not every man 
obligated to improve himself for the good of others? Whether 
the ideal of improvement is selfishly or unselfishly conceived, 
each man very clearly owes such development of self as a debt 
to others. Why make the inevitable, and good, evil? Professor 
Ramsey's objection to this idea would charge that to develop 
one's self for his own sake wo~ld oppose the basic obligation 
of Christian ethics by bringing self "in on the ground-floor" 
rather than derivatively, Professor Bertocci suggests. 75 
Perhaps it would improve the thought in Ramsey's case to propose 
that the neighbor be brought in, or derived, as an object of 
value in man's value experience. 
(3) Self-Love Plus Neighbor-Love 
Pressing for consideration is the question: How do we 
get to the neighbor in the complex of self-love and neighbor-
74. Crozer 1 s Quarterly, January, 1952. 
75. Ibid. 
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love, and how do these seemingly antithetical forces function 
together? 
The idea proposed by W. T. Stace has merit; it is 
emotionally and intellectually sound. For him, reason is the 
way-finder and love is the moving cause. He expresses it 
thus: "That reason is the highest element in us, and that 
it ought therefore to direct us in our private conduct and 
in all our human relations, personal and political, 11 76 and 
"that the psychological basis of every disinterestedly un-
selfish action is the principle of sympathy. 11 77 Stace 
combines reason and sympathy, or love, as two primacies of 
equal importance and complementary to each other, 
Stace reasons something like this: An enlightened 
understanding of my neighbor's need must dawn as a function 
of reason. This concept of ethics came into western thought 
from the Greeks, and especially from Plato.78 But reason is 
sight, not motivation. Reason indicates the goal, but it 
takes movement to achieve it. Consequently an urge to get 
action is needed. Functioning as primacies, reason denotes 
the worthy goal and love provides the impetus to attain it, 
For example, reason acting in its noble capacity ~uld 
designate the need of my neighbor, but the mere particularizing 
of a worthy purpose is not enough; there is needed, in addition, 
76, DWM, 88, 89. 
77. Ibid., 117, 
78. Ibid,, 89, 
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a compelling force to get action. Love supplies that urge. 
Thus reason says the neighbor has need, and love acting as 
its complement impels the agent to act. 
Now the point is that, according to the logical 
sequence of psychological selectivity, self-love (which gives 
the same value to the neighbor) and leads to the evaluation 
11 thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy self11 which is properly 
designated neighbor-love. Therefore, self-love in a 
rational context evokes neighbor-love. If self-love leaps 
to the neighbor's side, as Professor Ramsey states,79 it is 
not a leap in the dark, for it travels with both eyes open 
in vigorous reflective activity. All that Professor Ramsey 
theorizes regarding Christian love reaching the neighbor 
can be accomplished without the loss of the valuable 
personality principle, reason. Thus all the noble attributes 
of human personality are accounted for and rationally ordered. 
Self-love rationally conceived includes neighbor-love; hence 
it is not self-love or neighbor-love, but self-love plus 
neighbor-love. 
(c) The Inextricable Tangibles 
A tinal word needs to be said about other observations 
related to the Ramsey ethical concept of obedient love. It 
79. ECE, 101. 
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appea~s mo~e and mo~e as one follows his arguments that he 
is championing a kind of alt~uism. He is ca~eful to point 
out that Christian love "begins by loving 'the neighbo~,' 
not mankind or manhood.n80 But is this not merely particu-
la~izing the notion of "devotion to the good of others," 
which is the hea~t of alt~uism? If Christian love "means 
an entirely 1 neighbor-~ega~ding concern for others,' W1ich 
begins with the first man it sees," it still has a "unive~sal 
compass" even though "implicitly" so,81 Really it is a 
selfless love and devotion to society, and the "first man 
it sees" is only the convenient instant wh:l.c h actualizes it. 
Professor Ramsey assumes too much when he seems to 
hold that this alt~uism ought to be willed. Professor 
Be~tocci proposes that "we dis cove~ in the p~ocess of living 
itself that it is bette~ to t~eat other persons as ends in 
themselves and not as means only. 1182 Experience is the 
medium of justification for this hypothesis as the best way 
to protect human values, and if it were not t~ue then 
Ramsey's doctrine of "obedient love" "9.\:luld be "wo~ds without 
referent, 11 83 Since Professo~ Ramsey, as all others, is 
forced in the end to return to the person and to the meaning 
of his values to others, 11it would seem that the logical 
eo. BCE, 95. 
81. Ibid. 
82. C~oze~ 1 s Qua~terly, Janua~y, 1952. 
83, Ibid. 
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starting point for this ethics of obedient love resides in 
the person as the center of value realization, and not in 
the neighbor.tt84 
Thus the danger of cutting a person off from his 
values is overcome. Professor Bertocci summarizes the 
solution as follows: 
Finally, if we cannot f1 nd, in the 1 eng 
and varied experience of human beings with 
values, any suggestion of the ideals or true 
values by which their lives ought to be guided, 
then, whatever the values we find in the 
moments of religious experience, and whatever 
the values exemplified in the life of Christ, 
we would have good reason to doubt that the 
universe was conceived in and controlled by 
sacrificial love. It is rather because we 
find in the life of man, interacting wl. th his 
varied total environment, persistent inklings 
and trends of the supremacy of sacrificial 
concern for mutual welfare and enterprise in 
value, that our conviction grows--supported as 
it is by prophets in every land and by the 
unique place of Jesus in our Western tradition--
that we are blessed by living Love whose fellow-
ship with our ventures in fellowship is the 
supreme fact and value of existence.B5 
84. Crozer 1 s Quarterly, January, 1952. 
85. Ibid. 
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The last chapter of this dissertation brings to-
gether for comparison and evaluation the most prominent 
cognates in the ethical theories of Jacques Maritain, W. T. 
Stace, and Paul Ramsey. 
Even though deep, fUndamental cleavages separate 
some of their doctrinal positions, contrariwise there are 
instances of agreement. Their scorn for relativism is a 
point in case. Since the important points of agreement and 
difference are conspicious by emphasis in the main body of 
the dissertation, where their meaning and implications are 
extensively investigated, it remains now, it seems, only to 
arrange them in concise, clear form wherein their concord 
or conflict will be evident. Hence, in this chapter, the 
points of widest ethical concern will be put down in brief 
form as advocated by each thinker, and then an attempt will 
be made to evaluate them in the light of the philosophical 
quest. 
The positions on which the three thinkers under 
consideration will be compared are: Moral ideal, methodology, 
universality, relativism, and the nature of the good. Because 
one involves the other, universalism and relativism in ethics 
will be treated together. 
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A. Moral Ideal 
The moral ideals or Maritain, Stace, and Ramsey 
represent a rairly exhaustive compass or the field or 
ethics so rar as roundational views are concerned. In 
other words, the scope or moral idealism can be reduced 
to the three basic concepts treated in this dissertation, 
the writer believes. 
For instance, all ethical notions which are related 
to a subject rrom the standpoint or unreasoned assent to a 
code, law, or rule, revealed or stipulated by any authorlty, 
rall under'the general heading imposed ethics. The Roman 
Catholic church was chosen here as a type. There are, how-
ever, numerous sovereigns imposing moral views on adherents; 
Calvin at Geneva is but one instance. 
The second consideration, in which the ethical ideal 
is realized by the natural expression or the subject, a 
living out or the inherent moral goodness under the prudent 
examination or reason, is inscribed immanentism in ethics. 
This ideal includes a wide variety or ethical thinking, with 
the theory or W. T. Stace, an avowed immanentist, taken as 
representative. However, one might include also naturalism, 
religious liberalism, and personalism insorar as each holds 
that the moral fUnction or state inheres in a rational ex-
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pression of the individual provided an 11 ought11 situation 
obtains. The writer does not mean to infer that in his 
thinking naturalism and personalism or religious liberalism 
are equally tenable, for he believes that the personalistic 
conception of the universe Mth its implicit implications is 
vastly superior in most, if not all, points to the philosophy 
of naturalism. The grouping of these diverse philosophies 
is possible on the basis of one common denominator, that 
morality is somehow associated with the life process of the 
individual in a relationship with human reason. Any notion 
of morality in which the moral state or function is inseparably 
related to the immanent expression of the individual, a 
living out of the vital processes of life, consequently falls 
in the category of immanent ethics. 
A question may arise here, Do not the ideas of 
morality enjoined ~om without or expressed ~om within 
exhaust the known ethical sources? If imposed ethics embo:lies 
all morality related to the individual from without, and 
immanent ethics encompasses the dominion of morals re]a ted 
to the irxl.ividual 1 s immanent states, is there place for any 
other view? The writer believes that the~hical ideal of 
Paul Ramsey, which is related to the life of the individual 
"transformed" by the obedient love cf God, clearly represents 
a third view. Further, Prof6ssor Ramsey himself argues to 
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that point, for he rejects with equal vigor the ideas of 
impositionism in ethics, so often considered as the theological 
view, and immanentism in ethics, which he designates as the 
philosophical view. His principal thrusts are directed at 
impositionism as embodied in a code, and at immanentism 
as represented in idealism. The first exhalts authority 
above love, and the second lifts self above neighbor-love. 
The first is authority-centered, the second is self-centered. 
The writer has been careful to note, notwithstanding, 
that despite the Ramseian effort to avoid the complications 
of impositionism in his type of ~hies, there remains a 
strong theological strain throughout his thinking; and 
all dJubts seem to be removed when he indicates that his 
views are essentially those of the Reformation period, "an 
essay in Christocentric ethics of the Reformation." Herein 
the ethical ideal is not merely enjoined, nor is it so~ly 
the product of human nature, although there are representa-
tive factors of both moral views present. Rather the moral 
ideal is derived from a relationship between God and man 
wherein man, in reflecting the imago Dei through obedient 
love, undergoes a change which Professor Ramsey, in corres-
pondence with the writer, denoted "transformation." As the 
magnificent art imparts its grace and elegance to the room, 
so God imparts His love and righteousness to man who reflects 
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it mirror-fashion in selfless obedient love to his neighbor, 
called by Ramsey neighbor-love. This singular determination 
of the moral ideal, for that reason, has been entitled 
Imparted Ethics in the present writing. 
Here some would find difficulty in ascertaining the 
real difference between "infuse," which occurs under imposed 
ethics, and "impart." Some might ask: Does not impartation 
mean a process whereby man gets strength to live according to 
an ideal which is imposed? Or, would not the Roman Catholic 
get strength through the sacraments? The second question must 
be answered first, and in the affirmative.l The grace which 
"infuses faith, hope, and charity into a Christian's character 
may go further, according to Aquinas, and infuse moral 
virtues as we11. 11 2 According to the Catholic view there 
is an infusion of character by God's grace through the 
seven sacraments, l:ut the connotation of infusion differs 
in kind from impartation, as used by Ramsey. 
In consideration of the first question, does not 
impartation mean a process whereby man gets strength to live 
according to an ideal which is imposed? we must ask a further 
question: Is infusion in the Catholic sense equivalent to 
impartation as used by Ramsey? Here the answer is in the 
1. Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 63, art. 3; Q. 65, arts. 2 and 3. 
2. Ramsey, BCE, 213. 
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negative. Infusion implies that "grace as a substance is 
actually infused into human character,3 This denotes the 
transmission of some kind of substance. We do not ask 
whether the Catholic view is true, but whether it is 
different from the Ramseian view. Professor Ramsey describes 
the Catholic conception as an instance of perfecting human 
character miraculously, 4 whereas in his own view 11 the 
Gospel ethic is the mirror of the Word in which all men, 
viewing themselves, are brought down to nothing in their 
own eyes."5 Hence impartation varies from infUsion in 
that impartation involves no supernatural transmission of 
divine grace as substantial stuff, but it is a process in 
which man reflects cr images God 1 s love and goodness. In 
Catholic ethics we find transmission by infusion, but in 
Ramsey it is transformation by impartation. Sponge-li~ 
man absorbs substance in infused ethics, but mirror-like 
he reflects God's image in imparted ethics. 
To return to the question, Does the Roman Catholic 
get strength through the sacraments? Theoretically, yes, 
provided the process of infusion, or substance transmission, 
obtains. If, however, there is no actual transmission of 
divine substance, then the only possible ~ernative is a 
3, Ramsey, BCE, 216. 
4, Ibid, , 213, 
5, Ibid., 216, 
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psychological reaction in the human subject by which he 
derives strength from the sacraments, in which case, as 
Professor Ramsey observes, the term should not be infuse 
but Hevoke" or "elicit," since it suggests "an operation 
in us of our own love or devotion to something other than 
our own character calling for habits of strength in us."6 
According to Professor Ramsey, Aquinas attempted a synthesis 
of Aristotle's acquired virtues and Augustine's elicited 
virtues, 11 but in such fashion as to break the backs of both, 
attributing virtue to its source in intentional acquirement 
for only part of tm way and then turning to. infusion, or 
what we now may call 'unintended elicitation, 1 fort he rest. 11 7 
Thus, used loosely one might say that "impartation" 
is the process whereby man gets strength to live according 
to an ideal which is imposed, but if we adhere strictly to 
the meanings latent in the terms 11 impartation11 as used by 
Ramsey and infusion as used by Aquinas, we discover that 
there is a ratmr wide divergence between the connotations of 
11 impart11 and the nearest appro.x:l.mate Catholic term, "infuse," 
for one absorbs a substance whereas the other mirrors, or 
reflects, an image. 
Let us proceed now to the explanation and evaluation 
of these three historical moral foundations. 
6. Ramsey, BCE, 215. 
7. Ibid., 216. 
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1. Imposed Ethics: Maritain 
This moral ideal conceives of morality as enjoined 
upon the adherent by a revealed fiat of God or by any 
authoritative command of man, either verbal or written. 
It is a concept of morals related vitally to the Roman 
Catholic church, and is imposed on man as a member of the 
church which is an absolute, holding complete sway over 
the temporal, spiritual, and ecclesiastical interests and 
welfare of the individual. 
Evaluation: The unquestioned, unargued acceptance 
of authority, on which imposed et~ics rests, results first 
in negativity of morals, telling the adherent what he ought 
not to do, rather than what to do. Secondly, imposed ethics 
retards progress of social morality. New situations arise 
which require modification and enlargement of the code. 
Transient values, especially, need to be rethought and re-
interpreted. A case in point is slavery. Thirdly, this 
viewpoint is destructive of the moral perspective because it 
considers acts wrong if they violate the moral code, regardless 
of whether or not they relate to life's fUndamentals. Minor 
details, which might be non-essential to the moral perspective, 
if placed on the same level with recognized universal acts of 
immorality and condemned by the same authority, tend to 
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discredit the authority by casting doubt on his wisdom and 
insight. On the contrary, this form of ethics offers easy 
access to security for those Who shun mental rigor and vigor. 
2. Immanent Ethics: Stace 
Immanent ethics is conceived as the expression of 
man's conscious experience, lived out in his total behavior, 
whether the moral condition be human or divine. Morality 
arises out of the interrelation of the internal factors of 
man's peculiar personality, his reason, his appetite, and his 
spirit, the rational fUnction of which is the essence of 
morality. 
Evaluation: Unlike imposed ethics, this conception 
of morality maintains a relevance to human experience. The 
pattern here is cut to fit human potentialities which makes 
man responsible for the allegiance to the ideal. The best in 
human experience gives light on the wue meaning or nature of 
the good, and finding good in human experience, man has a clue 
to the Goodness of the universe; otherwise how could he ever 
know that God is good?. The best in human nature is stimulated 
into action, rather than subjugated under imposed code. The 
strength of human personality, reason, is set free. As 
Professor Stace argues, the superiority of immanent morality 
is "that it makes provision for our feeling of the goodness 
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of goodness. For the self-expression of an organic being 
is an end in itself for that being ••• Therein it achieves 
itself. 118 He notes further that it is because the supreme 
good of each life lies in its self-expression that poets, 
painters, and musicians are willing to starve in garrets 
rather than deny their art. Modern psychology has discovered 
that guided expression brings out the best in human personality; 
that ethics by force, imposition, tends to retard or dull 
human aspirations. Only as morals, or anything related to 
man's life, have meaning in human experience can effective, 
universal norms be worked out. Rational relevance, therefore, 
is the only universally-applicable standard, an objectivity 
arrived at through man's own empirical validation. 
3. Imparted Ethics: Ramsey 
Imparted Ethics, which is a transformist conception 
of morals occasioned by obedient love, is based on the imago 
Dei conditioning of man's spiritual selfhood, i.e., man's 
position before God reflecting mirror-like His image relevant 
in the obedient love of Christ. This ideal means instantaneous, 
total obedience to the demands of God's reign, which is the 
same as perfect love for man.9 
B. DWM, 32. 
9. BCE, 34. 
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Evaluation: The first complication to face in this 
ideal is its apparent relationship to impositionism. Professor 
Ramsey begins with a non-argued premise concerning God's 
righteousness from which he derives his line oT t~ought. The 
principal distinction between impositionism and impartation 
is seen in a variant regarding source. Imposition in ethics 
rests on a revealed code or a human edict; whereas impartation 
is related to life, the response of man to God's love. If 
Ramsey's conception of ethics were called impositionism, the 
term would fail to cover all Ramsey means. Even though total 
obedience to God's reign is involved in Ramsey's theory as a 
basic principle, there is a bi-lateral principle also 
involved, which is the freedom of human personality. Obedient 
love does not destroy the autonomy of the individual. 
The weakness in Professor Ramsey's theory lies in 
the fact that he begins his line of thought ~than unargued 
premise concerning God's righteousness, from which he derives 
the pattern of his argument. The force of opposition is not 
directed against the notion of impartation as such so much 
as it is against the relative deduction and lack of inductive 
analysis which support his thought. His whole thesis, which 
rests on a theological conception of God, man, and morals, 
is too unrelated to either God, man, or morals. His theo-
logical notion about God is not empirically grounded; his 
further idea of the nature of man is based primarily on the 
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views of such outstanding thinkers as Augustine, Aquinas, 
Rierkegaard, and Luther; and his moral ideal is severed from 
the actual experience of man, the vital actor, Hence, 
empirical and rational continuity breaks down at importHnt 
connections, such as the relation of Christian ethics to 
self-realization. 
B. Methodology 
The methodological procedures of Maritain, Stace, and 
Ramsey differ as to fundamental ori entaticn as we 11 as system. 
All profess considerable respect for man's rational power, 
but the place and extent of the use of reason vary widely. 
With Maritain and Ramsey reason is an accessory, whereas 
with Stace reason is primary. 
l. Maritain and Ramsey 
The methods of Mari tai n and Ramsey are sufficiently alike 
to be treated together. In the background of Maritain 1 s 
thinking is the reliability of the church, specifically the 
Roman Catholic church. It provides ample authority and 
support for moral theorizing. Ramsey relies on the Bible, or 
more accurately his interpretation of it, as a valid source of 
ethical revelation. Both seek to support an accepted authority 
by a system of reasoning. It is authority first and reason 
second. 
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Evaluation: To put authority first violates the 
rules of logical procedure. The vital weakness of Aristotelian 
logic has been revealed in its original premise which lacks the 
validation by experience, or induction. Failure to establish 
the original premise empirically may lead to a false, though 
logically-derived, conclusion. The unquestioned consistency 
of the syllogism does not give the whole truth, if it gives 
the truth at all. The thinker who does not tarry to validate 
his original premise commits himself to a strange fate: 
since he is cut off from experience in the beginning, his 
logical process may lead to an utterly false conclusion. He 
can never be sure that his results are correct. 
The device of the syllogism will assure logical 
consistency, but this is only part of the function of reason, 
for it is necessary to move f:rom the conception of reason as 
logical consistency between ideas or concepts 11into an area 
of reason as connectivity between ideas and between ideas 
and experience. 1110 Professor Eertocci says further that "we 
must ••• seek consistency between our ideas and the variety of 
experience and actions which make up the stuff of life. 1111 If 
this method is followed, the preconceived notions about 
authority and source may be radically modified, fbr the life 
of reason, in the fuller sense, 11 is now the constant inter-
10. Eertocci, IPR, 57. 
11. Loc. cit. 
relating of ideas, experiences, and events.n12 
Professor Maritain ani Ramsey seem definitely to 
violate both rules of' logic: Inductive validation of the 
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original premise ani the process of "growing, empirical 
13 
coherence," or the constant relating of' theory to f'acts and 
events of experience. Maritain ani Ramsey, no doubt, would 
reply that the religious experience is at the heart of' their 
syllogism, ani that such an experience is a f'act--the f'act 
which f'orms the heart of' a f'Ull-bodied ethics. This they can 
hold, ani they msy be right, but, so far as we know, no 
scientif'ic validation of ruch an experience has yet been 
achieved. The interpretation of the religious experience f'or 
Jdaritain and Ramsey is based on some authority, which violated 
the rules of' logical procedure, for to be inductively 
acceptable experience must be objectively explored over a f'ield 
extensive enough to be theoretically valid. In the Roman 
Catholic church, especially, the argument moves in a circle f'or 
it says "the experience is true because we say (by our own 
authority) that it is true." 
2. Stace 1 s Method 
Stace begins his ethical pursuit with a def'inition of' the 
good life. 14 If' he is given his def'inition his case is secure, 
12. Op. cit. , 58. 
13. Bertocci, IPR, 74 ff'. 
14. DWM, 5. 
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ror he attempts to support his statements with ~~e racts or 
experience, logically ordered. His original premise, that 
the good lire is the lire men find healthy, happy, and 
satisractory, although in the rorm or a derinition is not 
unsupported, however, ror it is the life that men find 
satisractory. In other words, it is the life which most men 
by experience discover to be good. Hence, the writer does 
not agree with Proressor Frankena, at the University or 
Michigan, that the fate or Stace 1 s argument rests alone on 
15 his derinition. Life round unsatisractory cannot meet 
Stace's definition or the good life. Satisraction is not 
deduced, it is experienced. This involves, although not as 
clearly enunciated in Stace as it should be, the function or 
logic in both areas of thought--the syllogistic and the 
11 growing, empirical coherence" in which the sturr of life is 
tested. 
Evaluation: The principal criticism which can be 
leveled against Stace at this point is his railure to show 
that because a certain kind of lire is 11heal thy, happy, and 
satisfactory11 for one individual, it will be the same for 
all men. Proressor Frankena's sharpest criticism of Stace 
charged that if he succeeded at all he succeeded only in 
showing what the moral ideal is for the individual, the 
15. Class notes, course Proseminar in Ethics, 1943. 
greatest happiness for the individual and not the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number. 
The empirical grounding of man's satisfaction ties 
the ideal firmly at one end to reason and experience, but 
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the further need to show that what is satisfactory for one will 
be the same for all men is not conclusively argued in Stace. 
Stace does not mean that all people do universally agree, but 
only that they ought to recognize and follow the ideal which 
takes root in their nature. Despite the granting of his 
basic premise that there is a common human nature, and a common 
psychological structure, it still does not follow that all men 
will be satisfied with the same kind of life. It may oe 
universally true that all men ought to be satisfied with a 
certain kind of life, which he holds, but experience teaches 
us that they are not. Professor Stace recognizes this 
difficulty and deals with it at the end of his work, 11The 
Destiny of Western Man,l6 where it appears, as Professor 
Frankena believes, that he all but 11 gives up the ship." He 
concludes, 
Perhaps it cannot be proved that each 
individual man, taken as a separate unit, must 
necessarily feel his life satisfactory and happy 
if he lives according to the Christian ideal. 
Perhaps it cannot be shown, as Plato tried to 
show, that each individual good man must 
necessarily be a happy man ••• To put the question 
in this way, as Plato did, implies a too atom-
16. The chapter "Nietzsche or Christ," but especially page 310. 
istic conception of man and of society. The 
question should be asked, not about the 
individual man, but about the social group. 
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Then he resorts to his definition of morality, which, without 
methodological validation, he says should prove universally 
applicable. He continues, 
I do not see how it can 
be doubted that a society of men should as a 
whole be happier if all its members applied to 
their lives the rules of Christian morality; 
or that the society of nations would be happier 
if all the nations applied these rules to their 
conduct towards one another instead of' the 
laws of' the jungle. And if so, the Christian 
morality must be held able to meet the final 
teat, which is Whether ita principles are 
really those which, if followed, would lead 
to the best, most h~~py, healthy, and satis-
factory human life. 
Perhaps honestly we should admit that the univer-
salizing of any moral standards has not been attained as yet, 
and that thus far "logical proofs" and "empirical validation" 
are still in the ideal, or hypothetical, form. It must be 
further admitted that to date the medium by which any moral 
ideal can be universalized is not clearly in sight. Even 
though these admissions reduce the coherent value of any 
system so far as finality is concerned, it is only fair to 
admit also that provided such an ideal will ever be fulfilled, 
it will be reason and experience which ultimately will make 
it possible. Because of his greater reliance on those two 
17. DWM, 310. 
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factors, reason and experience, Stace, although his case is 
not conclusive, established a firmer foundation for his 
ethical ideal, immanent morality. 
C. Universality-Relativism 
The methodologies employed by Maritain, Stace, and 
Ramsey involve their concepts of universality and relativity 
in moral theory. Whereas none uses a stria tly inductive or 
deductive approach, the elements of experience and reason 
figure more prominently in the system argued by Stace, as we 
have seen in the preceding section. Here, then, it will be 
necessary only to show to what extent they believed in 
universalism and relativism in ethics, and it will not be 
necessary to try to illustrate what success their methods 
achieved, since this was discussed under "methodology. 11 
1. Mari tai n and Ramsey 
Again Maritain and Ramsey's doctrines bear sufficient 
resemblance to be treated together. For them, universality 
in morals is possible, but only through the media prescribed: 
The church for Maritain and obedient love as eschatologically 
related for Ramsey. Maritain argues that the individual 
realizes moral value through the administration of the church, 
which, as the City of God on earth, is the sole medium and 
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authority in matters concerning morals. His philosophy is a 
justification of the position of St. Thomas Aquinas and not 
an attempt to discover basic ethical standards in human 
experience. Ramsey likewise begins with an accepted, but not 
empirically-validated, premise that the Bible as interpreted 
in the ethics of the Reformation is the one source of moral 
insight. Ramsey would say that philosophical ethics could 
never get the motivation for neighbor-love. Here, no doubt, 
is the crux between philosophical and theological ethics. 
Both of these men reject relativism in ethics because it 
renders objective standards in morals impossible. 
Evaluation: Maritain and Ramsey encounter the same 
obstacle in the attempt to place their et~ical ideal on a 
universal basis: the enigma of authority. Authority, as has 
been noted, for Maritain is vested in the dogma of the church, 
whereas P~msey invests authority in his interpretation of the 
Bible. This severance of the source of authority from human 
logic and experience allows the arrangement to fall in the 
area of reJa tive deduction, making impossible its extension 
to the universal degree. Maritain and Ramsey would hold that 
religious ethical experience is experience,and more empirical 
than 11 purely 11 ethical experience. They would insist, further, 
that religious ethics gives more power for altruism. Neither 
attempts to provide valid ground for his major premise beyond 
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the assumption embodied in the source alluded to. The church 
has said, or the Bible affirms is the beginning of the quest, 
Thus the process is limited to the bounds arbitrarily set 
by the sources specified, and the change for universal 
application is bound to the rate of these ventures. The main 
criticism which obtains here is the fallacy of deductive 
relativity, for the conclusion depends wholly on the validity 
of the first assumption, which itself is deduced from some 
other unargued premise and is therefore reJa tive. Unless the 
media adopted to carry the ideal are universally valid, the 
venture will come short of its announced goal. Clearly 
Marital. nand Ramsey's sources are restricted areas identified 
only by deduction based on an indubitable revelation. Until 
the media are universally 1dent1i1ed, the moral ideals cannot 
apply to all men, 
2, Stace 1 s Universal Concept 
Stace rests his argument for universal morality on the 
common human nature, and its proximate state, the common 
psychological structure. Since all men possess a common psy-
chology, there must be positive standards of the good life on 
which all ought to agree. These standards must be broad 
enough to encompass individual peculiar! ties arrl differences, 
principles which all men find to be basic in a satisfactory 
life, All men possess reason and sympathy; hence these 
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become the media by which morality is universalized. It is 
commonly called Christian morality, but actually it is a 
wedding of Greek reason and Christian sympathy; reason acting 
as a way-finder with sympathy providing the motivation. 
Although the difficulties of such a proposal are evident, even 
to Stace, he believes that if morality is ever placed on a 
completely objective basis, it will be accomplished through 
the media of reason and sympathy because they are the only 
universal principles available to all men. Stace rejects 
relativism in morals with the same deep scorn evidenced by 
Maritain and Ramsey, and for the same reason--that it is 
destructive of objective moral standards, a seed-bed of 
anarchy. 
Eval\Jation: Whether or not Stace makes a strong 
case for the concept of the common human nature, it seems to 
this writer that he at least begins where any rational system 
of ethics must start--in the human mind. Inasmuch as his 
basic assumption, that there is a common human nature and a 
common psychological structure, moves in a direction of man 
and his universe, his philosophical fortune seems more 
promising. His assumption regarding the common human nature 
runs afoul of no known impediment in recent or present history. 
To that extent his idea is valid from the standpoints of ex-
perience and reason. It remains, however, to show that even 
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though there is a common human nature, and possibly a common 
psychological structure, that basic principles of the good 
life will be the same for all men. The superior! ty of 
Stace 1 s notion over those of Maritain and Ramsey to this 
point is seen in a greater dependence on experience in 
reaching the original assumption on which their ideals are 
based. The superiority of Stace 1 s viewpoint from the universal 
angle is seen in his willingness to subject his ideal to the 
rigors of experience. He exceeds the prescribed boundaries 
of any institution in his quest, pressing the issue to the 
most remote point in an effort to test the validity of his 
assumption. 
Professor Stace 1 s refUtation of relativism lies in 
his ability to establish the idea of a common human nature, 
which he does by showing that, as Plato held, there is a common 
basic human constitution composed of reason, appetite, and 
life. 11 If morality is based upon such a common structure, it 
would, of course, be universal. There would be one common 
human morality. 1118 He admits, however, that the refUtation 
of relativism and skepticism depends "wholly upon the 
humanistic definition of morality as that set of principles 
Which will ensure a satisfactory human life. 1119 
18. DWM, 43. 
19. Ibid., 50. 
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D. Nature or Goodness 
The conception or the good undergoes diverse treatment 
in the thought or Maritain, Stace, and Ramsey. 
1. Maritain 1 s Common Good 
Maritain holds that there is no individual good or 
aggregate goods, but the "common good," which is the human 
good lire or the multitude, or a multitude or persons, the 
good lire or totalities at once carnal and spiritual, and 
principally spiritual. The common good or society is their 
communion in the good lire. The common good involves as 
its chier value the highest possible attainment (that is, 
the highest compatible with the good or the whole) of persons 
to their lives as persons. This is the rirst characteristic 
of the common good, but there is a second, which requires 
that certain individuals be charged with guidance and those 
who rollow must obey. This is the common good on which 
Maritain bases authority. Authority thus applies to those 
Maritain calls rree men, in contrast to the power held over 
human beings for the particular good of the master himself. 
This primacy of the common good derives from 
Aristotle's notion that the good of the whole is "more divine" 
than the good of the parts. The common good is the human 
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common good, and it includes within its essence the service 
of the human person. The adage of the superiority of the 
common good is understood in its true sense only in the measure 
that the common good itself implies a reference to the human 
person. 
The relation of the common good to God is set forth 
in The Person and the Common Good where Maritain explains it 
as follows: 
On the one ha~d, the proper good of the 
person as a person is achieved in the union of 
grace and charity with God, with the Uncreated 
Good, which is the Common Good of the Church--
a transcendent common good which no longer is a 
practical good to be realized, but the sub-
sisting good to w~ich to adhere--above all human 
good in all communications of created goods found 
in the Church. (75) 
On the other hand, the proper 
good of the person, as an individual, that is, as a part of 
the created whole of which the head is the Incarnate <iord, 
is inferior not only to the divine common Good of this whole, 
but also to the collection of human goods and of the commun-
ications of created goods which derive in this v1hole from its 
union of grace with the uncreated Good. Each part participates 
in the cownon good, which is the very life of God that is 
communicated to it. It should be noted that a degree of 
immanentism found in Roman Catholicism is alluded to here by 
Maritain. It should be understood, however, that the aspect 
of immanentism implied rests on a more basic premise, the 
authority of the church. 
2. Stace and the Good Life 
~ good, Stace means the good life, or the life man 
himself finds to be good, healthy, satisfactory, and happy. 
This definition of the good constitutes Stace 1 s notion of 
morality. Good in this sense is not disconnected from the 
common lives of common men. It embodies all rules and 
discipline which insure the good for man, a good which 
connotes health, satisfaction, and happiness. Good is a 
product of human nature itself, for it "arises out of the 
interrelation of the internal factors of man's peculiar 
personality, his reason, his appetite, and his spirit." 
Health appears as a good for Stace, but is related 
to the personality rather than the body, as in Plato Where 
health of the soul is moral and disease is immoral, The 
good includes satisfaction, for the 11 body cannot be kept 
out of this affair." Stace disavows that it is ridiculous 
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to bring under one rubric the precepts of the moralist and 
those of the physician. He insists that they must be brought 
under one rubric if we are really to understand what 
morality in its essense is. Good must, therefore, include 
satisfaction of human wants and desires. Happiness for 
299 
Stace is not equated with pleasure, although it does involve 
the opposites of pleasure and pain. Happiness is bro~ght in 
because morality is satisfaction of life, and no man can feel 
his life to be thoroughly satisfactory if he is unhappy--
whatever the term happy may mean. 
Stace does not require metaphysical support for his 
conception of good. Good is not an ontological essence or 
value communicated to man; it is experienced in the natural 
processes of life. All animals, including man, have 
principles of the good life,and by principle Stace means a 
rule which, if followed, tends to lead to a satisfactory 
li f'e, while the breach of' it will tend to lead to an unsa tis-
factory life. !&in ought to do that which gives satisfaction. 
All moral principles are statements that we ought or ought 
not to act in certain ways. 
Finally, the good reduces to the good for the 
individual, the life that man himself finds to be healthy, 
happy, and satisfactory. Relativism is overcome, however, 
by the common human nature, for if man finds certain principles 
of morality productive of the satisfactory life, men will 
experience the same universally. 
3. Ramsey's Whose Good? 
What is the good is changed into Whose Good by Ramsey. 
"Whose good?" is the main, perhaps the only, concern of 
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Christian ethics, which consequently finds itself in 
opposition to philosophical ethics only when the latter 
pretends to answer this question in terms of selfish enlight-
enment or by general, value-centered appeals to the acquisitive 
aspirations of some'poor love. 11 Thereby his notion of' good 
rests on a horizontal plane, directed to the neighbor. Ramsey 
merely quotes St. Augustine in placing God as the highest good. 
He does not give unqualified consent to the idea. The problem 
of God's goodness is not argued by Ramsey, it is granted or 
assumed. The human being's glimpse of the Good is seen in the 
obedient love of Jesus Christ. This introduces man to the Good, 
but it is not a mystical relationship; it is revealed in the 
human sphere in the form of Whose Good? and moves on the 
horizontal line to the neighbor. 
Professor Ramsey specifies that Christian ethics is not 
an ethics of 11 the good; 11 it is deontological and naturally 
desired. Good inheres in a self-forgetting concern for the 
neighbor, a sort of by-product, for to be concerned about one's 
own good brings in the evil of self-centered values. When 
Christian love 11 by a leap has set the agent fully on the side of 
the neighbor, when 'righteousness' has been accomplished, then, 
and only then does Christian love need to become enlightened as 
possible about What is truly good--for the neighbor." 
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E. Conclusion 
Herewith the study of Three Histcr ical Foundations of 
Ethics ends. In the light of the preceding investigation, 
analysis, and discussion the following estimates and 
assessments seem warranted: 
1. Crucial Issues 
The crucial issues of this dissertation involve the 
comparative value of philosophical and theological ethics, 
and the signi ficanoe of human nature 1n the mora 1 quest. 
Hence, two questions must be answered: (1) Is philooophical 
ethics superior to theological ethics, and (2) Can the moral 
life be grounded in human nature alone, or is moral consciousness 
also dependent upon some specific religious experience or belief? 
(1) In consideration of the first issue, Stace would 
ground morality in man alone, with Maritain and Ramsey committed 
to theological ethics. The strength of religious ethics is 
recognized by these three theorists. Stace found it necessary 
to graft in Christian sympathy,1 for he realizes the importance 
to man of what the Christian calls love, but he rejects its 
rootedness in God and Christ. He rejects the metaphysics 
and theology in which the Christian founds love. Even though 
he holds that reason is the way-finder and that sympathy is 
1. DWM, 104-120. 
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needed for motivation, he does not mean at all that he regards 
Christian ethics, better denoted religious ethics for him, in 
any sense superior to philosophical ethics. ~is use of 
sympathy reveals a willingness on his part to endorse a 
discernible value wherever found. However, his endorsement 
of love does not imply that he gives to it the traditional 
Christian connotation. He does not ground the primacy of 
sympathy in a supernatural source, even though in Time and 
Eternity and Religion and the Modern Mind he endeavors 11 to 
add to naturalism the other half of the truth which I now 
think naturalism misses,n2 He makes it clear that he has not 
retracted his idea of naturalism "by a jot or a tittle,n3 
Naturalism and religion represent the two sides or one truth. 
Sympathy is a constitutional factor of human nature itself 
and is very likely grounded in a false theory or explanation 
of the theological doctrine of the fatherhood of God and the 
4 brotherhood of man. Sympathy, with its roots in human 
nature, is the "flowing or passage of emotions from one 
5 person to another," as in mass psychology. Thus, Stace's 
treatment is a concession to the non-rational notion of the 
Christian tradition, though not consent to the metaphysics 
and theology of Christianity. His humanism is not based on 
2. TE, Preface, vi. 
3, Ibid. 
4, DWM, 107, 108. 
5. Ibid., 109, 
sympathy alone; other universal needs are involved, i.e., 
reason. 
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Ramsey rejects humanistic person-centered ethics in 
favor of theological ethics because he believes that Christ-
centered ethics can, and does, get the strongest and surest 
motivation. Maritain supports the idea of the superiority 
of religious ethics, for revealed ethics serves as counterpart 
for the rational phase of his theory, which is a natural law 
ethics. For Maritain and Ramsey theological ethics is basic, 
and for Stace the element of love (sympathy), derived from 
an analysis of man's nature, and supported by its development 
in the Christian concept of love, is brought in to complete 
the thesis of primacy. 
The writer believes that the ideas of reason and love 
combine to give a well-balanced ethical theory and outlook, that 
regardless of how one explains the religio~s implications in 
ethics, the rational best and the religious best (love) are 
necessary complements of a single moral venture and system. 
In that, Stace 1 s treatment in Time and Eternity moves in the 
right direction. 
The second issue, can the moral life be rooted in human 
nature, or is moral consciousness dependent upon some specific 
religious experience or belief, is an attempt to explain the 
religious implications of the moral quest. A. Campbell Garnett 
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treats 
recent 
the problem at length in three books published in 
6 years. He defends the thesis that we can move from 
morality to religion, logically, for 11 our analysis of the 
moral nature of man has shown clearly that the moral conscious-
ness is not necessarily dependent upon any specific religious 
belief. 117 
There can be little question but that Professor Garnett's 
argument is sound. He has pursued his course with erudition 
and logical skill. This writer accepts the thesis laid down. 
The question raised will not, therefore, be directed against 
the thesis that a system of ethics can be built up apart from 
religion, or even apart from God, for the conclusion is 
obvious--it can be, The real issue here is which is better, 
a morality based on religion or one independent of it? 
In the qualification of the Garnett view, also held 
by W. R. Sorley and others, that the movement is from morality 
to religion, should we not ask: Where does this leave the 
moral initiative in the quest, with God or man? If God is 
regarded as the Supreme Being, concerned with the moralization 
of the world owing to His goodness, would not the logical order 
from the standpoint of metaphysics require that God should be 
the initiator and that man would co-operate in the drama of 
6. A Realistic Philosophy of Religion. New York: Harper & 
Brothers , 1942; and The Moral Nature of Man ( 1952) ani 
Religion and the Moral Life (1955). New York: The 
Ronald Press Company. 
7. MNM, 241. 
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morals? The movement from morality to religion seems to 
reverse this order in being, though not in validity, placing 
the obligation of initiation on man, with God as an accessory, 
serving in the subordinate role. Even though it is possible 
to argue logically that there can be a morality apart from 
religion, and as Vorufartmann held a morality apart frcm God, 
yet if the concept God is included in a system of ethics it 
seems to follow necessarily that He would be the supreme 
referent, t~e Cause of all things, including morality, as 
Creator of man, but not as validifier of the moral standard. 
In any event, man's freedom permits him to deny God. 
It is not difficult to suppose that a good God, who 
is the true Cosmic Ethicist, if He is to achieve any impressive 
degree of teleological success, needs to work through the 
minds of men in some manner. So whether through revelation, 
reason, or both as medium, He "reaches out through the minds 
of men" to the ultimate fulfillment of His purpose in the 
moral venture. 
It should be noted that our definition of religion will 
have some bearing on this entire process. To the writer, any 
co-operative relationship between God and man is religion. If, 
however, we mean by religion an organized ecclesiasticism, or 
the sum of traditional religious mores, the point would of 
course be different. Religion that is the mere sum total of 
traditional notions certainly can be replaced by a non-
religious ethics. The writer, however, believes that the 
meaning of religion is not exhausted in the modern or 
historical structure of Churchanity, but that it has a 
richer, fuller meaning in a "movement of God to His pre-
scribed goal," or the fulfilling of the teleological urge 
in existence. 
As Professor Garnett rightly states, the trappings 
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of religion have obscured, rather than illuminated, the true 
purpose and process of God. But is this false representation 
religion, properly so-called? The writer believes not. 
Religion is God and man in action, and with this definition 
in mind, we must move from religion to morality. Clearly, 
the religion vulnerable to Professor Garnett's attack is the 
religion identified with theological doctrines and historic 
practices of the past and present as they are related to 
group action. From this definition his conclusion follows 
logically, but it is not the fundamental approach to the problem. 
{2) Secondly, the question of motivation can be raised. 
Can it be shown that person-centered ethics ought to get 
sufficient motivation? As Professor Garnett observes "man 1 s 
religious need is not that of a God to serve him, rut of a 
God to serve. 118 He notes further that the claim to divine 
8. RML, 91. 
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authority is of crucial importance, 11 i t is religion 1 s greatest 
contribution to the moral life," for 11 it lifts the fundamental 
sense of obligation of man to man, the conviction of the 
fundamentally equal rights of every person, from the plane 
of mere postulate to be accepted or rejected at will, or 
a conviction produced by social conditioning, to that of a 
cosmic moral law, a demand of the eternal, 119 Professor Garnett 
does not question, but rather affirms, the need of religion to 
insure the success of the moral venture, because it provides 
motivation, gives power and strength to get action, and 
ultimately more logical validity. 
At this point, do we face the psychological question 
what gives power to the moral will as related to the further 
question what gives light (or a standard) to it? Professor 
Stace put forth reason as the way-finder, the light, with 
sympathy as a power to get motivation. Reason and sympathy, 
no doubt, can stand in some such relationship, From a stand-
point of logical validity it matters not which precedes, but 
from the viewpoint of power for motivation, the religious 
aspect of sympathy cannot be left out. 
The question may be asked, is the moral standard based, 
to a large extent at least, on man's nature, and if so, does 
this invalidate the standard logically, or weaken it 
9, MNM, 251, 
308 
psychologically? Unless man is to be cut off from his moral 
base, the standard of morality must to some extent be related 
to his nature. The exact extent of the dependence of the 
standard of morality on the nature of man is indefinite. 
He is not completely sufficient in himself. If God is given 
a place in the moral quest, He is logically related to the 
standards of morality. But conversely, since man is the 
subject, all moral processing must involve his essential 
nature. Does this invalidate the standard? Quite to the 
contrary, it gives it clear logical consistency. Does this 
weaken the standard psychologically? Again, the answer is 
negative, for in man is found the psychological ground for 
moral insight and evaluation. 
A final question is apropos: Is moral standard, valid 
without religion, the best evidence for judging the goodness 
of God? We answer that the goodness of God is not possibla 
without moral insight. A valid moral standard, wi t 11ou t 
religion, does not by itself indicate logically the goodness 
of God. If it is valid without religion, it can dispense 
with even the notion of God. But will it get motivation? 
Stace and Garnett think that it will not. Again, is a moral 
standard, validwithout religion, the best evidence for God, 
and if so, does it get more metaphysical support from God's 
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existence, and hence more psychological support? The answer 
is in the affirmative, A valid moral standard cannot logically 
stand alone; its relation tothe rest of man's experience 
reveals the need of God, and, consequently, it gets more 
metaphysical support from the idea of God's existence, as 
Garnett holds. Clearly, it would then give greater psych-
ological support to the moral venture, let alone to man the 
worshipper, 
2. Estimates and Assessments. 
1) The three ideals herein classified (imposed, i~~nent, 
and imparted ethics) represent a reduction of the moral 
standards and theories to their fUndamental foci. 
2) The ideas proposed by Maritain, Stace,and Ramsey 
are not original with them: Maritain 1 s ideal being the 
historical view of the Roman Catholic church, Stace 1 s ideal 
rooting in Greek philosophy and the Christian tradition, and 
Ramsey's ideal being derived in a large part from the 
fundamental principles of St. Augustine, Luther, and 
Kierkegaard. 
3) None of the three thinkers is as true to the science 
of ethics as that discipline presupposed. Stace resorts to 
definition, his case resting on his conception of the good 
life, which is the life man himself finds satisfactory, healthy, 
and harmonious. Maritain 1 s position is tied inseparably to 
:no 
the authority of the Roman Catholic church, and Ramsey takes 
refuge in the Blble as the true basis of ethical understanding. 
4) Each deals at some point with the major concerns of 
moral philosophy, but from different viewpoints and with 
varying degrees of importance. For instance, Stace stresses 
reason and sympathy, but shows definite weakness in his 
comprehension of religious values. Mari tain treats at great; 
length the worth of theological ethics and religious values, 
but reason is used only to fortifY the teachings of the 
church. Ramsey emphasizes love, making neighbor-love basic 
in the ethical situation, but philosophical person-centered 
ethics takes an inferior position. 
5) Each man's system is focalized around different 
emphases. Maritain builds his system around the church, the 
person, the common good, and the strength of authority. Stace 
rests his system on the primacies of reason and sympathy, a 
common human nature, the infinite value of the individual, 
the effectiveness of reason, and historical immanentism. 
Ramsey constructs his system on the reliability of the Bible 
as a source of ethical truth, love as an effective social 
medium, and the superiority of Christian motivation evoked 
in a God-man relationship. 
6) The greatest agreement among these three thinkers 
involves their view as to the need of universalism in 
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ethics, the nullifying effect of relativism, the possibility 
of man's attaining the good life, and the source of ethical 
motivation. The greatest disagreements are found in their 
methods of universalizing the ethical ideal, in their 
conceptions of the value of reason and experience, in their 
tests of trutn, and in their concepts of goodness. 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem of this dissertation is two-fold: (1) A 
study of the ethical theories of Jacques Maritain, Walter 
Terence Stace, and Paul Ramsey, and (2) an attempt to classify 
moral theories in the light of three basic types of relation 
between man, moral standards, and reality. 
The analysis, comparison, and critical study of the 
three representative moral theorists are correlated with a 
view to illustrating the kinds of issues involved in the 
reduction of the moral standards to three foci, as a novel 
and useful classification. Hence, the field of moral theory 
has been divided into three foci designated as Imposed Ethics, 
represented by Maritain, Immanent Ethics, represented by 
Stace, and Imparted Ethics, represented by Ramsey. It is 
believed that when properly defined most, if not all, ethical 
ideals will fall within one of these three classifications or 
a combination of them. 
Procedure. The method chosen to facilitate the investi-
gation places special stress on the definition of terms found 
in the classificatory foci. Consequently, the following 
meaning of terms is given: 
IMPOSED ETHICS. By Imposed Ethics is 
meant any conception of morality enjoined 
upon the adherent by a revealed fiat of God 
or by any arbitrary command of man, either 
verbal or written. 
IMMANENT ETHICS. By Immanent Ethics is 
meant a conception of morality as the 
expression of man's nature and experience, 
guiding his total behavior, whether the 
moral basis be human or divine. 
IMPARTED ETHICS. By Imparted Ethics is 
meant a conception of morality baaed on the 
conditioning of man's spiritual aelfhood 
always consequent upon a vital relationship 
between God and man in whic~ the moral 
incentive is imparted directly to man in a 
transforming experience occasioned by obedient 
love. 
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The eth~cal theories of Maritain, representing the 
position of the Roman Catholic church, Stace, an advocate of 
ethical humanism, and Ramsey, who defends a theory of Christian 
love, have been analyzed in order to isolate the basic 
principles involved. These fundamental positions have been 
compared under the classification used in the dissertation. 
The results of the research have been evaluated under common 
headings, such as the moral ideal, methodology, treatment of 
universality, treatment of relativism, and the nature of the 
good. Finally, some crucial issues emerging from the investi-
gation are considered. 
Classification. The process of classification encountered 
difficulties in some areas. An apparent over-lapping occurs at 
certain points. For instance, in the Imposed Et11.i ca of Mari tain 
some immanent factors are involved, calling for the exercise 
of the reason and will of the adherent. The involvement of 
these immanent aspects of personality does not, however, 
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violate the fundamental principle of the class, which requires 
that the authority in the moral situation be external to the 
subject and remain outside the subject regardless of the 
ensuing relationship effected between the source of authority 
and the adherent. Hence, the immanent powers of the subject 
are engaged in a subservient sense only, and the basic 
principle of classification is unaffected. 
Professor Stace himself, in The Destiny of Western Man, 
compares imposed ethics with immanent ethics, and makes 
substantially the same distinctions found in this dissertation. 
The fundamental distinction for Professor Stace, as well as 
for this writer, is that in Imposed Ethics the moral standard 
is enjoined by an arbitrary authority external to the subject, 
whereas in Immanent Ethics the moral standard is evoked in 
the rational process of life; morality is a human product. 
Further research revealed·a third level whic2 does not 
fall within the compass of either Imposed Ethics or Immanent 
Ethics. Professor Ramsey sets forth an ideal which cannot be 
distinctly identifted with either. Thus, it was found 
necessary to establish a third class of ethical theories to 
embrace his concept. For Ramsey, the moral ideal is not 
derived solely from an external or an immanent state, but it 
involves both in a vital relationship. The subject stands in 
a relationship of obedient love to the Source of ethical 
329 
value, which is designated as an imago Dei relationship between 
God and man. It is a study of morality in the light of the 
religious thought of the New Testament, according to Professor 
Ramsey. Imposed Ethics involves a rule enjoined by an 
external authority; Imparted Ethics is an image of love 
reflected. Man's part in Imparted Ethics is to submit to 
the imago Dei relationship and react in responsive love. 
God imparts His likeness to man in the same sense that a 
masterpiece of art imparts elegance to a room. God's effect, 
which is love, transforms and influences man in his total 
moral behavior. So long as man stands in the place of obedient 
love, the imparted image of God is reflected through the 
immanent function of his life. Man reflects the imago Dei in 
neighbor-love. Inasmuch as the moral ideal of Ramsey rests 
on an impartational rapport between God and man, the third 
type of ethical ideal is herein termed Imparted Ethics. 
Thus, even though there is an apparent over-lapping at 
secondary points in the classifications, the basic principle 
of individuation in each case remains unchanged so that the 
primary emphasis divides ethical theories into three major 
foci, denoted Imposed Ethics, Immanent Ethics, and Imparted 
Ethics. 
Philosophers and principles considered. Jacques 
Maritain, the leading contemporary philosopher of the Roman 
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Catholic church, conceives of morality as inhering in a unity 
of the natural and the supernatural, merged in the supra-
temporal function of the church. Maritain attempts to 
co-ordinate rational and theological ethics. Reason and 
natural law provide the natural basis while the sacraments 
of the church supply the supernatural ground. The rational 
part of Roman Catholic ethics is rooted in naturallaw, which 
historically goes back to Plato and Aristotle. In the 
Catholic tradition, natural law is supplemented by love, which 
is itself rooted in revealed law as a metaphysical ground. 
The Roman Catholic church claims exclusive rights to 
formulate and teach moral standards, which are deduced 
arbitrarily, despite its claim to philosophical discipline, 
and then imposed on its adherents in a conclusive juris-
dictional sway. A contradiction is seen in Maritain 1 s attempt 
to harmonize the well-known authoritarian element in the 
Catholic theory with the more universal law of reason. This 
non-rational authority exercised by the church reduces its 
position ultimately to impositionism in the field of morals. 
Hence, this type of ethi.cs is classified as imposed ethics. 
w. T. Stace, contemporary ethical humanist, bases his 
ethical ideal on the primacies of reason and sympathy; reason 
being derived from Greek philosophy and sympathy from 
• traditional Christianity. Stace holds that reason is needed 
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as the way-finder, or the intellectual light in the moral 
quest, whereas sympathy is needed as the motivational urge. 
With reason and sympathy primary, man should find his life 
satisfactory, human satisfacticn being the test of true 
morality. The ground of ethical living is in the co~~on 
human nature. Thus, men everywhere ought to find a certain 
kind of life satisfactory, healthy, and harmonious. Stace 
does not say that all men will agree as to the satisfactory 
life, but that they ought to. 
Professor Stace loons heavily on historical immanentism, 
making especially strong appeals to Plato. Morality is grounded 
in human nature, which is self-sufficient in that it embodies 
the two factors, reason and sympathy, necessary to the attain-
ment of the satisfactory life. Stace does not give supernatural 
ground to sympathy, as does traditional Christianity; it is a 
capacity which all men possess. The standards of morality, 
therefore, are inseparably related to man 1 s natural expression, 
only the immanent situation being involved. Consequently, 
Stacets theory is classified as immanent ethics. 
Paul RaiJB ey, contemporary Christian ethicist, sets forth 
a thesis which he calls an ethics of the fleformation, in which 
he inculcates elements of St. Augustine, Luther, and 
Kierkegaard, In this concept, which he calls transformism, the 
subject is changed and influenced through a relationship to God, 
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in Which the subject reflects the imago Dei. In this trans-
formation is born the strong motivation of neighbor-love, 
which becomes the social basis of the ethical quest. 
According to Professor Ramsey, man is but a reflector 
of the love of God, a consequent contingent upon the position 
of man before God in total obedience. On that account, the 
ethical standard does not rest in an external authority, nor 
does it reduce simply to an expressi cn of human nature. 
Both of these factors are involved in the imago Dei relation-
ship by which the inadequacy of each is overcome in the 
impartation of God's likeness to man. Therefore, the concept 
of ethics held by Professor Ramsey is called imparted et..l-tics. 
Estimates and Assessments. 
1) The three ideals herein classified (imposed, immanent, 
and imparted ethics) represent a reduction of the moral 
standards and theories to their fundamental foci. 
2) The ideas proposed by Maritain, Stace, and Ramsey are 
not original with them: Maritain 1 s ideal being the historical 
view of the Roman Catholic church, Stace 1 s ideal rooting in 
Greek philosophy and the Christian tradition, and Ramsey's 
ideal being derived in a large pert from the fundamental 
principles of St. Augustine, Luther, and Kierke gaard. 
3) None of the three thinkers is as true to the science 
of ethics as that discipline presupposes. Stace resorts to 
definition, his case resting an his conception of the good 
life, which is the life man himself finds satisfactory, 
healthy, and harmonious. Maritain's position is tied 
inseparably to the authority of the Roman Catholic church, 
and Ramsey takes refuge in the Bible as the true basis of 
ethical understanding. 
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4) Each deals at some point with the major concerns of 
moral philosophy, but from different viewpoints and with 
varying degrees of importance. For instm ce, Stace stresses 
reaaon and sympathy, but shows definite weakness in the 
relation of ethics to religion. Maritain treats at great 
length the worth of theological ethics and religious values, 
but reason is used only to fortify the teachings of the 
church. Ramsey emphasizes love, making neighbor-love basic 
in the ethical situation, but philosophical person-centered 
ethics takes an inferior position. 
5) Each man's system is focalized around different 
emphases. Maritain builds his system around the church, the 
person, the common good, and the strength of authority. Stace 
rests his system an the primacies of reason and sympathy, 
a common human nature, the infinite value of the individual, 
the effectiveness of reason, and historical immanentism. 
Ramsey constructs his system on the reliability of the Bible 
as a source of ethical truth, love as an effective social 
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medium, and the superiority of Christian motivation evoked 
in a God-man relationship. 
6) The greatest agreement among these three thinkers 
involves their views as to the need of universalism in ethics, 
the nullifying effect of relativism, the possibility of man's 
attaining the good life, and the source of ethical motivation. 
The greatest disagreements are found in their methods of 
universalizing the ethical ideal, in their conceptions of the 
value of reason and experience, in their tests of truth, and 
in their concepts of goodness. 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
The youngest of five children, 
Mel-Thomas Rothwell was born, June 24, 
190~ to Thomas and Lavina Rothwell on 
a farm near Port Huron, Michigan. He 
attended the rural school and later 
Port Huron High School. 
He was a writer and reporter on 
the Port Huron Times Herald from 1926-
35. He resigned that position in 1935 
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to attend Owosso Bible College in preparation for the ministry. 
He was graduated from that institution in 1938 as valadlctorian 
of his class. That fall he entered Central State Teachers' 
college in Mt. Pleasant, Michigan. Becoming interested in 
philosophy, he transferred to the Ohio University after one 
term. He was graduated with honors from the Ohio University 
in 1941. He was granted a master of arts in philosophy by 
the University of M1chigan in 1943. 
On May 29, 1943, the night of graduation from the 
University of Michigan, he was married to Helen F. Francis, 
Nelsonville, o., a fellow in the department of English in 
Ohio University. They were in the same graduating class, 
Mr. Rothwell receiving his bachelor of arts degree in philosophy 
and Mrs. Rothwell her master of arts in English. They taught 
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two years in Owosso Bible College, and then accepted positions 
in Eastern Nazarene College, Wollaston, Massachusetts, where 
Mr. Rothwell is head of the department of philosophy and Mrs. 
Rothwell is associate professor in English and languages. 
One son, Paul David, was born to them, February 21, 1948, 
Mr. Rothwell has travelled extensively in religious 
and educational work. He has written numerous articles for 
religious periodicals. He is co-author with Mrs. Rothwell 
of A Catechism on the Christian Religion, 
